Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms: An Investigation of Networks in the Making by Iarossi, Juliana
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Business Administration Dissertations Programs in Business Administration
Summer 7-24-2012
Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms:
An Investigation of Networks in the Making
Juliana Iarossi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/bus_admin_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Programs in Business Administration at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Iarossi, Juliana, "Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms: An Investigation of Networks in the Making." Dissertation, Georgia
State University, 2012.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/bus_admin_diss/8
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   1	  
	  	  	  
	  
PERMISSION TO BORROW 
 
 
 
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from 
Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available for inspection 
and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type.  I agree that permission 
to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his/her 
absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in his absence, by the Dean of the 
Robinson College of Business.  Such quoting, copying, or publishing must be solely for the scholarly 
purposes and does not involve potential financial gain.  It is understood that any copying from or 
publication of this dissertation which involves potential gain will not be allowed without written permission 
of the author. 
 
 
 
Juliana Iarossi 
 	  
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   2	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
 
 
NOTICE TO BORROWERS 
 
 
 
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in accordance with 
the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement. 
 
The author of this dissertation is: 
 
Juliana Iarossi 
4260 West Club Lane 
Atlanta, Georgia 30319 
 
The director of this dissertation is: 
 
Mark Keil 
Department of Computer Information Systems 
Robinson College of Business 
Georgia State University 
P.O. Box 4015 
Atlanta, Georgia 30302-4015	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   3	  
 
 
 
 
Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms: 
An Investigation of Networks in the Making 
 
 
BY 
 
 
Juliana Iarossi 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Executive Doctorate in Business 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2012 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   4	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Copyright by 
Juliana Iarossi 
2012 
 	  
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   5	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the Juliana Iarossi Dissertation Committee.  It has 
been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Executive Doctorate in Business in the J. Mack Robinson 
College of Business of Georgia State University. 
 
 
 H. Fenwick Huss, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
 
Mark Keil 
Lars Mathiassen 
Benjamin M. Oviatt  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   6	  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Path Building in Emerging Entrepreurial Firms; 
An investigation of Networks in the Making 
 
BY 
 
Juliana Iarossi 
 
July 24, 2012 
 
 
Committee Chair: Mark Keil 
 
Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business 
 
 
Underpinning economic growth is the emergence of entrepreneurial ventures with the potential to grow 
that boost job creation and provide new sources of products for mature companies.  The critical role 
associated with new firms, underscores the importance of understanding how entrepreneurship unfolds.  
Network-based research, while leading the way to rich empirical studies provides a limited understanding 
of how entrepreneurial networks are built and their impact on the emergence of a new venture.  
Employing a multiple case study design and a perspective based on organizational path building, three 
young technology ventures were investigated in terms of the formation of networks around five key 
entrepreneurial activities defined by entrepreneurs.   Rich insight into new venture emergence is 
presented in terms of the reciprocal relationship between specific activities enacted by entrepreneurs and 
the networks that form to execute those activities revealing the path building mechanisms that evolve to 
drive network development.  The findings of this research not only contribute to theories of new venture 
emergence, but also offer an interesting opportunity for future research into factors that may influence the 
outcome of entrepreneurial ventures and provide practical insight for organizations seeking to sustain or 
develop an entrepreneurial path. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Research Problem and Perspective 
The critical role of entrepreneurial firms in terms of job creation (Kane, 2010) and as fuel for new ideas 
and products for mature companies (Stangler & Kedrosky, 2010; Tatum, 2008), coupled with the risk 
inherent in the formation of new firms (Reedy & Litan, 2011; Shane, 2008; Stangler & Kedrosky, 2010), 
underscores the need for an understanding of entrepreneurship in order to “speed the outcomes desired 
by enterprising individuals, firms and societies” (Busenitz et al., 2003, p. 286).  Yet, despite this general 
recognition of the importance of entrepreneurial companies, especially innovative startups with potential 
for growth, the dynamics of new company formation are not well understood (Shane & Cable, 2002; 
Stangler & Kedrosky, 2010).    
 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 217), in their widely cited article on the field of entrepreneurship, 
argue that the lack of a conceptual framework has been an obstacle to the study of this phenomenon and 
that “…entrepreneurship has become a broad label under which a hodgepodge of research is housed.”  
During almost a half century of research, the study of entrepreneurship has been characterized by 
“prolific debate” over “the merits” of research approaches (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001, p. 41) where current 
theories of the firm “are inadequate to inform our understanding of entrepreneurship” (Sarasvathy, 2004, 
p. 529) and have “almost always led either to “mixed” results…or have actually raised challenges to 
dominant wisdom…” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 113).  Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2011, 
p. 114) recently asked the question, “What if we have been thinking about entrepreneurship the wrong 
way?”   
 
An increasing body of empirical evidence supports the concept of entrepreneurship as a process of co-
creating opportunities with multiple stakeholders (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011).  In this context, 
entrepreneurship is the endogenous emergence of opportunities (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 60) “where the 
firm is a mortal implement that entrepreneurs and other stakeholders can use to shape the future 
according to their individual and/or collective imagination…an evolving phenomenon that is contingent 
upon particular founders/stakeholders…” (Sarasvathy, 2004, p. 522).  At the heart of this 
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conceptualization of entrepreneurship is an intricate web of relationships with stakeholders known as the 
entrepreneurial network (Larson & Starr, 1993) through which founding entrepreneurs access resources 
necessary to launch the new venture (Busenitz et al., 2003). Thus, this research employs a network 
perspective to the study of the emergence of entrepreneurial firms. 
 
The network perspective has been a widely accepted area of inquiry in the field of entrepreneurship 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Although no one doubts the central role of networks in the emergence of 
entrepreneurial firms, findings from this stream of research remain contradictory and theoretical models 
abundant (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).  And, despite the abundance in literature, 
Sarasvathy (2008) concedes that “[c]urrently, there is very little theoretical light to be shed on how such a 
network of stakeholders comes to be” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 8).  In a recent essay that considers 
entrepreneurship as a method, Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2011, p. 126), shared the following insight 
into the state of network-based research: 
An exhaustive search of the literature turned up virtually no journal articles on details of the 
numerous relationships and deals that entrepreneurs routinely negotiate with a wide variety of 
stakeholders…over four decades of empirical work has not even scratched the surface of 
intersubjective interactions between entrepreneurs and their stakeholders…Almost the entirety of 
social networks research takes networks as mostly given and outside the control of human action, 
hence not a source of valuable input into developing a method of doing entrepreneurship. 
This research contributes to this body of literature by providing a glimpse of what can be learned if we 
think about entrepreneurship in a different way. It seeks to increase the explanatory power of network-
based research in two respects: (1) by studying new venture emergence as a function of many networks 
formed around distinct entrepreneurial activities and (2) by investigating the process of venture 
emergence and network building using a path building perspective. 
 
Network-based research has largely studied the entrepreneurial network as a broad, single entity with ill-
defined boundaries and has treated resource mobilization as an undifferentiated activity.  Building on 
Feld’s (1981) theory of networks as organizations of individuals around a specific focus and Fombrun’s 
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(1982) argument for analyzing the separate networks and interrelationships among networks of a firm, I 
show that a deeper understanding of how entrepreneurship unfolds can be gained by disaggregating a 
firm’s networks according to key activities of new ventures.  Informed by interviews from an initial 
screening of 13 entrepreneurs, five key entrepreneurial activities where identified as activities around 
which distinct networks are built in a new venture.  In taking this approach, I extend the findings of 
Lechner and Dowling (2003) and Lechner et al. (2006) by using the networks formed around different foci 
as the conduit to study the emergence of entrepreneurial firms.   
 
Path building theories represent another body of literature that addresses the process of emergence and 
organizational development.  Although scholars acknowledge entrepreneurship as a phenomenon of 
“muddled circumstances” and an “untidy reality” (Gartner & Birley, 2002, p. 394), network-based literature 
in entrepreneurship largely portrays the entrepreneurial process as a process that begins with conception 
of an idea and progresses through predictable stages (Coviello, 2006; Evald, Klyver, & Svendsen, 2006; 
Greve & Salaff, 2003; Hite, 1998, 2001; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Jack, Dodd, & Anderson, 2008; Larson & 
Starr, 1993; Lechner et al., 2006; Pirolo & Presutti, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010). As Shane (2008) 
concedes, “[t]he reality is much messier.”  Recent research is beginning to describe the emergence of 
entrepreneurial firms as nonlinear, recursive, participatory and iterative (Pacheco, York, Dean, & 
Sarasvathy, 2010) where the starting point for entrepreneurial firms differs and the activities in which they 
engage to build their companies vary and do not occur in a set order (Shane, 2008, loc. 1306). Indeed a 
growing body of empirical evidence suggests that prescriptive and deterministic theories that have 
dominated network-based entrepreneurship research are inconsistent with and have limited the 
understanding of this phenomenon (McKelvey, 2004; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009b; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 
2010).  
 
Path dependence theory, originating in the ‘80’s to describe technology development, implies a tapering 
of scope, choice and action where initial decisions can lead to a narrow path of decision-making 
characterized by rigidity and lock-in.  Sydow et al. (2009) suggest the term path dependence has become 
a broad label that lacks a theoretical framework with which to evaluate this phenomenon in organizations. 
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They bring path dependency into the organizational arena and explain the organizational path in terms of 
three phases of development (preformation, formation and lock-in) where the progressive narrowing of 
alternatives and action is the result of a self-reinforcing feedback cycle.   
 
Pervasive in network-based entrepreneurship research, is the use of path dependence to describe the 
process of network development in new ventures.  However, descriptions of network development as a 
path dependent process are inconsistent. While some researchers describe network development as path 
dependent in the early stages only (Hite, 2005; Hite & Hesterly, 2001), others suggest this process may 
be present at all stages of development (Coviello, 2006; Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Sarasvathy, 2008; 
Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010) or not until later in development of at all (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007). In 
addition, the term path-dependence in the network-based literature is not clearly defined or is implied to 
mean the opposite of “intentionally managed” and outside the control of the firm (Hite, 2005; Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001), refers to strong ties (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Greve & Salaff, 2003; Jack, 2005)  or is 
explicitly defined as “reliant on history and chance” (Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010, p. 35).  Whether or not 
the term has been misapplied or simply not thoroughly examined when applied in the context of new 
venture network research, I suggest the lack of a uniform conceptualization of path dependence presents 
an obstacle to understanding the process of network formation and new venture emergence.  This study, 
therefore applies the model of organizational path dependence offered by Sydow et al. (2009) as a 
common perspective for network-based research.  But clarifying the definition of the process of path 
dependence also requires that we identify and establish the definition for processes that are not path 
dependent, processes that accommodate the progressive, regressive and pluralistic nature of the 
entrepreneurial process. 
 
McKelvey (2004, p. 337) argues that “[e]ntrepreneurship is about order creation” and an emerging group 
of scholars are calling for a greater focus on what goes on inside networks to access resources in terms 
of the “productive interaction” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 126) between actors in the network 
that includes the “discussions, debate, and experimentation” (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnoe, 2010, p. 
768) that occurs in the development of new organizations.   Indeed, Sydow et al. (2009, p. 705) speculate 
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that the emergence of paths might be explained by “creative agency” through a theory of intentional path 
creation and suggest further examination of the path-building process at both the network and individual 
level.  In the context of emerging entrepreneurial ventures, the path creation perspective may offer new 
potential for an understanding of emerging entrepreneurial firms as ‘networks in the making’1 (Garud et 
al., 2010).   
 
Path creation shares similarities with the preformation phase of the framework described by Sydow et al. 
(2009) where the scope of the path is unrestricted and decisions unconstrained.  However, in contrast to 
path dependence where paths simply occur and self-reinforcing feedback narrows the path, path creation 
emphasizes the entrepreneurial agency and the accumulating of inputs from a multiplicity of actors where 
learning from failure and feedback create opportunity and new paths. This conceptualization of 
organizational emergence does not imply that the path creation process is permanent and persistent 
throughout new venture formation.  In fact, it is plausible that at some point the mechanism for 
organizational path building may change from path creation to path dependent mode.  This, however, 
would challenge theoretical and empirical models that present new venture emergence as a path 
dependent process that becomes increasingly intentionally managed (path creation) or occurs throughout 
emergence.  
 
This research adds to the understanding of how “a network of stakeholders comes to be” (Sarasvathy, 
2008, p. 8) by examining the paths through which new entrepreneurial firms emerge from a collective and 
multi-stakeholder effort to develop new things or new ways of doing things (Schumpeter, 2008). The 
entrepreneur is seen here as the catalyst or instigating agent (McKelvey, 2004) who pursues and builds 
relationships with various actors to create networks of stakeholders that facilitate access to resources 
critical to the growth of a new venture.  Specifically, I depart from dominant models of past research by 
(1) using as a conduit for research, five distinct activities identified by entrepreneurs to explore the 
interactions and exchanges within the networks that form around those activities and (2) employing a path 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I thank committee member, Lars Mathiassen, for this catchy phrase. 
2 Sarasvathy (2008, pp. 61-62) specifically distinguishes logic, “an internally consistent set of ideas that 
form a clear basis for action upon the world,” from theory, “a statement about the truth or otherwise of 
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building perspective to study the process of emergence of those networks.. The findings answer the 
following research question: 
How do networks shape and how are networks shaped by the distinctive entrepreneurial activities 
that support the emergence of a new technology venture? 
1.2 The Research Approach 
 
In order to answer the research question a multiple case study design was conducted. The literature 
confirms that qualitative research and in-depth case studies are beginning to provide an understanding of 
“how to do entrepreneurship” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 116) and is, therefore, the 
appropriate approach to address the research question.   
 
Principles of engaged scholarship (Van De Ven, 2007) guided and shaped this research.  To understand 
issues and challenges around new venture emergence from a stakeholder perspective, I tapped into my 
network of business professionals that invested in and advised young technology ventures, including 
venture capitalists, attorneys, CPAs and firms that provide interim executives to startup companies.  
These individuals also provided a gateway to technology entrepreneurs.   An initial sampling of founders 
from 13 young technology ventures were interviewed to “discuss and explain what concepts might be 
used to observe this phenomenon” (Van De Ven, 2007, p. 24).   The interviews helped identify five key 
entrepreneurial activities critical to the building of a new venture.  From this initial sampling, three 
entrepreneurial ventures were identified for an in-depth study of the networks that form around these key 
entrepreneurial activities and co-develop with the new venture.  Semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders critical to the execution of each activity provided rich empirical data detailing the building, 
dismantling and reconstruction of the networks associated with each activity from the origination of 
relationships with interested individuals to their transformation to committed stakeholders within the 
network.   
1.3 Overview of Dissertation Content 
The details of this study will be presented as follows: 
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o Chapter 2 provides a discussion of network-based literature from a structural, relational and 
strategic standpoint and frames the theoretical framework in terms of two path-building 
perspectives (path dependence and path creation) and a priori criteria developed for data 
analysis.  Following this discussion, the opportunity for this research is presented. 
o Chapter 3 details the case study design, including criteria and justification for selection of cases, 
collection of data through semi-structured interviews and analysis using a path-building 
framework to guide coding and identification of emergent themes.  Limitations of the research 
design are discussed. 
o Chapter 4 presents, for each case, an overview using the path building framework, followed by a 
discussion of the interaction between networks and the key entrepreneurial activities that 
occurred as the paths of the new venture were being built and the mode(s) of path building that 
drove network building.   A cross-case analysis supports and supplements emergent themes 
while highlighting differences among the cases, especially as a function of the source of funding. 
o Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the contributions of this research as an example of engaged 
scholarship and to organizational path building literature and network-based entrepreneurship 
literature.  Implications for future research in terms of a new model for firm emergence as well as 
practical applications for entrepreneurial ventures are discussed. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 	  
2.1 Network-Based Research in Entrepreneurship 
At the heart of this research is the assumption that entrepreneurship involves a process of collaboration 
and organization to enact new things or new ways of doing things.  Critical to enabling this process, 
however, is the mobilization of resources by the entrepreneur.  While no one disputes the importance of 
resource mobilization to the entrepreneur, the mechanism through which a young venture extracts 
resources from its environment is less understood.  One body of research in entrepreneurship examines 
the emergence of entrepreneurial firms in terms of the complex network of relationships that enable 
access to resources.  In fact, previous research suggests the entrepreneurial venture and its networks 
actually co-develop (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Larson & Starr, 1993; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).  Indeed, 
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Johannisson (2011, p. 139) offers the following analogy: “The personal network is to the entrepreneur 
what the stick is to the blind (wo)man.” Therefore, an important underpinning of this research is the use of 
the entrepreneurial network as a relevant proxy to study emergence of the entrepreneurial firm. 
 
2.1.1 Approaches in Network-Based Research 
The network perspective originated as an important area of inquiry within the field of entrepreneurship 
during the 1980’s (Bhagavatula, 2009; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). This perspective asserts that the 
entrepreneur is embedded in complex social networks that facilitate or constrain access to resources and 
opportunities (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). Within this body of 
literature there are two distinct approaches: research that utilizes a structural approach to model the 
formation of networks and the emergence of entrepreneurial firms and research that employs an 
interactional or relational view to understand and model the entrepreneurial process.  
 
The first approach in this body of literature seeks to describe entrepreneurial outcomes or firm 
performance in terms of the structural attributes and features of the network.  This view of the network 
has its roots in the ‘strength of weak ties’ theory of Granovetter (1973) and illuminates the mechanism 
through which resources are exchanged in terms of the strength of relationships within the network 
(Granovetter, 1973), the density of the network and holes within the network (Burt, 1992), the “cohesion” 
and “closure” within the network (Coleman, 1988) and the intersection of cohesive networks (Vedres & 
Stark, 2010).  This stream of research has advanced an understanding of the varied nature and patterns 
of relationships between actors within a network and across networks (Aarstad, Haugland, & Greve, 
2010; Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Evald et al., 2006; Fritsch & Kauffeld-Monz, 2010; Greve & Salaff, 2003; 
Jack, 2005; Pirolo & Presutti, 2010; Shane & Cable, 2002; Smith & Lohrke, 2008; Tang, Kacmar, & 
Busenitz, 2009; Vissa, 2009; Zhang, Soh, & Wong, 2010).  Absent from this understanding of the 
variations in networks, however, is the role of agency on the part network actors.  Thus, it leaves the door 
open for research that focuses on the interactions and exchanges within networks that contribute to the 
emergence of entrepreneurial firms. 
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In contrast, research on network actor interaction and relational embeddedness emphasizes the role that 
entrepreneurial action plays in network formation and the movement and management of actors within 
those networks (Coviello, 2006; Hite, 2005; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Larson, 1992; Larson & Starr, 1993; 
Uzzi, 1996, 1997).   While scholars agree this body of research is beginning to move beyond descriptions 
of network formation, some concede that it still “lacks a rich understanding of when, how, and why” 
(Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010, p. 48) “a network of stakeholders comes to be” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 8).  
To address these issues, a stream of research has emerged that specifically focuses on the strategic 
nature of network relationships and “emphasizes how firms and individuals actively shape their approach 
to tie formation through thoughtful agency” (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012, p. 36).   This relational-strategic 
approach offers rich opportunity for exploration of network dynamics with the potential to contribute 
texture and context to models of entrepreneurial firm emergence. 
 
2.1.2 Disaggregating the Entrepreneurial Network 
Network-based literature is comprised of a number of competing research perspectives that may account 
for mixed findings and at the same time offer opportunity for further investigation into how entrepreneurial 
ventures and networks co-develop. While network-based research in entrepreneurship largely presents 
the entrepreneurial network as one entity engaged in multiple serial or concurrent activities (Hite, 2005; 
Jack, 2005; Larson & Starr, 1993; Sarasvathy, 2008; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010), some researchers 
study it in terms of a specific activity, such as raising capital (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2008, 2012; Shane & 
Cable, 2002); others view it in terms networks developing in firms with certain attributes (Coviello, 2006; 
Elfring & Hulsink, 2007; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
 
Feld (1981, p. 2) suggests that networks are a function of organization around a specific shared focus.   
A focus is defined as a social, psychological, legal, or physical entity around which joint activities 
are organized…As a consequence of interaction associated with their joint activities, individuals 
whose activities are organized around the same focus will tend to become interpersonally tied 
and form a cluster.  
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Feld (1981, p. 1) also refers to this as the “focused organization.”  Through his focus model, Feld (1981, 
p. 10) presents the basis for an explanation of how individuals organize their relations in the context of a 
shared focus and suggests that individuals can “invent a focus around which to combine activities of 
various others” (Figure 2.1.2-1).  Lechner et al. (2006), citing Fombrun (1982), depict the organizational 
environment as an “aggregate network” that can be viewed as “an overlapping set of networks” where 
“[t]he only conceptually meaningful strategy of analysis is to distinguish each network by its content, 
analyze it as a separate network, and look at the interrelationships among the different networks” 
(Fombrun, 1982, p. 280).    
 
                                            
Figure 2.1.2-1. The Dynamics of the Focus Model: “ Individuals can find or invent a focus around which to 
combine activities of various others…” (Feld, 1981, p. 11)  
 
The research reported here conceptualizes new ventures as such a set of multiple interlocking networks 
where the “patterns of clustering” around distinct foci (Feld, 1981, p.10) within these networks 
corresponds to specific entrepreneurial activities that engage people both internal and external to the new 
venture.  In other words, different entrepreneurial activities within a young venture may produce not one 
but many distinct networks each focused on mobilizing a specific resource or attaining a certain goal.  
Thus, the new venture itself is not defined by clear boundaries but by the multiple networks that link 
individuals and organizations.  Indeed, it is this permeability and fluidity of the new venture boundaries 
3/21/11 8:17 PMThe Focused Organization of Social Ties
Page 11 of 21http://smg.media.mit.edu/classes/library/feld.focused.ties/feld.html
I will list five basic focus theory propositions, predictions of the likelihood of ties
between dyads based upon the number and types of foci that they share. Then the
same five propositions will be adapted to make predictions concerning transitivity,
bridging, and density of personal networks. These propositions have been
informally discussed and explained in the preceding sections and are formally
stated here to avoid theoretical ambiguity and to allow for empirical testing.
Basic Propositions
Proposition 1.- Two individuals who are related to the same focus are more likely
to be tied than two people not so related.
Propo ition 2.-If two individuals are related to the same focus, the more
constraining the focus, the more likely it is that they will be tied.
Proposition 3.- The more different foci that two individuals share, the more likely it
is that they will be tied.
Proposition 4.-Where two individuals are each tied to a third, based upon a
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that makes it difficult to clearly distinguish the firm from the environment in which it operates unless the 
firm is disaggregated and analyzed in terms of the distinct activity-based networks.  Therefore, the 
disaggregation of the entrepreneurial network is likely to yield new insight into network formation. 
 
Such an analysis builds on the description by Lechner and Dowling (2003) and Lechner et al. (2006) 
pertaining to the “relational mix” of networks, networks formed around different categories of relationships 
or different resources exchanged.  Lechner and Dowling (2003, p. 10) reported that “firms used different 
types of networks to realize growth…” Based on this earlier finding, Lechner et al. (2006) subsequently 
showed how the mix of different networks changes over the life cycle of an emerging venture.  Lechner 
and Dowling (2003) and Lechner et al. (2006) used five different networks to examine the role of different 
networks on the development of the entrepreneurial firm: social networks, reputational networks, 
marketing information networks, co-opetition networks, co-operative technology networks.  While not all of 
the network types conceptualized by Lechner and Dowling (2003) were found to be good discriminators of 
performance or successful network development in a subsequent study (Lechner et al., 2006), this body 
of work demonstrates the efficacy of studying entrepreneurship in terms of disaggregated networks. The 
conceptualization of the entrepreneurial networks in this manner, however, is vulnerable to multiple 
interpretations and as a result, presents challenges as a tool for data collection and translation into 
practice.  Consequently, few scholars have extended their work.    
 
A number of researchers have attempted to conceptualize the entrepreneurial network in terms of specific 
entrepreneurial tasks or patterns of activity that influence network development.  Coviello and Cox (2006) 
provide evidence that different types of resources (physical, human, functional, organizational) are 
exchanged through different activities (mobilization, acquisition, development) in the organizational 
network at different evolutionary stages of an international new venture.  Elfring and Hulsink (2007) 
studied how firm network formation was influenced by, among other things, key entrepreneurial tasks, 
defined as spotting opportunity, acquiring resources, and gaining legitimacy.   While Santos and 
Eisenhardt (2009) found that nascent firms engaged in three different processes or activities when 
shaping firm boundaries: claiming, demarcating and controlling a market.  Anderson et al. (2010) 
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observed that networking practices of entrepreneurs pursuing growth involved the following activities: 
liberating themselves from mundane activities, inspiring others in co-exploration, turning inspiration into a 
vision, articulating the product or service, and implementation of the plan.  Valuable as they are, all these 
studies investigate network formation around attributes perceived as important by the researchers.  At 
this early stage of entrepreneur network research, it is also potentially valuable to let the entrepreneurs 
themselves define the attributes around which entrepreneurial networks form, then determine whether 
such networks have explanatory power.  
 
In this research, activities identified by entrepreneurs are used as a conduit for studying new venture 
emergence.  Three processes of network development or path building from the existing literature provide 
the theoretical lens for understanding the unfolding of networks around entrepreneurial activities: 
entrepreneurial effectuation, path dependence and path creation.  
2.2 The Process of Network Development 
2.2.1 Entrepreneurial Effectuation 
Entrepreneurial action and the creation of a network of committed stakeholders are central to an 
emerging method or logic 2  of entrepreneurship developed by Sarasvathy (2004, 2008) known as 
“entrepreneurial effectuation”.  Effectuation, born from a study of theoretical decision-making by “expert” 
entrepreneurs, describes entrepreneurship as a process of network development that “transforms extant 
realities into new markets” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p.101).  In the effectual framework, the founding 
entrepreneur begins with a unique set of means and seeks to increase resources to the emerging venture 
by “stitching together a variety of stakeholder commitments” and “shaping committed ingredients into 
unanticipated new confections” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p. 120).  Arising from this process is 
a network of committed stakeholders who actively participate in shaping the new venture (Sarasvathy, 
2008).  “Unmoored” from specific goals, the goals of the effectual network change based on the 
composition of stakeholders who comprise the network.  As a result, the boundaries of the network and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sarasvathy (2008, pp. 61-62) specifically distinguishes logic, “an internally consistent set of ideas that 
form a clear basis for action upon the world,” from theory, “a statement about the truth or otherwise of 
phenomenon of the world.” 
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indeed the new venture itself, are fluid spanning both the organization and its environment as it creates 
new markets and alternatives (Sarasvathy, 2008).   
 
In contrast to Lechner and Dowling (2003), Lechner et al. (2006) and this study, however, Sarasvathy 
(2008) limits the conceptualization of the effectual network to a single network of stakeholders.  In 
addition, the description of network development that emerges from effectual logic was derived from the 
researcher’s interpretation of entrepreneurial action based on responses by practicing entrepreneurs to 
hypothetical problems or activities extracted from “informal consultations”, “case studies and histories of 
startups” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p.23).  Thus, further development of entrepreneurial effectuation may be 
achieved by studying the emergence of entrepreneurial ventures in terms of multiple interlocking 
networks of stakeholders that form around entrepreneurial activities explicitly identified by founding 
entrepreneurs as important.   
 
Sarasvathy’s (2008) work contrasts with the research reported here in an additional way.  While extolling 
the importance of purposeful entrepreneurial agency in building a network of committed stakeholders, 
Sarasvathy explicitly describes effectuation as a “intrinsically path-dependent” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 38) 
and offers a typology of  how new networks are initiated and developed that includes “random chance”, 
“some path-dependent fashion” or “through the deliberate activation of an existing network” (Sarasvathy, 
2008, p. 117). The ability of the effectual entrepreneur to “control the shape of the future to the extent it is 
controllable through human action” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 116), however, appears to be inconsistent with 
the more passive role of the entrepreneur implied by path dependence (Sydow et al., 2009).  A deeper 
understanding of path dependence and exploration of another process of emergence, path creation, may 
shed light on whether effectual logic describes a distinct process of emergence, is a path dependent 
process or a combination of path building processes. 
 
2.2.2 Path Dependence in Network-Based Research 
While it is generally understood that the emergence of entrepreneurial firms follows a path that is 
nonlinear, recursive and iterative (Pacheco et al., 2010), the entrepreneurial process in network-based 
literature is frequently described in terms of path dependence (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Jack et al., 2008; 
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Lechner et al., 2006; Sarasvathy, 2008; Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 
2010) where the network and new venture are assumed to co-develop in predictable stages (Aarstad et 
al., 2010; Hite, 1998; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Larson & Starr, 1993; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).   There 
are two limitations with this approach.   
 
First, emerging empirical evidence suggests that the historical bias toward the application of prescriptive 
and deterministic theories has limited the understanding of entrepreneurship (McKelvey, 2004; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009a; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).   Indeed, models that are “overly prescriptive”, as 
Slotte-Kock and Coviello (2010, p. 52) suggest, “do[es] not allow for sufficient innovation…”  in a 
phenomenon described by McKelvey (2004) as “order creation.”  Second, the meaning of path 
dependence as a description of the entrepreneurial process is unclear.  Scholars of organizational path 
dependence suggest that the term has been broadly used as a “metaphorical” (Sydow et al., 2009, p.689) 
explanation of “how certain aspects of the past relate to current properties of the organization” (Vergne & 
Durand, 2010, p. 738).  In reality, path dependence as a construct is ambiguous and subject to different 
interpretations(Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010).    Since it is not clear whether the use of 
path dependence as a construct in network-based literature is intentional, a misapplication or simply not 
thoroughly developed, further exploration of this construct and its role in the emergence of entrepreneurial 
ventures offers an additional opportunity for research.  
 
The path dependent perspective originated in the 80’s to describe the process that constitutes 
technological paths that led to sub-optimal or inefficient technologies.  The best known example is the 
case study by Paul David (1985 and 1986) which explains the dominance and persistence of the 
QWERTY keyboard despite the availability of more efficient designs (Sydow et al., 2009).  However, it is 
W.B. Arthur (1989 and 1994) who is credited with modeling this phenomenon in terms of four principles: 
nonpredictability, nonergodicity, inflexibility and inefficiency (Sydow et al., 2009).   
 
Path dependence has gained acceptance in the organizational arena as a construct to describe the 
creation of new institutions and the mechanism through which they become locked-in to a pattern of 
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action (Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010).  However, it has also become the catch all for 
theories where “history matters” (Vergne & Durand, 2010, p. 736).  Vergne and Durand (2010, p. 741) 
argue that this is a mistake since “not every historical process is path dependent.”  They point out that 
categorizing theories such as absorptive capacity, resource accumulation, institutional persistence and 
imprinting as path dependent diminishes the value of path dependence as a distinct perspective since, its 
broad use implies, for example, that “both persistence and its opposite” can be explained by one theory 
(Vergne & Durand, 2010, p. 739).  In order to avoid theoretical confusion, this study adopts the narrower 
definition of path dependence of Sydow et al. (2009)and Vergne and Durand (2010) as presented below. 
 
Noting a need for a theoretical framework to clarify the dynamics of path dependence, Sydow et al. 
(2009) suggest a three-phase model for organizational development: preformation phase, formation 
phase and lock-in phase (Fig. 2.1.2-1).  Their model describes a tapering of scope, choice and action in 
an organization where initial decisions lead to an increasingly constrained pattern of decision-making.   
 
 
Figure 2.2.2-1.  The Constitution of an Organizational Path (Sydow et al., 2009, p. 692) 
 
In the first phase, preformation, the scope of organizational decisions is broad, decisions unconstrained 
and the outcome unknown.  However, the culmination of the initial decisions and choices inherently 
embedded in certain routines, practices or strategies (anchored in a history carried into the organization) 
692 Academy oí Management Review October
The transition from Phase II to Phase III—the
Lock-in Phase—is characterized by a further
constriction, which eventually leads to a lock-
in—that is, the dominant decision pattern be-
comes fixed and gains a deterministic charac-
ter; eventually, the actions are fully bound to a
path. One particular choice or action pattern has
become the predominant mode, and flexibility
has been lost. Even new entrants into this field
of action cannot refrain from adopting it. When
more efficient alternatives are available, indi-
viduals' and organizations' decision processes
and established practices continue to reproduce
this and only this particular outcome. The occur-
rence of a lock-in renders a system potentially
inefficient, because it loses its capability to
adopt better alternatives.
Figure 1 illustrates the process across the
three stages. Th s d fferentiated framework is
intended as a general model of path depen-
dence; its fu ctioning, however, is likely to diff
from context to context according to the prevail-
ing conditions, particularly market versus hier-
archy. The contextual specifics when applied to
an organizational context—the target field of
this contribution—will be outlined in subse-
quent sections.
Preformation Phase
Phase I can be characterized as an open situ-
ation with no significantly restricted scope of
action. From a theoretical point of view, the
question that arises is how this initial state can
be conceptualized in more distinctive terms. The
technological path studies—if at all—have con-
ceived of the initial situation as being unre-
stricted. The search for alternatives starts from
scratch, and decisions are unconstrained.
Such framing of the first stage in the rational
choice tradition, however, paradoxically ignores
the fact that the development of a path is em-
bedded and connected with other developments;
it cannot be considered a completely separate
process without any imprints from the past. In
brief, history matters in the Preformation Phase
too. In organizations initial choices and actions
are embedded in routines and practices; they
reflect the heritage—the rules and the culture—
making up those institutions (e.g.. Child, 1997;
March, 1994; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Institutions
are " arriers of history" (David, 1994), and his-
tory cannot be intermittent; it does not matter
only occasion lly—it always matters! A conc p-
tualization of the activities in the Preformation
Phase thus cannot start from scratch; it has to
account for institutional imprints.
On the other hand, history in this broad sense
is not destiny; we have to draw a clear distinc-
tion between historical-institutional influences
and imperatives. The notion of path dependence
does not refer to a state of determinacy from the
beginning; it sheds light on a tapering process
that possibly ends in a lock-in. Increasing path
dependence implies an initial scope of choice.
Otherwise, the theory would lose its very point:
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triggers further similar patterns of action.  Indeed, Vergne and Durand (2010, p. 741) describe the series 
of contingent events “whose influence on the path taken is larger than that of the initial conditions 
themselves” as one condition of path dependence.  This continues until a “critical juncture” is reached 
where the scope of organizational action begins to constrict into an emergent path, labeled by Sydow et 
al. (2009) as the formation phase.  During this second phase, patterns of action reproduce creating a self-
reinforcing process that further narrows organizational behavior.  This self-reinforcing process is identified 
by Vergne and Durand (2010) as the second necessary condition for path dependence.  Eventually the 
path of choices restricts to the point where a preferred pattern of action becomes so embedded in the 
organization that it crowds out other alternatives and behavior becomes rigid.  The “unintended 
consequences of former decisions and positive feedback processes” is lock-in, the final phase in the 
development of an organizational path (Sydow et al., 2009, p. 696). 
 
Does the path dependence perspective of entrepreneurship truly capture the salient characteristics and 
represent realistically the entrepreneurial process?  Critics suggest that certain implications of path 
dependence, especially as they relate to agency, are “problematic for a theory of entrepreneurship” 
(Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 353).  According to Stack and Gartland (2003, p. 489), the role of the 
entrepreneur in path dependence is passive and does not “leave any room for an entrepreneur to 
“mindfully” plan a role in shaping their environment.”  Garud et al. (2010, pp. 760-761) criticize path 
dependence on the basis that it is “fatalistic” and does not allow the entrepreneur to “shake free” of 
history.   In other words, the path dependent perspective has “entrepreneurs watching the rearview mirror 
and driving forward” (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 467). This perspective appears inconsistent and overly 
constraining for the concept of the entrepreneurship as creating new things or new ways, where the 
entrepreneur purposefully instigates a process through networks consisting of a changing cast of 
stakeholders.  Indeed, even Sydow et al. (2005; 2009, p. 705) raise the possibility that paths may not 
“simply occur.”  In fact, they do not rule out as plausible the emergence of paths as deliberate or 
intentional actions arising from “creative agency” (Sydow et al., 2005; 2009, p. 705).  Furthermore, Sydow 
et al. (2009) suggest that an understanding of organizational path building may be enhanced by studying 
individual-level processes and network development within the organization.   
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Thus, it becomes apparent that the study of the emergence of entrepreneurial firms through the 
development of functional networks needs to embrace a perspective of path building in organizations that 
allows for intentional human agency on the part of actors within emerging organizational networks.  By 
diverging from path dependence, the ability to capture rich themes describing emergent actions and 
activities of networks is enhanced. Citing a lack of consensus regarding the study of entrepreneurial 
networks, Jack (2010) suggests that research should be framed using two paradoxical views, a Ptolemaic 
perspective that emphasizes agency and places the individual (entrepreneur) as central in the network 
and a Copernican view that emphasizes the overall structure of the network including the web of 
interconnected networks in which it resides. The integration of these two perspectives is best embodied 
by a perspective rooted in structuration (Giddens, 1984) known as path creation (Garud & Karnoe, 2001).   
 
2.2.3 Path Creation and Networks in the Making 
Path creation originated in the study of technology entrepreneurship to describe the role of agency in 
shaping new technologies or new paths through a process that “builds upon the efforts of many” (Garud & 
Karnoe, 2003, p. 277).  Path creation refers to “paths-in-the-making” (Garud et al., 2010, p. 760), a theory 
of emergence where purposive actions initiate interaction and engagement among actors to shape and 
navigate the translation of “‘emergent ideas into action’ and ‘emergent actions into ideas’” (Garud et al., 
2010, p. 762).  Garud and Karnoe (2001, loc. 102) argue that “[a]lthough we may be creatures caught in 
webs of significance of our own making (Geertz, 1973, p.4), we do possess the capacity to untangle 
these webs to create new paths” and “shape history in the making.”  It is these foundational attitudes that 
make path creation a useful theoretical frame to study the emergence of entrepreneurial firms in terms of 
co-creation with functional networks of stakeholders…’networks in the making.’  
 
Entrepreneurship from a path creation perspective is not a “random act of genius but is a disciplined effort 
involving many” in a process “fraught with failure” (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 570, 903).  Conditions at 
the onset of the path creation process are not given but are “constructed through negotiations by actors” 
(Garud et al., 2010).  The entrepreneur sets the process in motion and acts as a boundary spanner 
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interacting with a multiplicity of actors who engage with the process at different points in time (Garud & 
Karnoe, 2001, 2003).  As actors join the process they become embedded by generating inputs that 
“continually and progressively” (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 366) transform the path either enabling or 
constraining future activity(Garud & Karnoe, 2001, 2003; Garud et al., 2010).  The makeup of actors 
embedded in the emerging path is not stable, however (Garud & Karnoe, 2003).  Actors can depart from 
the process and may do so unexpectedly in a manner that similarly enables or constrains future actions 
(Garud & Karnoe, 2001; Garud et al., 2010).  
 
“[P]lans and visions emerge as part of the entrepreneurial process” (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 840).  In 
the vernacular of path creation, “experimentation and exploration” replace “errors and mistakes” as ideas 
are evaluated and modified, even shelved or abandoned with each action and decision.(Garud & Karnoe, 
2001, loc. 480, 481).  Even accident, serendipity and luck are translated into opportunity (Garud et al., 
2010).  Throughout this process, however, the entrepreneur and engaged actors remain mindful of the 
amount and rate of innovation the market is willing and able to accept and digest.  While gradual 
improvements in innovation may not “galvanize” support for an initiative or create a compelling story that 
entices customers or investors, too great an innovative leap runs the risk of  “counter-reactions” from 
investors or customers that do not understand the benefits of the new innovation (Garud & Karnoe, 2003, 
p. 281).  In this sense, it is not breakthroughs and leap-frogs in technology that are sought as the 
outcome, but rather a process of continual “resourcefulness and improvisation on the part of involved 
actors” that shape the emerging path (Garud & Karnoe, 2003, p. 278).  The resulting “tension between 
learning and creation” contributes to the emerging path (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 894).  Consequently, 
the future is uncertain and changing as situations along the path emerge requiring discussion, debate, 
experimentation, and bricolage (Garud et al., 2010). Therefore, what may emerge may be different than 
what was originally pursued (Garud & Karnoe, 2001). 
 
What becomes clear from this narrative is the purposeful enactment by actors as the core of path 
creation.   According to Stack and Gartland (2003, p. 489), “path creation stories highlight the active role 
of the entrepreneur and the firm.” Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2011, p. 127) suggest examples in 
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literature on “relational exchanges and interpersonal negotiations point to fertile untapped resources for 
future entrepreneurship research.” Thus, a research approach is needed that enables the study of the 
emerging firm and the entrepreneur as they purposively interact with the environment, initiating 
interaction, creating ties and adapting to changes in the environment through constructive processes 
(Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010).  Therefore to uncover the existence of path creation as the path building 
modality of an emerging venture, the relational–strategic approach to tie network formation, which 
emphasizes the role of agency, was employed in this study. 
 
Indeed, the literature with a strategic approach to network formation is beginning to reveal this purposeful 
enactment of network participants by isolating specific strategic action employed during new venture 
emergence.  For example, Zott and Huy (2007, p. 70) found evidence of four types of “symbolic actions” 
that enable entrepreneurs to obtain more resources for their new ventures: “conveying personal credibility 
of entrepreneur”, “conveying professional organizing”, “conveying organizational achievement” and 
“conveying quality of stakeholder relationships”.  From a study of how entrepreneurial firms create high 
performing networks or portfolios of alliances, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009b, p. 246) developed a 
theoretical framework that, similar to the aforementioned study, “emphasizes agency and strategic 
action.”  Recently, Hallen and Eisenhardt (2012) used empirical evidence to develop a theoretical 
framework of the actions entrepreneurs employ to form relationships.  They identified two paths to 
forming efficient network ties in entrepreneurial firms: “reliance on existing strong direct ties” and 
“catalyzing strategies” to shape opportunities and induce tie formation, such as “casual dating”, “timing 
around proofpoints”, “scrutinizing interests” of potential partners and “crafting alternatives” to transform 
hesitant partners to committed stakeholders.   
 
Although the strategic network approach facilitates discernment of purposive enactment, a key signal of 
path creation in an emerging venture, there is a limitation of this approach.  What if the two central 
modalities of path building (path dependence and path creation) coexist or the firm transitions from one 
modality to the other based on the development of the firm?  The focus on strategic entrepreneurial 
agency in network building may prevent the identification of self-reinforcing cycles or stabilizing processes 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   29	  
that are characteristic of a path dependent process.  Consequently, a set of criteria that enables the 
identification of the existence of both modalities of path building is necessary in order to further the 
understanding of network formation in new ventures. 
 
2.2.4 A Framework for Discernment of Path Building Modality 
McKelvey,(2004) argues that different motors may explain different contexts in which firm development 
occurs.  Indeed, even Schumpeter (1934, p. 78) recognized that entrepreneurship is a temporary 
condition: “…everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually “carries out new combinations,” and 
loses that character as soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down to running it as other 
people run their businesses…”   His conceptualization implies a progression from ‘path creation to path 
dependence.’  In fact, it could be argued that the initial “formation phase” described by Sydow et al. 
(2009, p. 693) may be more appropriately explained in terms of the path creation process, especially 
since they do not rule out creative agency, a chief driver of path creation, as the source of path 
emergence.  Indeed their earlier research presents a model of path building that includes path creation, 
path dependence and path breaking (Sydow et al., 2005).  It is also plausible that entrepreneurial agency 
may diminish in importance as the firm attains an identity separate from the founding entrepreneur or 
“loses that character” as described by Schumpeter (1934).  In other words, path creation, as the 
mechanism of network or venture emergence, could at some point in the entrepreneurial process coexist 
with and eventually give way to path dependence. Perhaps this is the “critical juncture” described by 
Sydow et al. (2009, p.693) where path creation ends and path dependence takes hold.  Yet much of the 
network based literature presents network formation as a process that begins as path dependent and 
becomes increasingly intentionally managed through entrepreneurial agency (Coviello & Cox, 2006; Hite, 
2005; Hite & Hesterly, 2001).  On the other hand, Garud et al. (2010, pp. 769-770) suggest that path 
creation and path dependence are distinct perspectives and that “any process driven by a mix of the 
two…is mixing ontologies.”   
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To enable a study of network formation in emerging ventures in terms of the different modes of 
organizational path building, the path building framework below was developed from a synthesis of the 
path dependence, path creation and effectuation literature (Table 2.2.4-1). 
 
Table 2.2.4-1 Framework for Organizational Path-Building. 
 
The path building framework used in this study builds on the dimensions employed by Garud et al. (2010) 
and Vergne and Durand (2010) to highlight the key differences between path creation and path 
dependence.  Seven dimensions were identified from the relevant literature along with specific criteria for 
each path building mode (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, 2003; Garud et al., 2010; Read, Sarasvathy, Dew, 
Wiltbank, & Ohlsson, 2011; Sarasvathy, 2008; Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010, 2011).   
Specifically, this framework was used to analyze and interpret the actions associated with the five key 
entrepreneurial activities that lead to network formation and the interaction within the networks that 
changed how these activities were pursued.  It is interesting to note that, although effectuation is explicitly 
described in the literature as path dependent (Sarasvathy, 2008) and this study initially considered it a 
Dimensions 
(Garud et al., 2010; 
Vergne & Durand, 2010) 
Path Dependence 
 (Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010, 2011) 
Path Creation  
(Effectuation) 
(Garud & Karnoe, 2001, 2003; Garud et al., 2010; Read et al., 2011; Sarasvathy, 
2008) 
Path Origin:   
Initial Conditions Historically framed or imprinted with neither an 
assumption of determinism or completely unrestricted 
choices. 
Constructed by actors who determine what part of the past to mobilize to 
support the vision of the future. (“the bird-in-hand principle”) 
 
Instigating Event Origination of process can only be identified in hindsight 
but begins with a contingency that triggers a course of 
action that results in positive feedback. 
Purposive entrepreneurial action where the entrepreneur acts as boundary 
spanner generating momentum that mobilizes skills and resources from 
many actors, networks and multiple domains. 
Path Development:   
Drivers Positive, self-reinforcing feedback cycle from a certain 
pattern of action unintentionally develops its own pull 
through various mechanisms (i.e., coordination, 
complimentary, learning or adaptive effects). 
 
Interaction of actors to accumulate inputs generates momentum that either 
enables or constrains actions as ideas are modified, rejected. Continual 
and incremental experimentation and learning from failure and feedback 
(“critical revision”) leads to a recombination and transformation of 
resources. (“the pilot-in-the-plane principle”) 
Agency/ Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Engagement is limited as actors replicate dominate 
patterns and practices in order to reproduce a path and 
particular outcome.  Even new entrants lack ability to 
intervene and change course.  Agency becomes 
increasingly inert in the absence of exogenous shock. 
A multiplicity of actors intentionally interact to “accumulate inputs.”  Different 
actors bring different frames and resources. Engaged actors generate 
inputs and transform the emerging path through negotiation and debate. 
The constitution of actors is not stable so boundaries are negotiable and 
malleable. (“the crazy quilt principle”) 
Contingency 
Response 
If a course of action from a contingency results in positive 
feedback, the action gains dominance and is replicated to 
the exclusion of other actions triggering a self-reinforcing 
process. 
Emergent situations provide context and opportunity for actors to “generate 
functionality” by strategically manipulating and cultivating the unexpected 
through bricolage and improvisation. (“the lemonade principle”) 
Scope of Action Initially broad and unrestricted with a constricting range 
of options as preferred pattern of action gains 
dominance, constricts choices and constrains decision-
making. 
Options are not unbounded in this collective effort of engaged actors whose 
entrance, departure and input may enable or constrain the emerging path. 
“Mindful deviation” and “setting affordable loss” ensures that action does 
not get too far ahead of the ability of the market and investors to accept 
innovation but creates enough action to generate momentum.  Options may 
reduced as the desire to exploit what has already been created dampens 
the “impulse to explore and create.” (“risk little, fail cheap”) 
Path Outcome:   
Outcome 
 
Order and a reduction of ambiguity in a new organization 
(Pierson).  However, this may lead to lack of variation in 
decisions resulting in persistent organizational rigidity or 
strategic persistence.  Such lock-in may jeopardize the 
ability to respond to changes in the environment if no 
exogenous shock triggers breakout from the path. 
Creation of new opportunity by the collective but what emerges may be 
different from original idea.  Momentum generated by the process can 
become unmanageable causing the process to spin out of control unless 
lock-in provides “temporary stabilization” of path building, but this “logic of 
control” can become an “illusion of control” leading to escalation of 
commitment to a failing course of action.  !
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separate hybrid mode of path building, when deconstructed in terms of the path building criteria, the key 
principles of effectuation appear to be directly aligned with the attributes of path creation.   Therefore, the 
principles of effectuation were integrated with the criteria for path creation.  Additional discussion of the 
use of this path building framework is presented in the next chapters. 
2.3 The Opportunity for Research 
 
Although grounded in a body of literature that is generally recognized and accepted in the study of 
entrepreneurship, this study not only embraces a perspective that differs from the dominant approach in 
current network-based literature, but also draws from a body of literature not typically integrated into 
network-based research.    As a result, this line of inquiry is able to expand the understanding of new 
venture emergence by answering the following question:  
How do networks shape and how are networks shaped by the distinctive entrepreneurial 
activities that support the emergence of a new technology venture?   
 
Adopting a strategic-relational view of network formation, this research adds to a newer body of network-
based literature that views the emergence of networks in terms of purposive entrepreneurial agency and 
seeks to answer how individuals become committed stakeholders in a network.  At the same time, this 
study expands an underdeveloped area within network-based research that views the entrepreneurial firm 
in terms of multiple networks formed around specific activities, thereby challenging the dominant view of a 
single entrepreneurial network.  By directly engaging entrepreneurs in defining the key activities in new 
venture emergence, five key entrepreneurial activities were identified and then used as the conduit 
through which networks were studied.  This study links these two streams of literature within network-
based research to a line of inquiry focused on the process of organizational path building.  Synthesizing 
literature pertaining to three different path building processes, a framework was developed to investigate 
network formation in terms of two distinct path building modalities.  This approach enables a deeper 
understanding of strategic action that leads to network formation around key entrepreneurial activities. 
Thus, a distinct contribution to the entrepreneurship literature is built by extending three streams of 
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entrepreneurship literature, not previously integrated, to develop a process narrative of entrepreneurial 
firm emergence.  
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design 
 
This research is exploratory in nature, aimed at building a theory of how the entrepreneurial process 
unfolds in terms of the multiple interlocking networks that form around key entrepreneurial activities 
pursued in the building of a new venture.  It has been suggested that a deeper understanding of how 
entrepreneurship unfolds in terms of network formation can only be attained through in-depth qualitative 
studies using process theory (Jack, 2010; Johannisson, 2011; McKelvey, 2004; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 
2010; van de Ven & Poole, 2005).  Indeed, van de Ven and Poole (2005, p. 1385) argue that “[p]rocess 
research is capable of tapping aspects of processes that variance research cannot” by enabling the study 
of a complexity of different effects that produce change.  Therefore, this study builds on network-based 
literature that employs a process perspective. Specifically, this research adopts an ontological 
perspective consistent with Approach III described in Table 3.1-1 by van de Ven and Poole (2005) where 
the entrepreneurial network is studied in terms of the action of emergence, not as a ‘thing’ and findings 
are communicated through a process narrative. 
 
Figure 3.1-1 A Typology of Approaches for Studying Organizational Change (van de Ven & Poole, 2005, 
p. 1387) 
consisting of things or processes, and epistemologies of variance or process
methods for studying organizational change. Approaches I and II adopt
variance and process methods, respectively, to study change in an organiza-
tional entity that is viewed as a real social actor with an enduring identity.
Approaches III and IV adopt variance and process methods, respectively, to
study processes of organizing. The typology provides a repertoire of ways 
to study organizational change. We now discuss the differences and similari-
ties between the four approaches, as well as their strengths and weaknesses,
in addressing various research questions about organizational change. We
believe that, when related and combined, the four approaches provide a richer
understanding of complex organizational dynamics than can be obtained from
one approach alone.
Approach I: Variance Study of Change in Organization
Approach I studies change in an organizational entity with a variance
methodology. It is particularly well suited for examining research questions
such as: what are the causes or correlates of change in organizations? This
approach treats change in an organizational entity as a dependent variable
and explains it as a function of independent variables. Studies that explain
adoption of an innovation as a function of innovation characteristics such as
trialability, comparative advantage, and observability (Rogers 2004) are
examples of this type of study.
A variance method is useful for studying the causes or correlates of
organizational change in two important respects. First, variance research
methods offer good pictures of the mechanisms that drive a process and are
well suited for testing hypotheses related to mechanisms. Second, the variance
Van de Ven & Poole: Studying Organizational Change 1387
Table 2. A Typology of Approaches for Studying Organizational Change
Ontology
An organization is represented as being:
A noun, a social actor, A verb, a process of 
a real entity (‘thing’) organizing, emergent flux
Variance method Approach I Approach IV
Variance studies of change Variance studies of
in organizational entities organizing by dynamic 
Epistemology by causal analysis of modeling of agent-based 
(Method for independent variables that models or chaotic complex
studying change) explain change in entity adaptive systems
(dependent variable)?
Process narratives Approach II Approach III
Process studies of change in Process studies of
organizational entities organizing by narrating 
narrating sequence of events, emergent actions and 
stages or cycles of change in activities by which 
the development of an entity collective endeavors unfold
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Consistent with this perspective is the use of multiple case studies and intensive qualitative analysis (van 
de Ven & Poole, 2005).  Thus, a multiple case study design involving three entrepreneurial ventures was 
employed. Although entrepreneurial network processes have been studied employing different 
methodologies (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010; Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010), Slotte-Kock and 
Coviello (2010) suggest that entrepreneurial network research can benefit from the type of data 
generated from case-based methodologies which are more widely used in business network research.  
Indeed, Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2011) acknowledge that in-depth case studies and qualitative 
research are providing the level of detail required to understand entrepreneurship (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011).  Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 27) similarly argue that the use of multiple 
cases “typically yields more robust, generalizable, and testable theory than single-case research”.  
Furthermore, multiple-case research produces more “varied empirical evidence”, allows for “broader 
exploration” and enables “comparisons that clarify emergent findings” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 
27).  However, this type of design also presents challenges in terms of selecting the particular cases to 
study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009).   
3.2 Case Selection 
An early question in the development of this study was whether a case should be defined as the 
individual founding entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial firm.   A ‘case’ for the purpose of this research is 
defined as an emerging technology venture.  However, previous entrepreneurship research has also 
adopted another approach.  Historically, researchers have attempted to conceptualize entrepreneurship 
in terms of ‘who’ the entrepreneur is (Sarasvathy, 2004; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  The 
entrepreneur has been portrayed as a hero who possesses certain attributes or behavior that drive them 
to pursue a heroic path of discovery and exploitation of opportunities (Blank, 2007; Garud & Karnoe, 
2003; Sarasvathy, 2004; Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  Yet, as 
some scholars argue, the singular attention on the individual entrepreneur has “generated incomplete 
definitions” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218) and “contributed to frustrated efforts to overgeneralize 
results” (Wiklund, Davidsson, Audretsch, & Karlsson, 2011, p. 4).  
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Case selection began by identifying founders of emerging technology firms who were willing to participate 
in a screening interview to discuss their experiences as entrepreneurs and their conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship.  Emerging technology companies were specifically selected because they operate in 
business environments that are fast moving and rapidly changing.  It is believed that studying companies 
in a dynamic environment would increase the likelihood of collecting data as network building is occurring 
and the impact of the network unfolds. The intent is to capture data that is not only retrospective in nature, 
but from actions occurring in real time.  
 
Entrepreneurs for the screening interviews were identified during a three-month period from May 2011 to 
July 2011 from two sources: (1) existing personal direct relationships the researcher had with emerging 
technology companies and (2) referrals from advisors to emerging technology companies, such as CPAs, 
attorneys, partners in venture capital firms, angel investors and advisory board members, with whom I 
have a personal direct relationship. Seven sources of referrals led to introductions to 18 emerging 
technology companies.  Initial introductions were conducted through email.  The pool of respondents was 
subsequently reduced to thirteen founding entrepreneurs and companies using a filter based on the 
following six criteria: (1) the company is based in the Southeastern United States, (2) the company is less 
than seven years old, (3) at least one of the founders is still involved in the company, (4) at least one of 
the original founders is a serial entrepreneur, (5) the company is a B2B technology company and (6) the 
company is not engaged in biotechnology.  These criteria were helpful in identifying companies that 
operate in a similar environment and under similar business conditions.  The specific rationale behind 
each criterion is presented in Appendix 7.1. 
 
Data was collected through face-to-face (8) and telephone (5) interviews using a semi-structured 
interview protocol (Appendix 7.2).  The interview protocol was developed to capture the following data 
from entrepreneurs:  background of the participant and the companies they have launched, definition of 
entrepreneurship, key activities in which they engaged to create and grow a new venture, definition of 
success and how they measure it, definition of failure, key concerns in building a company, factors that 
would cause them to ‘walk away’ from any new venture they founded and willingness to participate in 
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subsequent research. Interviews lasted from twenty five to ninety minutes. Eleven of the participants 
agreed to audio recording of the interviews.  With the exception of two companies, preliminary screening 
interviews were conducted with the founder or co-founder of the company.  The other two interviews were 
conducted with an interim CEO, who reported to the founder, and the spouse of a founder, who was also 
an investor, advisor and on the executive management team.  Audio files were transcribed using a 
contract transcription service. I edited all transcripts to ensure integrity and accuracy of the text.   
 
Responses to four main questions (key activities, definition of entrepreneurship, definition of success and 
definition of failure) were then organized in a table for comparison.  Data from the interviews are 
presented in Appendix 7.3.  The entrepreneurs in this initial screening generally defined entrepreneurship 
in terms of a process of building an organization and gathering resources around a unique idea or 
opportunity.  Below are sample quotes that underscore this perspective of entrepreneurship: 
 
• “A true entrepreneur is building…something unique” (Participant Case 1) 
• “It’s the opportunity to build something that no one else has built.” (Participant Case 3) 
• “…the act of creating a business that survives you…that’s more important and bigger than you 
are as an individual.” (Participant Case 4) 
• “…to create something from scratch…build and develop the business and the people…get into 
something small and grow it into something much bigger…” (Participant Case 5) 
• “The activities and abilities around seeing opportunities and capitalizing on them…” (Participant 
Case 8) 
• “…taking an idea, a concept…all the way through to profitability and all the steps in between.  
Building up the right business plan, testing it, getting customers, getting funding for it, launching 
it…” (Participant Case 12) 
• “…entrepreneurship is about a love of creating and the art of persuasion…you have to persuade 
a lot of different people a lot of different things…to build something that doesn’t exist…” 
(Participant Case 13) 
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With an understanding of the organization as the manifestation of entrepreneurship, the ‘case’ in the 
context of this research was defined as an emerging technology venture, not the individual entrepreneur.   
 
According to Feld (1981, p. 16): “ The focus theory directs the researcher to look for the particular foci 
that organize the activities and interactions of individuals in a situation.  In order to find them, the 
researcher will ordinarily need to understand the major activities that organize the interactions of 
individuals.”  Therefore, key activities in which these entrepreneurs were engaged were also identified 
during the screening interviews.   Participants were asked the following question: “Based on the 
experience with your company(s), what are the key activities of entrepreneurs and emerging 
entrepreneurial firms?”  Excerpts from the responses are presented in Appendix 7.3.   From these 
responses, five common activities were identified:  (1) creation of the value proposition, (2) capital 
acquisition, (3) talent acquisition, (4) customer acquisition and (5) product development.  Thus, the unit of 
analysis for this study was defined as the unfolding of these specific activities initiated by the 
entrepreneurs. These activities served as the conduit through which network formation was studied.  The 
unit of observation was an individual key to the execution of one or more activities as defined by the 
entrepreneur or other case participants.  These activities are defined in greater detail in Appendix 7.4.  
The identification of common key entrepreneurial activities based on direct responses from entrepreneurs 
not only further grounds the constructs of this research in practice, but provides a consistent foundation 
upon which to collect and compare data across cases.  The development of constructs through direct 
engagement of entrepreneurs represents a departure from methodology in the relevant literature and a 
key contribution of this research. 
  
After the initial screening, theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) and replication logic 
(Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Yin, 2009) drove the selection of cases from the original thirteen companies.   
Three cases were selected for investigation.  This is consistent with network-based research in 
entrepreneurship where the number of cases in the relevant literature generally ranges from three to nine 
cases (Coviello & Munro, 1995; Coviello, 2006; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2008; Hite, 2005; Jack et al., 2008; 
Larson, 1992; Lechner & Dowling, 2003; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009b).  Although generalizable results are 
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not the objective of case study research, the use of three cases enables more robust data, increases 
“analytic power” and provide a stronger base of empirical evidence for theory building and subsequent 
theory testing than a single case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  A brief description of each case is 
presented below (Table 3.2-1).  
 
	   
Table 3.2-1 Case Descriptions 
 
The application of literal replication logic enabled the selection of three cases that share similar attributes 
based on the six screening criteria (Appendix 7.1).  The purpose of identifying cases that operate in a 
similar business environment is to determine if findings are idiosyncratic or replicated (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007).  Similar to the study by Lechner and Dowling (2003, pp. 6-7), the cases selected 
represent high growth potential emerging technology companies “with the same general attributes…in 
slightly different settings.”  Although each company has been responsible for creating a new market, they 
represent different lines of business.  Since investigating differences in network development attributed to 
product type or line of business was not an objective of this research, this issue remains a weakness of 
the study and at the same time an opportunity for future research.  
 
Using theoretical replication logic, additional variance was purposefully built into the selection of cases to 
allow for further exploration of differences in network development based on the source of initial funding: 
institutional, angel, or self-funded (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Different patterns of network 
development were suspected to arise from different sources of seed capital since each source introduces 
a different set of ‘founding actors’ at the onset of the new venture.  For example, the literature indicates 
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that angel investors interact with their portfolio companies to provide access to expertise and leads 
(Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007). Santos and Eisenhardt (2009, p. 646) argue that heterogeneity in the sample 
of cases will aid in the “grounding of theory.”  So in this sense the similarities and differences between 
cases should benefit theory building.  
3.3 Data collection 
 
Data were obtained from two sources: (1) publically available archival sources such as company 
websites, published articles and interviews, founder blogs and tweets and (2) in-depth interviews.  Data 
from interviews were collected over a six-month period using semi-structured interviews guided by an 
interview protocol.  A total of twenty-two interviews were conducted, including three interviews conducted 
as part of the initial screening.  Table 3.3-1 provides a list of study participants by case and role.  
Anonymity was promised to all participants to encourage candor.  Twenty-one interviews were audio 
recorded. The audio file was electronically submitted to a contract service for transcription within 24 hours 
of the interview and subsequently edited by the researcher to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the 
text. 	  	  
 
Table 3.3-1 Descriptions of Participants by Case and Role 
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The development of each case began with an interview with one founding entrepreneur. A specific 
interview protocol was developed for collecting data from the founder(s) (Appendix 7.5).  The ‘founder 
protocol’ was designed to extract information on the formation of networks around the five key activities 
defined by entrepreneurs during the initial screening interviews. Five interviews with founders were 
conducted using the protocol.  Interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes.  All founder interviews were 
conducted in person.  In two cases where there were co-founders, the interviews with the co-founders 
were conducted separately.  At the end of each founder interview, the interviewee was asked to facilitate 
introductions to potential research participants identified in the interview as being key participants in one 
or more key activities.  Introductions were provided by the founding entrepreneurs in person or by email.  
A different interview protocol was developed for case participants who were not founders (Appendix 7.6).  
The non-founder protocol was designed to collect data on the specific activity the participant was 
identified with in a previous interview.  Interviews with non-founder case participants lasted 25 minutes to 
an hour.  Of the fourteen non-founder interviews, five were conducted in person and the remainder by 
telephone. 
 
At this point it is necessary to recognize the potential weaknesses of this method of data collection.   Of 
primary concern are risks associated with retrospective bias, “impression management” and convergent 
perspectives (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 28).  To mitigate these risks, Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) suggest engaging participants with diverse perspectives on the phenomenon being investigated.   
By conducting interviews with participants from different organizations, different hierarchical levels, and/or 
functional roles, they argue that the risk of convergent perspectives will be reduced.  Multiple participants 
(5-7) were interviewed for each case.  Participants for each case represented different hierarchical levels 
and or functional areas within the firm and included one outside informant or contractor.  In addition, 
Interviews were held in private and anonymity was promised to each participant. Furthermore, data 
gathered from earlier interviews was incorporated into subsequent interviews when possible to elicit 
responses from different participants on specific events. News articles on each case, websites, blogs and 
tweets of founders were monitored during data collection.  
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Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) also recommend combining retrospective and real-time cases. In order 
to mitigate retrospective bias, the protocol was designed to elicit responses about past events, as well as 
recent and ongoing situations.  Next, by selecting companies that are less than seven years old, 
operating in dynamic business environments and not yet having established their viability, the probability 
of capturing network development as it was occurring was increased.   In addition, conducting interviews 
over a period of eight months (including initial screening interviews with founders), captured retrospective 
accounts of events, data at different periods in time, as well as data on events as they were unfolding.  All 
of these features of the research design enhanced the ability to mitigate risk by allowing to for divergent 
perspectives and corroboration or further investigation of key pieces of data. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
An iterative process that entailed cycling between data, literature and emerging themes was performed 
(Yin, 2009).  Bounded by the research question, empirical data was transformed into an in-depth analysis 
for each individual case using the path-building framework to examine the unfolding of the five key 
activities and the formation of networks around those activities.  This was followed by a cross case 
analyses to compare findings and identify differences based on venture funding source (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). 
 
Indeed, case study research is criticized for a lack of rigor, yet qualitative data of this depth cannot be 
captured through quantitative methods.   Yin (2009, loc. 557, 581) identifies two sources of weakness in 
case study research that contribute to this criticism: (1) researchers do not implement “systematic 
procedures“ and (2) when it results in “massive unreadable documents.”  To address these issues, a 
systematic and repeatable process was created for the analysis of data that builds on the techniques 
prescribed by Charmaz (2008), Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and Yin (2009) (Figure 3.4-1).  The 
process developed for this study involved a continuous and iterative process of cycling between data and 
literature in an effort to winnow and extract key data and emergent themes over multiple cases.	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 Figure 3.4-1 Process for Data Analysis 
 
Beginning with a founder interview, cases were examined one at a time using NVIVO9 software to 
analyze interview transcripts.   The coding scheme was developed a priori using the seven dimensions 
from the path building framework to code data corresponding to each of the five key entrepreneurial 
activities (Table 3.4-1).  A detailed case history and narrative using the path-building framework was 
created for each case (Appendix 7.7-7.12).  From these narratives, emerging patterns and themes were 
identified within each case that provided answers to the research questions and illuminated the 
relationship between key activities enacted by each young venture and the networks that formed around 
those activities to mobilize resources for growth.  Next, a cross-cases comparison was conducted to 
identify common themes and patterns of action in network development, as well as differences between 
the cases that may have been attributed to funding source or other conditions.  The data analysis phase 
of this study culminated in new insight into path building and network development in emerging ventures 
and recommendations for future research.  
Coding Scheme: 
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Table 3.4-1 Coding Scheme for Data Analysis. 
4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 	  
4.1 Case: Coupon 
 
4.1.1 Coupon Overview 
Coupon was established in mid 2008 by two co-founders with no capital, no product and no 
employees…just their networks of senior level professionals from a number of industries across the 
country and ideas based on industry and consumer trends they observed in their previous jobs.  The co-
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founders met at their previous employer and were paired in the same operating unit because of 
complementary skills, one leading strategy and innovation and the other providing the operational and 
implementation expertise.  After a major acquisition for a new line of business they were building failed to 
close (“the regulators killed the acquisition the day before closing”), an event described by one co-founder 
as a “catastrophic event,” they decided it was time to leave “corporate America” to try to build something 
on their own.  
 
While one co-founder brought a deep and broad technology background with experience building 
businesses as a senior executive and venture capitalist, the other co-founder was focused on execution 
of strategies within a large corporate environment.  Together they developed a concept that would lead to 
an innovative way for merchants to send targeted offers to consumers and a new revenue stream for an 
entire industry.  By their own admission, they “invented an industry.” 
 
With only their “skills and their networks,” the co-founders spent the first two to three months crafting the 
value proposition and vetting the business model within their network in order “to get to the right one fast.”  
After raising the first round of capital from the venture capital community in late 2008, they hired their first 
employees and spend the remainder of 2008 and all of 2009 focused on “fast prototyping” and testing 
with potential customers.  In 2009, the company closed their second round of capital, predominately an 
inside round but added another institutional investor that passed in the first round. At the same time, they 
began onboarding “a broader set of business skills into the business, “ including building the sales 
organization.  In 2010, the company “went live” with the first product to market.  However, as it became 
apparent that the positioning of the product in the market was not yielding the desired results, the 
company replaced the sales organization and strategic direction.  Major customer contracts followed, as 
well as two additional rounds of funding from new institutional investors.   
 
In less than four years, the company has grown to over 90 employees and raised in excess of fifty million 
dollars.  As competitors enter the new market, the co-founders remain focused on fast growth and 
execution in the space they “invented” and intend to dominate. 
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4.1.2 Coupon Path Building Narrative 
Using the path building framework, a rich narrative for new venture emergence was developed.  The 
detailed case narrative organized by entrepreneurial activity is presented in Appendix 7.7 along with a 
table that summarizes key findings for each activity in terms of the seven path building dimensions in 
Appendix 7.8.  A summary of network development for this case in terms of the seven dimensions of path 
building follows.  What unfolds is a story of new venture emergence that follows an evolving and changing 
path created by the interplay between key activities pursued and the networks that form around them. 
 
Initial Conditions:  Armed with over three decades of business experience, a positive reputation in the 
business community and an idea for a new business, the only resource on which the co-founders could 
draw was their extensive network of senior level professionals.  While one co-founder had extensive roots 
in the venture capital community, the other brought deep relationships with executives of potential clients. 
They contributed no capital, were prohibited from hiring employees from their previous employer, were 
operating in a new city in which they had few business contacts and, were admittedly not even sure they 
could develop the idea into a viable business.  Yet the co-founders were confident that if they could 
create a convincing business model, they would be able to unlock both capital and customers from their 
network.  Thus at the onset, the co-founders identified resources on hand that would be useful, but were 
well aware that these would not be sufficient to build the new venture.  So, while history guided the 
general direction of this new venture and provided important ingredients, the co-founders needed to 
devise ways to mobilize other critical resources.  The past provided only part of the answers…the co-
founders had to create a new future. 
 
Instigating Events: Although it was an unexpected event that precipitated the departure of the co-
founders from a large corporate environment, the failure of a major acquisition for a new line of business, 
there were four deliberate and strategic actions on the part of the co-founders that served to establish the 
new venture.  First, the co-founders simultaneously vetted their idea for the business with two groups of 
individuals they knew and trusted: venture capitalists and senior level professionals with potential 
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customers or senior level professionals with access to potential customers.  What they learned was that 
potential customers were excited by the idea, but expected the new venture to be backed by institutional 
investors.  Thus, using feedback from their network they concentrated their efforts on VCs3 with which 
they had the strongest ties, and raised the first round of venture capital, enough to build a prototype.  
Upon closing the first round, the co-founders hired their first employees, developers to build the prototype.  
Finally, with a prototype in hand, the venture tested the technology with their first potential customer 
whose senior executive was a mentor and long time friend of a co-founder.   
 
These instigating events demonstrated the ability of the co-founders to mobilize critical resources, capital 
and customers, from their existing network.  In fact, it is in these early events that the respective networks 
of the co-founders begin to be distinguished based on the focal activity.  However, while each event 
provided positive feedback that spurred the co-founders to pursue the next course of action, repeatable 
and self-reinforcing processes had not yet developed in the emerging venture.  
 
Drivers: In the absence of a self-reinforcing business model (i.e., generating sufficient cash flow to fund 
growth), the new venture was propelled by distinct and incremental milestones, established by the co-
founders, that would best position the venture to attract the next round of capital.  Driven by the need to 
achieve each milestone before running out of money, only those resources, namely capital and people, 
absolutely necessary to pursue the specific milestone were engaged.  People, including employees and 
customers, and strategies that slowed execution were avoided or changed.  Those that facilitated growth 
were sought out and engaged.  Although incrementally pursued, the milestones were cumulative and 
increased and diversified the types of activities and stakeholders involved in the emerging venture.  For 
example, the first milestone was to raise sufficient capital to hire developers to build the prototype.  This 
early activity involved only the co-founders and their existing network in the VC community.  While the 
fourth milestone was to attract major corporate clients, an activity that involved a multiplicity of 
stakeholders, including investors, product developers and sales and support team to negotiate contracts.  
Consequently, attainment of each milestone was accompanied by an increasing need for structure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The abbreviation VC is used throughout this document to refer to venture capitalists or venture capital 
firms. 
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around each of the activities undertaken in order to reduce mistakes, improve efficiencies and process 
multiple sources of feedback. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement: Stakeholders were drawn from the existing networks of the co-founders, as 
well as non-network sources such as the internet, recruiters and cold calls.  Individuals who committed to 
the new venture typically engaged for one or more of the following three reasons; (1) they were aware 
(either by reputation or direct experience) that the co-founders (and later the senior management team) 
had the ability to execute the value proposition, (2) the opportunity appealed to their entrepreneurial 
aspirations, and (3) they understood the vision and the tremendous upside potential of the venture.  To 
strengthen the level of commitment to the vision of the new venture, all employees became owners of the 
firm and retained that ownership even when they departed the firm.  
 
As the new venture attained its milestones the viability of the value proposition became more likely 
enhancing the firm’s ability to attract individuals and other resources.  However, it also increased the 
complexity of stakeholder engagement in terms of the identification of individuals who could contribute, 
the diversity of skills and resources needed, as well as the number of stakeholders involved.  Initial 
milestones leveraged the existing networks of the co-founders and involved single activities and 
stakeholders with specific resources.  Subsequent milestones involved multiple concurrent activities 
outside the expertise of the co-founders and that of their original network necessitating a jump to non-
network sources to identify resources.  As a result, stakeholder engagement expanded considerably as 
new participants committed to the venture creating bridges to individuals who were not part of the co-
founders’ networks.  
 
In moving from a small and narrowly focused group of stakeholders to a large and diverse group, the co-
founders exercised prudence in the engagement of stakeholders in order to maintain control of growth in 
a capital constrained environment.  Believing that input from too many sources can “crush” a young 
venture, the co-founders purposively managed the number, the nature, the rate of entry and the departure 
of stakeholders.  For example, only customers who could “move the needle” were worth pursuing, the 
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“natural athlete” was recruited over the specialist and later round investors were chosen more for their 
access to markets than capital. In addition, the co-founders believed that organizations have “seasons” 
and not all people are appropriate for all “seasons.”  They were well aware of the limited ability of humans 
to scale and adapt as quickly as the business.  While past accomplishments and contributions of 
stakeholders were important for continued engagement, a focus on the future needs of the new venture in 
terms of skills, expertise and capability from stakeholders determined continued engagement.  Thus, led 
by co-founders known for clearly defined performance expectations and praised for their willingness and 
ability to defer to the expertise of other stakeholders, a culture emerged in the venture that was both 
collaborative and cohesive but unwilling to yield space to those who don’t fit or contribute. 
 
Contingency Response: Driven to achieve the next milestone but constrained by limited resources, the 
co-founders did not let opportunities go to waste nor did they waste resources on ineffective strategies. 
For example, they replaced functional teams as soon as it became clear that they were unable to meet 
expectations and adapt to growth.  When they learned about a company with a similar business model in 
another industry, they seized the opportunity to recruit experienced managers from that company’s 
network to reposition the strategy of the new venture.  The willingness to turn the unexpected into 
opportunity was similarly exemplified by employees who were able to overcome product limitations and 
objections from one market segment by creating a secondary line of business to address the specific 
needs of that market segment.  Thus, for this new venture, unexpected events triggered new 
opportunities for stakeholder engagement and new strategies to pursue milestones. 
 
Scope of Action: Building the new venture through the incremental pursuit of key milestones that would 
enable the next round of fundraising from investors, the co-founders admittedly micromanaged early 
activities to prevent others from slowing progress or wasting resources.  They mobilized only those 
resources necessary to achieve the next milestone, limiting the number and input of stakeholders. While 
this facilitated initial milestones, which involved single activities and a limited group of stakeholders, later 
milestones involved multiple concurrent activities and broader sets of skills and resources. Thus, 
decision-making became increasingly less constrained as the co-founders deferred to the expertise of 
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their senior managers and multi-functional teams for ideas, solutions and prioritization of tasks.  In spite of 
releasing decision-making at the operational level, however, the co-founders continued to maintain 
oversight at the strategic level.  They were quick to course correct ineffective strategies and aggressively 
performance managed, even to the extent of being willing to “wreck and rebuild” entire functions and turn 
away customers who would not add value to the venture.  So, while decision-making became less 
restrictive engaging a broader group of stakeholders at one level, activities continued to be bounded by 
the co-founders at a broader level. 
 
Outcome: Emergence of the firm occurred incrementally and thoughtfully, one milestone at a time.  This 
strategy enabled activities to be quickly adjusted based on market feedback resulting in market 
acceptance and increasing amounts of capital to be raised.  Active management of stakeholder 
engagement (number, nature, entry and departure) removed impediments early in the life of the new 
venture.  Aggressive performance management allowed for rapid change of stakeholders to upgrade 
skills, adjust strategy and enhance solution generation.  Progression to each subsequent milestone, 
however, required a broadening of stakeholder expertise, resources and engagement in decisions.  
Progress and increasingly complex stakeholder engagement also revealed weaknesses in the new 
venture.  Rapid scaling of the business and constrained resources prevented development of repeatable 
customer acquisition processes and revealed the need for a structured recruiting process as gaps in 
staffing threaten to impede future growth.  Thus, while the current state of the venture was attained by the 
co-founders through diligent oversight and a broadening of stakeholder engagement in decision making, 
an increasing need for structure and processes to manage stakeholder engagement is beginning to 
emerge. 
 
4.1.3 Coupon Activities Shaping Networks 
The findings of this case show that entrepreneurial activities purposively instigated by stakeholders, 
shaped the networks of the new venture in three ways: coalescing participants, instigating change in 
participants and determining the makeup of participants.   These are known as the ‘activity effects.’ 
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First, the initiation of an activity triggered the coalescence of network participants and determined ‘when’ 
the network was activated and ‘who’ was included the network.  As one co-founder explained, “the way 
we very much built the business was trying to get to the next key milestone before we die…you tend to 
get insanely focused on hitting the milestone.” Each milestone represented a unique proof point, such as 
building a prototype, conducting a pilot of the technology or closing a “marquee name” client.  As an 
activity (or activities) was initiated to pursue a particular milestone, the co-founders mobilized a unique 
mix of stakeholders who could provide resources vital to the execution of the activity.  While ‘what’ the co-
founders knew and ‘whom’ they knew was important, the new venture could not have been built without 
the co-founders strategically and incrementally reaching outside of their pre-existing networks and what 
they knew. So, the networks that developed were not simply a reconfiguration of participants from one 
network, but a unique mix of individuals from pre-venture networks, existing venture networks, networks 
of other activity participants, as well as non-network sources, such as recruiters, social media and the 
internet joined together through a specific activity in pursuit of a specific goal.  
 
For example, after raising the first round of capital, the co-founders began product development for their 
first prototype.  Although they had the expertise to design the product, they did not have the skills to build 
the product, so they needed to recruit technical expertise.  What they learned was that their networks 
were not helpful.  Not only were they prevented by contract from recruiting from their previous employer, 
but they had established the company in a city in which neither had previously lived or worked.  In 
addition, as one co-founder explained, “it was not through our network because our network is very 
national and very senior.”  So they turned to digital networks, such as social networking sites and online 
job boards, which provided access to human resources not available through their personal networks. 
This enabled the co-founders to put together a team of  “classic early stage developer[s]” capable of 
producing large amounts of code for fast prototyping.  One co-founder described them as “quirky…they 
were a great little team.  And they were excited about the vision.”  This team constituted the first 
employees of the firm and was formed specifically for product development and more specifically to build 
the prototype.   
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Second, the outcome or efficacy of an activity instigated changes in network participants.  While positive 
outcomes and increased intensity in activities served to attract new types of stakeholders or create a 
greater need for stakeholder engagement, negative results from an activity resulted in the departure of 
stakeholders, including the dismantling and rebuilding of entire networks.  Continuing with the previous 
example from product development, after the prototype was built and successfully tested, the product had 
to be modified for scalability and peer review to meet the demands of the growing customer base.  As one 
co-founder described it, “[T]he problem we had almost universally with that team is when we got just a 
little bigger and we had to have a little bit of management structure in place and a little bit of process, they 
sort of started dropping and being ineffective.” Consistent with the co-founders’ philosophy that “[h]uman 
beings can’t always scale as quickly” and their practice of aggressive performance management, nearly 
all the original team was replaced with “more mature sort of code writers.”  In addition, the network built 
around product development expanded to include stakeholders from other functions of the company who 
contributed input based on the growing customer segments and markets they were serving.    
 
Third, the strategy pursued by a specific activity determined the network constituents.  For example, 
Capital acquisition was not a continuous activity, but one that was initiated by the co-founders after 
certain milestones or proof points were attained.  As the new venture emerged, the type of investor 
sought changed.  One co-founder explained the expectation of stakeholders in the early rounds of capital 
acquisition as follows:  “Money and just being supportive.  What you don't want is an investor who's going 
to tell you how to run your company.”    However, after the launch of the product, customer acquisition 
became a focal activity and this influenced the selection of later round investors.   The third round of 
fundraising “was far less around the money… but far more around the person.”  In fact, the investor 
brought in this later round was pursued largely because of his “network of senior people that’s 
unbelievable.” One co-founder described him as “our hardest working sales guy.”  Similarly, the most 
recent round of capital acquisition, was driven by market expansion, “[W]e have international expansion 
to worry about.  Let’s go find a good international expansion partner.” 
 
4.1.4 Coupon Networks Shaping Activities 
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While distinct activities shaped the networks, the reverse was also true. The networks of individuals who 
committed resources and engaged in building the new venture, shaped the activities that supported the 
emergence of this venture in two ways: determining the strategy of activities and impacting the speed of 
execution of activities.   
 
First, networks constituents determined the strategy of the activities.  The strategy of an activity reflected 
(1) the resources that existing network participants brought to the network and (2) new stakeholders the 
venture wanted to attract.  For instance, the pursuit of venture capital as the initial strategy of capital 
acquisition, was based in part on the strong VC network of one co-founder, a former venture capitalist, 
coupled with institutional backing as a requisite condition of another important group of stakeholders, 
potential clients.  As described by one co-founder, “[W]e knew from day one that if we did not have major 
investors behind the company, no [customer segment] was going to engage with us…so we talked to 
people that we knew in [customer segment] well.  But three minutes into the conversation, “So how much 
money have you raised from your investors?””  In this case, stakeholders or potential stakeholders from 
two different networks associated with different activities determined the capital acquisition strategy. 
 
Indeed, a more dramatic example is seen in the customer acquisition strategies adopted by the original 
and the current sales team.  While the sales teams built by each sales manager effectively leveraged 
their personal networks, experience and skills, the heads of sales came from distinctly different 
professional backgrounds.  Thus, the teams they built and strategies each enacted as a result of their 
different perspectives differed.  The outcome of these strategies also differed. One co-founder remarked 
that the digital strategy adopted by the first team “was all making sense except they weren’t selling 
anything.”  What they realized in the end was that the head of sales “didn’t know a damn thing…his 
network and his sales experience and his skills were all wrong.”  So, a year after hiring the first sales 
manager, the co-founders hired a recruiter to find a replacement from an industry with a similar business 
model.  The co-founders learned about that particular industry during fundraising, but had no direct 
connections to the industry. The new head of sales brought a “different playbook” and had to “completely 
wreck and rebuild our [sales] organization…tough things the company had to go through,” according to 
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one co-founder. In this case, network constituents did determine the strategy of the activity.  In fact, the 
successor sales team not only repositioned the sales strategy, but they also were able to develop a 
secondary business model “that we never envisioned and it had never really been thought of relative to 
the revenue potential to this business…could be a pretty significant side business for us.” 
 
Second, networks impacted the speed of execution of activities.  By facilitating access to resources, such 
as capital, expertise and customers, the networks enabled activities to unfold quicker than if resources 
had to be developed from scratch, train and teach people from the ground up, learn by trial and error and 
gain access via cold call.  The speed with which the co-founders were able to access capital in the first 
two rounds, for example, was credited to the network of one co-founder:  
[B]ecause I was a VC, I had a pretty big network of VCs.  We didn’t talk to that many.  We went 
straight to [General Partner at a VC firm] who was the guy who hired me there… And then we 
went to [another VC firm] where I sat on a couple of boards with [a General Partner].  So where 
we were lucky I guess is we knew a couple of VCs incredibly well.  They knew us and trusted us 
and so that made that process easier.   
The venture encountered the same “luck” with the strategic investors they brought in during the later 
rounds of fundraising.  The third round investor facilitated customer acquisition in the following manner:  
“[H]e’s flown us everywhere and opened up a door that we would be working at a year.”  Similarly, the 
impact of the fourth round investor on the efforts to expand their market was described as follows: “[T]hey 
are literally going to help us expand internationally to all the major countries in the world frankly in a much 
faster rate than we could ourselves.”  Notably, the word “luck” was frequently used by case participants to 
describe these situations.  While luck may have played a role, it seems that the intentional and strategic 
management of networks may have been at the root of this network effect.  
 
Alternatively, when networks had participants who could not deliver critical resources, activities unfolded 
more slowly or ceased to contribute to venture emergence. This was the situation with the initial network 
built around product development, as well as the original sales team.  While the former slowed 
development of the technology and the latter slowed customer acquisition, both set the company back a 
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year in terms of revenue generation and growth.  With this venture, speed of execution was important in 
order to achieve milestones before running out of capital. 
 
4.1.5 Coupon Path Building Modality and Networks-in-the-Making  
The findings of Coupon revealed a process of network development that was more consistent with 
attributes of path creation as defined by Garud et al. (2010) than of path dependence defined by Sydow 
et al. (2009).  Path creation as the dominant mode of path building in this case implies that network 
formation was not a “random act of genius” (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 903) but a result of purposeful 
action on the part of stakeholders.  The case evidence, presented in terms of the ‘activity effects’ and 
‘network effects,’ supports this assertion.  Most notable from these ‘effects’ is the continuous ‘funneling 
and filtering’4 of network participants through active and thoughtful network management. As milestones 
were pursued, the networks that unfolded were subject to a continual process of mobilization and 
reconfiguration of stakeholders and resources. The co-founders of this venture, however, were aware of 
the  “potential dark side” (Gulati et al., 2000, p.203) of networks.  That is, too much of a good thing can 
hamper emergence of a young venture.  In fact, one cofounder expressed his cautious approach to 
network building as follows: “I do think a way to crush a new company is to get too much of a network, 
around it.  Because they take time… Because managing all these relationships and knowledge and all 
these people “helping you” takes time.”   
 
As a result, networks were carefully managed in terms of the number and types of stakeholders engaged, 
as well as their entry and departure. Stakeholders, including investors, employees and customers, were 
engaged only if it was perceived that they would not impede progress and could add value.  This strategy 
manifested as a recruiting strategy of hiring the “natural athlete” since, according to one senior manager, 
“if you hire someone to do something specific, it doesn’t really work because tomorrow we are doing 
something different.”  In addition, only those potential customers who could “move the needle” and not 
“destroy the value” were engaged, and investors who could be “strategic partners” providing access to 
customers and markets were sought.  A more dramatic example of the active management of networks, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I thank committee member, Ben Oviatt, for this catchy phrase. 
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however, was the aggressive performance management of employees.  As one co-founder noted, “the 
company as a business is scaling very quickly.  Human beings can’t always scale as quickly.”  For 
instance, the co-founders were willing to “wreck and rebuild” entire functional teams “not because they’re 
not good people…they serve a value for a period of time and then [the company] just grows above and 
beyond them.”  As one senior manager described it, ”the sword swings fast, fast and hard.”  
 
The incremental building and active management of networks through this continual process of ‘funneling 
and filtering’ of stakeholders and resources implies that the boundaries of this emerging venture were 
dynamic, unpredictable and changing.  Networks and firm boundaries were being shaped and reshaped 
by these actions as more stakeholders and types of stakeholders were engaged in the building of this 
young venture.  As one member of the senior management team put it, “We’re creating the path.  It’s 
really an open field or an open slate.”  
 
With that said, case participants also revealed the emergence of processes around decision-making.  As 
one co-founder explained, input from a growing base of stakeholders coupled with resource constraints 
lead to a more structured decision-making process:  
…it’s a prioritization process that happens company-wide now...you have stakeholders from each 
of the major areas saying this is what we’d like to build.  We put a priority on it based on the 
estimated value and the estimated time it’s going to take and then company-wide we say here’s 
what’s going to be in our next release…it’s very well established relative to what it was the first 
year.    
In contrast, the absence of structure was becoming an impediment in other activities.  One senior 
manager commented, “we’re building and running at the same time…it’s hard to get down a repeatable 
[customer acquisition] process this early in our life cycle…it’s the instability of a new company and our 
processes.”  Similarly, noting that talent acquisition is their biggest constraint to growth, one co-founder 
admitted, “We haven’t had a recruiting strategy…I know that’s not sustainable…Going forward we need a 
recruiting strategy…we probably need someone in the company whose primary role is to think about 
recruiting.”  Thus, as networks were being actively managed around entrepreneurial activities, increased 
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stakeholder engagement appeared to increase the need for stabilizing processes.  Whether this is 
indicative of a shift from path creation to path dependence or the beginning of concurrent modes at play is 
yet to be determined.  
4.2 Case: Pixel 
 
4.2.1 Pixel Overview 
When two serial entrepreneurs married, one result of this sacred union was the creation of a perpetual 
cycle of innovation.  In the mid 2000’s, while one spouse was busy growing a business, the other spouse 
was searching for the next big idea.  Inspiration came from identifying an emerging trend and a 
technology gap in the industry in which his spouse was engaged.  While participating as a judge and 
mentor for an emerging technology showcase in 2006 the entrepreneur came across a technology that 
ignited the vision for a new product that would enable him to exploit the emerging trend.  Later that year, 
Pixel was established, seed capital was raised from friends, family and angel investors to purchase the 
technology and an advisory board of “science guys” to determine “what’s best to build out of the 
technology” was formed. 
 
Guided by feedback from potential customers, the founder, his technology advisors and in-house 
engineers spent the next couple years transforming the technology into a marketable product. The 
founder concurrently worked with the head of sales and marketing to develop the sales strategy and sales 
team to launch the technology in the market.  While research and development by the new venture 
advanced science and won awards, producing a commercially viable product was challenging.  In 
addition, there was a tension between engineers who wanted perfection and the need to launch a product 
to generate income to sustain the business.  The venture struggled to raise sufficient capital from friends, 
family and angels.   And perhaps it was by divine intervention that the next wave of employees and 
contractors accelerated progress. 
 
First, was a senior engineer with a deep background in technology, operations and launching new lines of 
business who called the founder “out of the blue” in late 2007.   The two had worked together at another 
venture and the founder seized the opportunity to hire someone he knew to handle daily operations and 
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engineering.  Not only did this hire enable the founder to focus on fundraising, he helped to “manage their 
vision” and was influential in the decision to switch the base technology.  The change in technology 
expedited product development and led to the unsolicited hiring of a seasoned sales professional who 
came to the company from a friend of a friend who recognized that this individual had experience with the 
technology and knew the markets the founder wanted to break into.  Starting as both a contract employee 
and investor in the venture, this individual built a sales team that put “30,000 miles on the sprinter van5… 
hanging [the hardware] wherever we can get it hung.”  The sales strategy, however, did not crystallize 
until 2011 when the founder fired the head of sales and marketing “because he didn’t have the ability to 
do marketing and sales.”  To rebuild the sales strategy, the founder hired his wife who had recently left 
her role as CEO and sold her stake in her company. With sales and operations in the hands of seasoned 
professionals he trusted, the founder needed to fill one more role, that of CFO.  After firing a number of 
CFOs, the founder hired a CFO who was also a successful technology entrepreneur who agreed to work 
on a contract basis in 2011.  What he brought to the venture was experience in dealing with institutional 
investors, boards and implementing financial and sales systems to provide transparency while at the 
same time igniting a healthy pressure to continually improve top line performance. 
 
The resilience exhibited by this venture over the six years since inception can be attributed (1) to the 
courage and commitment of the founder who was “absolutely willing to risk the reward/failure ratio of 
being the person in charge…Because that’s what you do in the [branch of the military] as an officer” and 
(2) to the loyalty of the employees, best summed up by one manager who said, “[I]f [the founder] calls 
me, I’m going to follow him.”   The company is infused with confidence.  One executive explained that the 
venture is poised to take advantage of “a land grab” and seize the “huge, huge opportunities” could lead 
to “tenfold” growth.  It is yet to be seen whether this is ‘irrational exuberance’ or a projection grounded in 
market data. 
 
4.2.2 Pixel Path Building Narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A sprinter van is a van or mini-bus with enhanced cargo space for commercial use. 
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A detailed path building narrative was developed from the case data that describes findings for each 
entrepreneurial activity in terms of the seven path building dimensions.  The full narrative is presented in 
Appendix 7.9 along with a summary table in Appendix 7.10.  A consolidated narrative that captures the 
key points for all activities in terms of the path building dimensions is presented below. 
  
Initial Conditions:  An entrepreneur with a background in R&D and commercializing emerging 
technologies observes a trend and identifies a technology gap in the industry that his wife, also a serial 
entrepreneur, is engaged.  He begins to transform these observations into a concept for a new product 
and new business.  Through contacts from his spouse, the entrepreneur vets the idea with potential 
customers and receives positive feedback that he has indeed identified a need in the market that cannot 
be met through current hardware design and technology.   The entrepreneur, however, has neither capital 
nor technology to develop the concept. 
 
Instigating Events:  While participating in an emerging technology forum as both a judge and mentor, 
the entrepreneur is introduced to a new technology developed by university scientists outside the U.S.  
Although intended for another application, the entrepreneur sees the potential to transform and develop 
this technology into a different category of products, one that would solve the business problem he had 
previously identified in the industry he became familiar with through his wife.  With a potential technology 
solution within reach, the entrepreneur establishes a new company, and raises the first round of capital to 
acquire the IP and “hire the people to turn it into a company.”  The new venture’s investors include the 
founder and his wife, family members, friends and high net worth individuals, some of whom invested in 
previous companies run by the founder or his wife.  As the new owner of the technology, the founder then 
conducts a search and forms a group of scientists and engineers, “some of the best guys in this space in 
the world”, to advise, challenge and debate “what might work and what might not” as the technology is 
transformed into a marketable product.  Concurrently, the founder continues to engage prospective 
customers on attributes they would like to see in the product.  The founder then hires his first employee, 
an individual to lead sales and marketing and develop the strategy to deliver the future product to the 
market.   Thus, the new venture begins with a broad base of stakeholders from multiple domains and 
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momentum fueled by positive market feedback, but no clear structure or processes to guide the emerging 
venture. 
 
Drivers:  There were four driving forces guiding the emergence of this venture.   First, a commitment to 
develop products based on attributes defined by the customer meant that feedback was continuously 
gathered from stakeholders and integrated into decisions.  In fact, the company considered attention to 
the needs of customers the basis on which they were going to compete in the market.  Second, a founder 
that valued autonomy, boldness and adaptability created a culture that expected generation and debate 
of ideas, experimentation, action in uncertainty, a willingness to learn from mistakes, and perseverance in 
pursuit of solutions and success.  For example, the technical advisory group was encouraged to 
challenge each other, the operations manager was not afraid to suggest that the founder scrap and 
replace the original technology, the new head of sales and marketing rebuilt the strategy and sales 
people provided market feedback that debunked original assumptions and changed the course of product 
development.  Third, a sense of urgency to stake their claim in the market before the emergence of direct 
competition drove action.  This driver manifested as a tension between stakeholders, such as engineers 
and technical advisors, who preferred to keep a product in development and perfect it, and investors and 
the sales force, who wanted to get a product in the hands of customers and make improvements based 
on feedback.  The sense of urgency also meant that mistakes, whether in hiring or product design, were 
corrected expeditiously. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  This venture was built through the collaboration of stakeholders from 
multiple domains and under various arrangements.  Scientists, engineers, sales and marketing 
professionals, customers, suppliers, investors and financial experts were drawn into the venture through 
existing relationships as well as non-network sources, such as recruiters, cold calling, telemarketing and 
social media.  Even third party validation through awards, industry rankings and technology competitions 
helped draw in stakeholders.  Stakeholders were engaged as advisors, employees, contractors and 
investors.  Since limited capital limited the ability of the company to pay market rates for services, equity 
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in the company became an important form of compensation that also had a benefit of binding 
stakeholders to a common vision and goal. 
 
The engagement of stakeholders, however, was not unbounded.  When it came to investors and the 
board, the founder intentionally managed who was in and who was out.  Capital was accepted only from 
investors who would not interfere with management of the business or require a high degree of 
interaction.  In fact, all investors were required to assign their voting rights to the founder.   The board, 
initially comprised of the largest angel investor and the founder, grew by only two members during the six 
years since inception.  In addition, employees, advisors and contractors not able to fulfill their roles were 
quickly replaced.   
 
Although the entrance and departure of stakeholders was purposefully managed, the founder encouraged 
and expected stakeholders in the venture to discuss, debate, brainstorm and innovate to improve the 
effectiveness of the emerging business.  And, the same autonomy the founder sought from investors and 
the board to lead the emergence of the venture was granted to the executive management team so they 
could apply their expertise to develop strategies and processes to effectively execute their 
responsibilities.  Thus, as participants in networks entered and departed the venture, the strategies that 
guided various activities changed as new participants joined the venture bringing different expertise, 
contacts and perspectives. 
 
Contingency Response:  The founder intentionally hired individuals with “high adaptation skills.”  This 
attribute enabled the founder and the company to take advantage of unexpected opportunity and 
effectively respond to unpredictable outcomes.  For example, two key employees were the result of “out 
of the blue” calls and the founder’s ability to recognize skills and experience that would be valuable to the 
emerging business. When product development based on the original technology acquired by the founder 
proved too challenging to develop, the head of operations and the founder were able to transfer learning 
from the original new technology to a technology in widespread use to create a new product category.  
Similarly, a “difficult repair path” with the first generation product that created a “make or break challenge” 
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for the company resulted in a unique design change developed by the founder and engineering team that 
became a new selling point for the product.  In another instance, the new CFO devised a unique program 
to license hardware to customers so the new equipment would not have an adverse balance sheet effect 
after realizing that a major obstacle to sales was the adverse effect of capital purchases on a customer’s 
balance sheet.  The ability of the venture to take advantage of opportunities as they emerged and 
persistently rebound and innovate when confronted with critical product and market challenges 
underscores the “high adaptation skills” embedded in the venture. 
 
Scope of Action: As activities unfolded, competing action in network building emerged which involved, 
on one hand, the active pursuit and engagement of stakeholders and, on the other, the development of 
structures, processes and rules for engagement of stakeholders.  For example, the founder actively 
sought to bring in a diverse range of skills, expertise and resources critical to the development of the 
venture, yet not everyone who wanted to be a part of the venture was allowed in or allowed to stay.  This 
scenario is illustrated by the ongoing need for capital and the focus on bringing in investors who could 
provide access to other sources of capital that was subject to certain conditions: potential investors who 
wanted to “help” in the management of the company or who required frequent interaction with the founder 
were turned away and all investors were required to assign their voting rights to the founder which 
discouraged commitments from some potential investors.  Similarly, while the founder actively 
encouraged and expected collaboration to generate options and alternatives, he also enabled managers 
with autonomy to create structure and processes to guide and action.  A sales strategy that initially had 
no boundaries, was transformed by the SVP of Sales and Marketing through collaboration with the sales 
team, the CFO, customers and potential distribution partners into a highly structured sales process for 
training, lead generation, channel sales and sales tracking and reporting.  
 
Outcome:  Since inception, the founder built this venture through a collaborative effort of a diverse group 
of stakeholders.  Stakeholders were thoughtfully brought in based on the needs of the business, but were 
also managed out if they could no longer add value.   As the venture progressed, original assumptions 
changed and structure and systems were added as a result of the interaction of a changing group of 
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stakeholders and synthesis of feedback.  Consequently, both the product and the manner in which 
revenues were generated changed significantly.  This commitment to active engagement of stakeholders 
led to continuous improvement in the business model, but also created loyal investors, employees and 
customers.  Although the future is still uncertain, the company through its stakeholders has improved and 
continues to improve its prospects for success. 
 
4.2.3 Pixel Activities Shaping Networks 
Networks that comprised Pixel formed around key activities consistent with Feld (1981) and Fombrun 
(1982).  The findings of this case revealed how the key entrepreneurial activities studied shaped the 
networks that developed during emergence of Pixel.  Three ‘activity effects’ were identified: the 
coalescing of network participants based on activity, the continuous engagement of network participants 
and the changing of network participants based on outcome.   
 
First, the initiation or anticipation of the execution of an activity triggered the coalescence of network 
participants and determined the timing and makeup of the network.  Individuals were purposively, not 
randomly, brought into a network to assume a specific role critical to the execution of a particular activity.  
Indeed, even when the founder received a random call “out of the blue,” engagement of the unexpected 
caller hinged on whether the experience and skills mapped to a current or future activity.   So the forming 
of networks was not only purposive, but opportunistic as well.  The intentional formation of the group of 
technology advisors to guide product development from the original technology serves as one example.  
The founder explained the singular purpose of that group as follows: “Science guys generally don't have 
money but they were some of the best guys in this space in the world and therefore they have the 
experience and breadth of knowledge I didn't have to know what might work and what might not.”  
Similarly, when asked what investors brought to the table other than capital, the founder responded, 
“Financial connections.”  So investors were engaged for capital and access to capital, technology 
advisors were engaged for scientific knowledge and, according to the founder, the two groups did not 
interact. 
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  Second, the activity being executed bound network participants by continuously engaging them in the 
exchange of resources and gathering of feedback to pursue the goals of the activity.  For example, the 
founder grounded the product development in customer needs from the beginning. “I went to the potential 
customers with the idea of doing this,” he explained, “they defined the attributes they wanted to see and 
then I stayed in touch with them…And continued to show them the advancements along the way.” “Our 
DNA,” according to one manager, “says we as a company - we really care about our customers and we 
really want a solution that fits in the long term…we’re going to compete because we’re going to listen to 
our customers and we’re going to help understand their pain points and we’re going to develop products 
that fit.”  The commitment to engaging customers throughout the execution of this activity created a 
strong bond between the stakeholders and provided momentum for continuous product improvements.  
One executive shared a comment from the head of a prospective customer: “You’ve listened to me and 
developed the product that really hits [our] sweet spot.” 
 
Third, the outcome of an activity instigated changes in network constituents.  With Pixel, it was the 
activities that underperformed expectations that resulted in the most dramatic changes in network 
participants.  For example, a series of CFOs were hired and promptly fired because, as the founder 
explained, “they wanted to sit there and count money instead of raising them…they came in to rearrange 
money…And they failed.  They were fired.”  From the founder’s perspective, the chief responsibility of the 
CFO is capital acquisition.  A series of missteps in hiring meant that fundraising became a persistent 
challenge and diverted the founder’s focus from other key activities, such as product design and customer 
acquisition.  “I'm probably on CFO number 6 by now,” the founder explained.  However, the current CFO, 
found through a local company that specializes in placing interim or contract CFOs in early stage 
technology ventures, brings extensive entrepreneurial experience, including fundraising and interacting 
with institutional investors.  The current CFO commented that the founder often introduces him “as the 
first darn CFO that he ever liked and worth a darn.”    
 
4.2.4 Pixel Networks Shaping Activities 
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While the nature and outcome of a focal activity impacted network development around that activity, the 
network participants themselves influenced the execution of activities through three ‘network effects:’ 
determining the strategy, determining the speed of execution and managing resources and stakeholder 
engagement. 
 
First, network constituents determined the strategy of the activity. Each individual that coalesced around a 
particular activity in this venture brought a unique combination of skills, resources and experience to the 
execution of that activity.   As individuals entered a particular network, their perspective and competency 
(or lack thereof) shaped the strategic direction of the activity, and as they departed they created voids in 
execution of the strategy or an opportunity to change the manner in which an activity was carried out.  
The difference in the customer acquisition strategy enacted by the two different heads of sales and 
marketing presented a dramatic example of the impact one person has on the strategic direction of an 
activity.   Another example of this effect is found in the influence of the operations manager on the 
product development strategy.   When he joined the company, the operations manager was not 
convinced that they would be able to overcome the challenges with the technology acquired by the 
founder.  As he explained:  
I'm more of the grassroots, feet on the ground, but from a practical perspective, I couldn't see 
how we're going to get there… so we started talking about [an alternate technology] somehow 
and I actually got some [alternate technology components] in here.  Spoke with [the 
founder]…why don't we build [the product] using [the alternate technology]?  His initial response 
was we can't get there on the price… And we let that go probably for four months and then all of 
a sudden, he came up with, why don't we do [the alternate technology]? 
 
Second, network constituents impacted the speed of execution of activities.  Time is critical for a young 
venture challenged to stake a claim in a new market before capital is exhausted and viable competitors 
appear.  As one employee noted, “you never make your progress fast enough certainly to please your 
board, and to please your investors.” Another manager pointed out that “Six months in a technology 
world, 12 months in a technology world, people have already passed you by…. you have to make the 
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decision to get out on the market.”  In this case, there were clear examples of network participants that 
increased the momentum within an activity and those who constrained progress.  Expanding the previous 
example, one executive shared how technology experts slowed down product development by getting 
stuck on a technological path and by a quest for perfection:  
Engineers by nature…we got to make this thing perfect and they freak out “Why are we releasing 
what we have, this is not right, this is not good.”  We can continue to sit here for the next six 
months to a year to get it better or you get it out there…We don't have this cash machine just 
sitting here funding us.  We've got to get it out and take that risk so it's all about timing…If you go 
too early, you could make a big mistake but if you wait, people are going to pass you by…[the 
founder] was being advised by a lot of smart guys and I think we probably stayed on that a little 
too long…all these smart guys are engineers and professors and these, no offense, these PhD 
people who sit in a bubble, who get funded by the states…they don't really have to produce 
anything.  So here, you’ve got to produce something, you know, we don't have money that just 
keeps coming in, we've got shareholders who want to see progress.”   
As one manager noted, “if you left it up to this aisle [engineering], we wouldn't get any place, we would be 
sitting in a box.”  
 
Third, network constituents managed resource utilization and facilitated stakeholder engagement by 
building structures and systems to guide and stabilize the activity.  As networks were forming around key 
activities, the implementation of certain systems and processes could be traced to specific stakeholders 
in the network.  For example, the current CFO saw his role as the person to “bring the process piece 
together with the visionary CEO.”  He formalized the sales reporting process, “getting it into a form where 
it’s kind of a more well-oiled machine,” and improved financial reporting systems adding that, “[the 
founder] said to me yesterday, he doesn’t know what I’m doing, but the board seems to love what I’m 
doing.”   Similarly, the SVP of Sales and Marketing reorganized the sales function and introduced 
processes for generating and qualifying leads, sales training and procedures for pursuing business that is 
more closely aligned with industry practices.  Another member of the management team also saw his role 
as “trying to improve the process” and articulated his relationship to the founder and his spouse as one of 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   65	  
trying to “[m]anage their energy, manage their vision.”  His vision is to add structure to the engineering 
function and improve the effectiveness of a single engineering function that currently handles both design 
and production:  “Eventually, we want to grow out of that and just have a design group that works on new 
products and then a production group that works with our contract manufacturers to maintain our current 
products and to enhance and drive cost down.” 
 
4.2.5 Pixel Path Building Modality and Networks-in-the-Making  
The analysis of Pixel reveals networks developing in a manner consistent with path creation.   From the 
time of inception, this venture was built around the input and collaboration of stakeholders who 
brainstormed, debated and implemented ideas.  Participants that joined the various networks created 
options and increased alternatives.  The findings of this case, however, also brought to light the 
emergence of path dependent processes as each activity unfolded.  Rather than emerging as a 
progressive process of tapering choices from self-reinforcing feedback, as described by Sydow et al, 
(2009) the emergence of path dependent processes was punctuated in nature and generally instigated by 
a new network participant with the intent of providing direction and improving the efficacy of an activity.  
Thus, in this bi-modal path-building environment, path dependence did not replace path creation (at least 
not yet) but enabled it to flourish. 
 
The sales systems and processes instituted by the new SVP of Sales and Marketing illustrates the 
emergence of these path dependent processes from Phase I to Phase II (Sydow et al., 2009).  As one 
executive explained, the customer acquisition strategy under the original head of sales and marketing 
was “we’re going to hope and pray and talk to them [customers] all the time and they’re going to buy.”  
But as that same executive pointed out, “’hope’ is not a sales strategy.”  In addition, in their zeal to deliver 
customers, sales reps were unknowingly violating industry practice by engaging certain customers 
directly rather than going through customary channels and intermediaries.  This alienated potentially 
important stakeholders in certain segments of the market.  Furthermore there was no system of tracking 
the sales process and understanding what opportunities were lost or why the product was not gaining 
traction.  Realizing that the ‘anything goes’ sales approach was not working, the new head of sales and 
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marketing explained, “I had to go talk to customers…figure out how they currently buy their products.” 
The result was the development of a sophisticated channel sales strategy coupled with, sales training, 
demand generation and lead qualification systems.  This structured approach rebuilt trust in the market 
and systematized the sales process making more efficient use of sales reps. According to company 
executives, the new structures that enveloped the sales process, instead of constricting action, opened 
distribution outlets, increased referrals from within the industry and increased sales productivity.   
 
This example illustrates a common theme that emerged throughout this case as activities unfolded: path 
dependent processes arose that guided network development and enabled more effective engagement of 
stakeholders and utilization of resources, but did not appear to inhibit the process of path creation or lead 
to lock-in.  In fact, it appeared that the tension that was created by the existence of two seemingly 
opposing modes of network building actually complimented or balanced each other.  This theme is further 
illustrated by the rules and conditions that the founder had around accepting commitments from investors.  
The structure around investor engagement preserved the autonomy of the company.  Similarly the 
reporting systems and processes instituted by the CFO improved investor engagement, attracted 
additional investment and allowed the founder to shift his attention to customer acquisition and product 
development. Thus, in this case, neither lock-in nor chaos was found in the unfolding of activities as 
opposing actions from the concurrent enactment of path creation and path dependence.  
4.3 Case: Prospect  
 
4.3.1 Prospect Overview 
Prospect involves an idea that was conceived by an entrepreneur in late 2006 who was simply trying to 
solve a problem with another company he had founded six years earlier while a junior in college: how to 
make sales and marketing more efficient.  Thinking the solution might be beneficial to other similar 
companies, the entrepreneur spent the next 90 days “talking to people” with the goal of getting money 
and domain experts on board to create and build a solution.   The domain expert was a college friend with 
whom the instigating entrepreneur reconnected through a chance meeting at an industry event earlier that 
year.   This individual, who had a background in digital marketing strategies, became the second co-
founder.  Through relationships in the local technology community, the instigating entrepreneur identified 
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a co-founder to run sales, as well as an angel investor who also recommended a co-founder with a 
programming background.   In March of 2007, the new venture was formally organized with four co-
founders.  Seed capital for the venture was provided by an angel investor and the co-founder who 
initiated the concept for the business.   
 
 The technology platform for a new service was built, but when the co-founders took it to market, they 
quickly found that it was not the service, but the technology platform that intrigued potential customers.  
Within a month, the first concept was “scrapped” and a decision was made by the college friends to 
become a software company.   This change in direction, however, was no longer a fit for the other two co-
founders, so they “parted ways.”  In addition, the angel investor was bought out of his stake in the 
company, with a return on his investment.  By the summer of 2007, a new lead engineer and eight college 
interns were hired to execute the new software strategy.  According to one of the surviving co-founders, 
within 90 days of founding, “the business was pretty different than what we started and the people that we 
started with.”   
 
With the help of a seasoned sales professional, the company’s fourth hire, who started in September of 
2007, the new venture was able to record its first revenues by year end.  However, market acceptance 
came slowly as they were helping to create a new market.  During 2008, as competitors began to emerge 
and market awareness of the benefits of this software grew, the firm focused on building a repeatable 
sales process.  By late 2009 “the business was building a nice momentum,” so the co-founders decided 
to “go raise some money to grow the business even faster.”  After venturing into the world of venture 
capital in late 2009, however, the co-founders decided that organic growth and funding was preferable to 
the dilution of ownership and risk associated with institutional investors.  
 
For the nearly five years since inception, this new venture has been “riding the wave of the emerging 
field” and has “gone from sort of a blip on the radar to one of the major names or providers in the world.”  
Although “it is still a market for early adopters,” the 65 employees are focused on growing the business, 
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“dominating” the market and “making a good name for ourselves.”  The co-founder who initiated this 
process in 2006 admits “[t]he second time around is so much easier.” 
 
4.3.2 Prospect Path Building Narrative 
The detailed path building narrative for this case is presented in Appendix 7.11, followed by a summary 
table that breaks down key findings for this case in terms of each of the seven path building dimensions in 
Appendix 7.12.  A summary path building narrative is presented below. 
 
Initial Conditions:  An entrepreneur seeking to improve the sales and marketing ability of a company he 
founded seven years earlier, while a junior in college, unexpectedly reconnects with a college 
acquaintance at an event for marketing professionals.  This friend happens to have the domain expertise 
the entrepreneur is seeking to help solve his business problem.  The two informally toss around ideas for 
months until the entrepreneur decides to develop one of the ideas he thinks will not only help his existing 
company in the marketing and sales of their product, but could also help other similar companies.  He 
also convinces his college friend to join him in this new venture.  Although he “didn’t believe 100% in the 
idea,” the college friend “believed 100% in [his] co-founder.”  The two co-founders developed a one-year 
operating budget and set out to find additional expertise and capital to turn the idea into a business.  
Therefore, while the past provided the context and the purpose for the new venture, the co-founders did 
not have all the components necessary to bring the idea to fruition.   
 
Instigating Events:  Led by the initiating entrepreneur, the co-founders deliberately and strategically set 
out to mobilize expertise and capital that would enable them to turn their idea into a marketable product.  
Each action and decision provided direction for the next step in the process of building the new venture.  
It was through relationships in the local technology community, that the initiating entrepreneur identified 
individuals who were willing to commit to the new venture.  The first to commit was an angel investor who 
had previously established a relationship with the entrepreneur for another project.  The angel investor 
not only committed capital to the new venture, he recommended a technology expert who became part of 
the founding team responsible for building the product.  Within this community, the co-founders identified 
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another co-founder to lead sales for the new venture.  The four member founding team developed the first 
version of the product and then took this to market to gather feedback and customers.  These very 
purposeful actions on the part of the co-founders to build the new venture proved their ability to mobilize 
critical resources from their existing networks to turn an idea into a product.  However, at this point there 
were no repeatable self-reinforcing processes that defined the emerging venture. 
 
Drivers:  Three distinct forces drove the emergence of this new venture.  First, continuous gathering and 
syntheses of feedback from stakeholders shaped decisions.  From a major change in the business model 
to development of functional teams to minor modifications in the product, input from customers and 
employees impacted the direction of the venture.  Second, maintenance of flexibility and autonomy 
enabled experimentation, failure and quick directional changes in response to feedback from 
stakeholders.   In fact, despite identification and cultivation of outside sources of capital, the co-founders 
consciously chose to remain independent and bootstrap the venture.  Not only did the co-founders not 
have to deal with expectations of other owners, but the constrained capital had a paradoxical benefit – 
mistakes were small so they were able to avoid “huge disasters financially.”  Third, an incremental 
approach to building the venture meant that resources were mobilized and omitted based on the value 
added to the venture, whether it was employees, customers or even ideas for product modifications.  
Interesting to note however, are the specific processes and structures that developed around each of 
these drivers.  For example, internal and external exchanges served to continuously capture stakeholder 
feedback and the structured recruiting process helped maintain culture and reduced mistakes in hiring.   
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  This venture was built around two groups of stakeholders, employees and 
customers, drawn from existing networks, as well as non-network sources.  Whether they came through 
online job boards, social media, college fairs or recruiters, employees were largely attracted to this 
venture because of the culture and as the venture grew referrals from these stakeholders became the 
preferred source for new employees.  New customers were similarly sourced from existing customer 
referrals and leads from online advertising, as well as sponsorships of online communities in which 
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potential customers were engaged.  Thus, Prospect intentionally sought to bring stakeholders into its 
networks by casting a wide net to access other networks to identify potential network participants. 
 
Networks of stakeholders were also bounded and intentionally managed.  For example, a highly 
structured recruiting process was designed to maintain the culture that was viewed as a key strength of 
the young venture.  In addition, not only did the co-founders decide on two different occasions to remain 
independent owners, which eliminated the need for a board, they specifically avoided establishing an 
advisory board.  Instead, they chose to interact with mentors and peers through informal settings or 
professional forums when they needed advice.  Furthermore, when it came to customer engagement, 
feedback from prospects on product modifications was given low priority, and feedback from customers 
that would not benefit the majority of existing customers was not considered.   
 
Despite the boundaries and intentional management of networks, however, the complexity of stakeholder 
engagement increased as the venture progressed.  For example, product development went from market 
input debated and prioritized by co-founders who directed implementation by the lead engineer, to an 
activity involving the polling, negotiation and prioritization of input from a growing number of customers 
and employees from all functions.  And, as stakeholder engagement in underlying activities grew more 
complex, structures and processes developed around the execution of such activities.  These systems did 
not limit or constrain input and interaction between stakeholders, but instead, enhanced the ability and 
efficiency of the young venture to gather and process input from the growing number of stakeholders. 
 
Contingency:  With particular attention to market feedback and a willingness to experiment and change 
direction, the two co-founders demonstrated an ability to turn the unexpected into opportunity.  For 
example, when the original four member founding team failed to gain traction in the market with the new 
service, the two initial co-founders “scrapped” the original idea, disbanded the founding team, bought out 
the angel investor and rebuilt the company based on what they heard the market needed.  The first two 
employees hired following the reorganization of the venture were identified based on “luck” and 
“accident.”  The employees, an engineer and a sales rep, whose qualifications exceeded the expectations 
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of the co-founders became important members of the management team and critical to the growth of the 
venture.   While these examples illustrate opportunities developed from the unexpected, there were also 
instances when the transformation of an emergent situation led to a process that narrowed action within 
the young venture.  Recognizing a unique culture that had formed around the early group of employees, 
the co-founders created a structured recruiting process geared to preserving that culture.   The low 
turnover, ability to attract employees and growth of the venture has been attributed to the persistence of 
this culture through this structured hiring process.  
 
Scope of Action:  Early in the formation of the venture, decisions were controlled and constrained by the 
co-founders.  The co-founders persistently declined outside funding and saw no value in forming an 
advisory board.  While these actions appeared to narrow the range of options available to the emerging 
venture and limit the networks of stakeholders, they actually provided the co-founders with complete 
autonomy to build an organization with the capacity to experiment, fail and rebound quickly.  As 
managers were recruited, the co-founders pushed decision-making to the operational level by providing 
managers with the autonomy to build and shape their own functional areas.   A culture emerged in which 
trying something new without fear of failure was the norm.  Constrained financial resources, however, 
meant that growth in terms of customers and employees was incremental, and experimentation was 
cheap as long as failure resulted in a quick directional shift.  Thus, there was a willingness to dismantle, 
replace and rebuild with respect to strategy and people.  This was especially evident in the aggressive 
performance management of the sales team.  New alternatives and opportunities were also continuously 
being created through the active engagement of stakeholders, both customers and employees.  Again, 
constrained resources meant that input from the increasing number of stakeholders was organized, 
debated and prioritized so that only ideas that benefited most of the existing client base were 
implemented to ensure that change lead to increased value.    
 
Outcome:  The business that emerged was dramatically different from the original concept.  While the 
unfolding of this venture involved a process of continuous change through the deliberate gathering and 
synthesis of feedback from stakeholders, stability was intentionally built into the process of emergence to 
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prevent stakeholder engagement from overwhelming the organization.  The active management and 
engagement of stakeholders by the co-founders constrained resources in one respect yet enhanced 
autonomy, agility and opportunity in another.  Growth that occurred incrementally as a result of limited 
resources had a positive benefit in that action characterized by autonomy and experimentation did not 
result in catastrophic failure.  Structured processes that emerged around various activities enabled an 
increasing number of stakeholders to participate in shaping the direction of the venture by organizing and 
prioritizing feedback.  However, these structures and systems also served to create homogeneity in the 
culture of the organization as well as the customers they pursued.  Nonetheless, there are indications that 
continued growth of the venture will present future challenges to the maintenance of the culture in spite of 
the structure and processes in place. 
 
4.3.3 Prospect Activities Shaping Networks 
Networks associated with the emergence of Prospect did not randomly emerge, but were created out of 
strategic action to support specific activities of the venture, consistent with Feld (1981) and Fombrun 
(1982).  The findings of this case revealed that entrepreneurial activities intentionally enacted by 
stakeholders shaped the networks of the new venture through two ‘network effects’: the coalescing of 
networks and the continuous engagement of participants.  
 
First, the initiation and evolution of an activity triggered the coalescence of network participants by 
determining ‘when’ to activate the network and ‘who’ should be included in the network.  This venture did 
not rise from a mass gathering of people the co-founders knew on a particular founding date.  It was the 
result of an incremental and selective gathering, from existing network and non-network sources, 
individuals with specific talents and skills needed to execute a focal activity.  New networks were initiated 
as new activities were added to the repertoire of the young venture.  The sequence of hiring managers 
was directly tied to the initiation of specific activities.  After the first version of the venture was “scrapped,” 
the original two co-founders immediately hired an engineer to build the technology.  No other employees 
were hired at that time and, in fact, the only support the lead engineer had was a team of eight summer 
interns, so in essence, he was actually the ‘lone’ engineer.  Once the product was ready to be launched, 
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the co-founders hired an experienced sales professional as a sales rep to begin establishing the market 
for the product.  He began customer acquisition as a sole rep aided by the support of a co-founder and 
the engineer who could hear his cold calls through the office wall and would instant message helpful tips 
while he was on the calls.   A year later, when a customer base was established, an experienced project 
manager was hired to begin building a customer service and support team.  A couple years later, as 
stakeholder engagement around product development became increasingly more complex, the co-
founders hired a dedicated product manager to oversee the process.  Each of these managers, in turn, 
built their teams incrementally according to the needs of the firm.  One manager explained the hiring 
philosophy instilled by the co-founders as follows: “It was really all about being opportunistic and being 
able to have a good idea and opportunistically staffing around that idea.” 
 
Findings related to capital acquisition provide additional support for this ‘activity effect.’  Two years after 
the founding of the venture, the co-founders decided to seek institutional funding to enable them to 
accelerate growth. According one co-founder, “We just talked to whoever would talk to us” and once the 
word was out, “people who had different connections…would open doors.”  Although the co-founders had 
relationships in the local venture capital community, it was connections through other entrepreneurs and 
even a high school friend who opened doors to VCs in other cities.  The network arose from initiation of 
the activity…and was deactivated as soon as the co-founders decided against using external funding for 
growth and terminated the activity. 
 
Furthermore, while each new network that emerged from a specific activity involved a distinct group of 
participants, some networks included individuals new to the venture, as well as individuals from networks 
focused on other activities within the venture.  The network that formed around product development best 
illustrates this.  Product development network constituents originally consisted of the co-founders, the 
lead engineer and engineering interns.  As the venture grew, the team of engineers grew to 10 full time 
employees and stakeholders from other networks who had an interest in product development were 
drawn into the process, including customers, sales reps and customer service associates from the 
customer acquisition team. 
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Second, the activity being executed bound network participants by continuously engaging them in the 
exchange of resources to attain the goals of the activity.  The relationship of participants within a network 
was persistently reinforced through the active solicitation of input and the encouragement of debate and 
negotiation between network participants.  Thus, participation in the network was not merely an exchange 
of resources to execute an activity, but an act of co-creation within the focal activity.   This in turn 
strengthened the cohesion of individuals within a particular network.  For example, “the first major 
iteration in the business” as described by one co-founder was based purely on direct market feedback: “It 
was very obvious once we had enough information, once we talked to enough people about the original 
idea, it was obvious that what we had built and the direction we were going, this other thing was going to 
prove to be much more valuable.”  The solicitation of feedback from stakeholders did not stop with the 
first major shift in the business, but pervaded emergence of the venture.   Customer acquisition and 
product development were also highly collaborative processes where feedback was continuously 
gathered and implemented.  
 
For example, all functions contributed to building an internal knowledge base, “the corporate brain,” that 
provides the sales team with quick responses to questions or objections that might arise during a sales 
call.  The client onboarding process according to one manager  “was something we put together based on 
client feedback…and we’ve tweaked it since then, just based on client feedback as well.”  Similarly, with 
respect to product development, as one-co-founder explained: “[W]e make changes every day…it comes 
from a mix of customer requests and our own vision for the product…It comes from everybody at the 
company…every department is sort of a constituent and the clients are the main constituents.”  Indeed, 
even internal and external exchanges were established to allow customers and employees to not only 
post ideas for product modifications, but enabled them to debate and vote on ideas.  One manager noted, 
“[W]e usually get notifications whenever something is posted” and explained that if an idea got 55 votes 
“then we know it’s something important.”   
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This intentional commitment to stakeholder engagement not only allowed the venture to more effectively 
allocate resources and respond to market demand, but also provided a rapidly growing base of 
stakeholders with ownership in determining the direction of the business.  A benefit of more engaged 
stakeholders is low turnover in the network, especially important to a business where customers are on 
month-to-month contracts and employees with specialized skills are in high demand. The outcome 
according to one co-founder:  “Our clients love us because we bend over backwards for them.” 
 
4.3.4 Prospect Networks Shaping Activities 
Just as the focal activities shaped the networks that developed in the emerging venture, network 
constituents shaped the manner in which activities were executed through two ‘network effects’: 
determining the strategy and managing network exchanges. 
 
First, network constituents determined the strategy of the activity.  As a focal activity gathered participants 
into a specific network, the unique background and experience of each participant shaped how the 
activity was executed.  As one manager explained, “[O]ne of the greatest benefits is getting to sort of craft 
what I do and shape it.”  Another manager described the team he built as an “imperfect version of me.”  
Since the market was emerging as the venture was emerging, there were no established rules, tools and 
standard practices to define how stakeholders within a network should execute a particular activity.  
Therefore, it was incumbent on participants within a network to borrow from their own experience, the 
expertise of others in their personal networks or the creativity of the developing network to craft the 
strategies to execute the specific activity.  In other words, as one manager expressed it, “[W]e were 
learning on the fly...We were learning as we went.”  An example of the discretion managers had in 
crafting the strategies for activities comes from customer acquisition:  
[W]e had the idea that we sell software [for a specific function]…it makes sense on paper. We 
called them [professionals in that function]…no one cared…from there we just went back to our 
initial assumption that B2B technology companies, much like [the company owned by the 
initiating co-founder]…would be companies that would drive the most value from a tool like 
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[Prospect]...We needed to go out and find out how sound it was...by stepping out and trying 
something new but then we redirected back.” 
 
Second, network constituents managed resource utilization and facilitated stakeholder engagement by 
building structures and systems to stabilize and guide the activity.  Execution of an activity with limited 
resources, especially financial and human resources, in a growing business in a new industry where there 
is no blueprint to follow could easily result in financial disaster if not thoughtfully managed.  Network 
constituents in this case developed processes and rules that controlled the manner in which activities 
unfolded, but did so in a way that encouraged engagement of network participants.  As a result, feedback 
was gathered and ideas were generated but action was organized and based on rules and prioritization 
based on valued added to the venture.  There are numerous examples in this case. 
 
One example is the formalized approach to product development introduced by the VP of Product hired in 
2011.  One manager explains the process as follows: “[W]e come up with the top 10 things we’d like to 
see… and we have to explain and justify why we think this thing is important…every department in the 
organization has the opportunity to come up with 10 things and then you negotiate your way into having 
those in the product.”  In addition, a structured performance management system was developed for the 
sales force that closely monitored activity to enable identification, intervention and dismissal of employees 
who were not performing according to clearly defined expectations.  According to one manager, “[E]very 
time we do an employee survey we get nasty feedback from the sales reps who can't believe I have the 
gall to hold them responsible for numbers.”  This same manager who summed up the “mantra” of the firm 
when it came to hiring as “Hire slowly, fire quickly,” was also praised for a system of rewards that has 
helped young associates reach “places they’d never expected to be at this point in their lives.”   
 
On the other side of the table are rules around customer engagement.  Since the firm offers one product 
to all customers, it has a policy that product modifications must benefit at least 80 % of the customers.  
One-off changes to attract certain prospects or retain a particular customer could diminish the value of the 
product to other customers and misallocate company resources to serve a few customers to the detriment 
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of the broader customer base.  One co-founder shared the firm’s philosophy as follows: “We never listen 
to prospects because they want everything…So even if Microsoft said we’ll sign up but you have to do 
this…if it doesn’t meet the needs of the rest of our clients, it will just sort of ruin the product…we’d rather 
be opinionated.”  Therefore, expectations around accommodating changes are established early with 
prospective clients.  Furthermore, there is a policy of firing customers who are unprofessional to 
employees.  No customer business is worth ruining an employee’s day according to one co-founder: 
“[W]e expect them to treat us well…so, if we ever have a client that is out of line or rude, they get 
transferred to me immediately so that I can fire them…they get one warning.” 
 
4.3.5 Prospect Path Building Modality and Networks-in-the-Making 
The findings from Prospect further an understanding of the relationship between the execution of key 
entrepreneurial activities and the networks that develop around those activities in an emerging technology 
venture. When framed in the context of organizational path building, the findings reveal an interesting 
dynamic between path creation and path dependence.  Evidence from this case points to path creation at 
the heart of network development, where stakeholders who opportunistically enter and depart from 
networks actively engage in shaping the business through feedback, negotiation and debate.  While path 
creation was the basis for network development, path dependent structures simultaneously emerged 
around each activity to guide network development and resource utilization so that stakeholders who 
engaged in shaping the venture were accretive not dilutive to the emerging organization. These structures 
and processes built around specific key activities for a defined purpose bounded options, however there 
was no evidence that they enkindled a continuous tapering of action and choices when it came to network 
development.  In fact, the findings show that these systems and procedures actually enabled autonomy 
and broader action by network participants.  In contrast to the model suggested by Sydow et al. (2009) 
the creation of these path dependent processes were punctuated in nature and opportunistic, not 
progressive as described by the model of organizational path dependence.    
 
Take the highly structured recruiting process.  One co-founder explained the culture was created “sort of 
by luck”: “[O]ur first dozen or so employees were fantastic…we looked around and said this is something 
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we want to preserve.”  Intent on maintaining and replicating this unique culture, the co-founders identified 
attributes that characterized the group of employees: positive, supportive, and self-starting.  They then 
developed a complex recruiting process, “a scientific process to make sure we keep that going.”  The 
process includes handwriting analysis, skills testing and several rounds of interviews with an offer 
predicated on the “100% unanimous” decision of those involved in the interview process.  This could be 
interpreted as the “positive feedback” that Sydow et al. (2009, pp. 694, 696) refer to that results in  “self-
reinforcing processes.”  Although indicative of a path dependent process that clearly impacts network 
development around talent acquisition, the recruiting process did not constrain the engagement of 
stakeholders and the accumulation and synthesis of feedback in shaping the emerging venture.  Instead, 
the recruiting process simply provided guideposts and mile markers for decisions, not a straitjacket.  
Other similar examples of this phenomenon, previously presented, include the performance management 
system for the sales force that helped retain performers, while enabling an early departure of those who 
could not meet expectations, as well as the systems for engaging stakeholders and prioritizing feedback 
for product development that bound network participants in product development but prevented the 
network from overheating and draining company resources trying to address all participant feedback. 
 
In other words, the findings of this case show network development that was clearly driven by strategic 
action, not a “random act of genius” (Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 903).  The findings also present a view 
of network building that began as a process of path creation that actually enabled path dependent 
systems and processes to emerge.  These path dependent structures and processes borne out of path 
creation then, paradoxically, stabilized and guided the continued process of path creation.  In fact the 
bimodal process of network building enabled through the intentional action of stakeholders in this case, 
facilitated and contained stakeholder engagement to enable more effective engagement of stakeholders 
and utilization of resources, but certainly did not lead to “lock-in” at this point in the development of the 
company.  Whether continued growth in the number of stakeholders will challenge the stabilizing 
structures of path dependence or the ability to engage stakeholders and experiment is yet to be 
determined since as one manager noted, “It’s starting to get to the point where not everybody knows each 
other really well…and then preserving the culture is difficult.”   This case, however, provides another 
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perspective of path building in emerging ventures that challenges and expands the current body of 
literature. 
 
4.4 Cross Case Analysis 
 
4.4.1 Path Building and the Dynamics of Entrepreneurial Activities and Networks 
Using the relationship between the execution of key entrepreneurial activities and the composition of the 
networks that form around those activities as the conduit through which to study firm emergence, findings 
from the individual cases provide rich insight into the dynamics of entrepreneurial activities and networks.  
Comparing the evidence across cases, however, yields additional insight into network development and 
firm emergence.  Table 4.4.1-1 compares case findings along four dimensions, highlighting 
commonalities, differences and, most notably, revealing three distinct stages in the process of 
emergence. 
 
 
Table 4.4.1-1 Cross Case Comparison. 
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The first key observation from the case comparison is that the path building framework used in data 
analysis revealed path creation as the initial, dominant and foundational mode of network building in all 
three cases.  This finding differs from the way firm emergence is often portrayed in the network-based 
literature where new ventures begin as path dependent or evolve from a path dependent mode to one 
that is intentionally managed.  Differences in the definition of path dependence or a lack of in depth 
empirical research on the specific path building process in young entrepreneurial firms are two possible 
explanations that may account for this.   
 
A second key observation from the case comparison is that the network building process in all three 
cases was not static.  In fact, the findings actually point to a point of transition in network building that has 
not been fully investigated in the literature: the spawning of path dependent processes (or a need for such 
processes) from the process of path creation.  This finding can be more easily understood by keeping in 
mind the specific definition of path dependence used in this study as the tapering of scope, choice and 
action or a constrained pattern of decision making from some initial decision or self-reinforcing process 
(Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010).  In this study, path dependent processes were manifested 
as structures, systems, rules and practices that arose intentionally to guide, direct and control decisions 
and interactions within and between networks during emergence. While it was found that the process of 
path creation generated the need for path dependent processes, there was no evidence that path 
dependent structures replaced or dampened path creation in the cases.  Instead, the processes emerged 
serially, but progressed concurrently.6  The driver behind the emergence of path dependent structures 
appeared to be improved efficiency in resource utilization.  
 
Although unintentional when selecting cases for this research, each case represents a different state of 
development in path building as distinguished by the degree to which path dependence guided decision-
making in activities.  Coupon represents a path of emergence characterized by path creation that has 
created an emerging need for path dependent processes. Performance management and the 
prioritization of stakeholder feedback were largely ad hoc and at the discretion of managers instead of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I thank Ben Oviatt for finding a better way to articulate this finding. 
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based on specific processes and guidelines and a repeatable customer acquisition process had not 
developed because they were “building and running” at the same time.  Study participants explicitly 
communicated the need for structure and processes, particularly around recruiting, product development 
and customer acquisition to enable the more efficient utilization of resources (i.e., time talent and capital) 
and prevent being overwhelmed by feedback and demands from a rapidly growing base of stakeholders 
from different networks.  Moving along the continuum, Pixel represents network building where path 
dependent systems have begun to emerge to stabilize and guide, but not constrain, the process of path 
creation in certain activities.  For example, a formalized customer acquisition process was being 
developed during the course of the study that integrated the financial administration of the company.   
The new structure and systems in this activity, initiated by a new head of sales and new CFO, helped 
opened distribution channels and led to the creation of novel financing programs in the industry.  Finally, 
in Prospect path dependent systems and procedures were found to envelop and guide every key activity. 
For example, the highly structure recruiting process, rigorous sales training and tracking and the internal 
and external platforms for gathering feedback and ranking ideas around product development and 
modification were created to facilitate and moderate stakeholder engagement in an effort to ensure that 
those who joined various networks were additive and not impediments to firm progress.  Similar to the 
other cases, it was the process of path creation that enabled the creation of path dependent structures to 
stabilize, guide and facilitate path creation itself.   
 
The literature suggests that path creation, if not stabilized, can lead to action that can “spin out of control” 
(Garud & Karnoe, 2001, loc. 564).  As each of these ventures grew, so did the number and nature of 
individuals who committed in some way to the growth of the venture.  Attempting to interact, integrate 
feedback and respond to all of these stakeholders can easily overwhelm and deplete the limited 
resources of each firm.  Perhaps the need for structure and emergence of path dependent processes 
may have been a way to manage engagement with this growing number of stakeholders, efficiently 
deploy resources and prevent activities from spinning out of control.  
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The literature also offers multiple perspectives on the transition or concurrence of modes of path building.   
Whether the findings of this study can be explained as the entrepreneurial transition described by 
Schumpeter,(1934) the “critical juncture” or progression through the phases described by Sydow et al. 
(2005, 2009), or the beginnings of concurrent process modes as suggested by McKelvey(2004), is 
beyond the scope of this research.  These findings do, however, offer a gateway for further study and 
communication about the development of networks and firm emergence in terms of, not just the 
presence, absence or concurrence of modes of path building, but whether and how each mode of path 
building impacts key entrepreneurial activities and outcomes. 
 
In addition to the insight into the dynamics of path building, a third key finding from the comparison of 
cases supports the view that networks are the direct outcome of the execution of distinct activities 
initiated in the pursuit of specific milestones.  In fact, the effects of activities on network development 
were fairly uniform throughout the cases.  In each case, it was the initiation of a particular activity that 
triggered the coalescence of network participants and determined the composition of the network. In 
addition, the execution of activities facilitated continuous engagement primarily through the solicitation of 
feedback, which bound network participants.  And, unless there was a negative outcome in an activity, 
constituents within networks remained stable.   
 
Conversely, network constituents also had an effect on the unfolding of activities.  The skills, experience 
and resources of network constituents determined the strategic direction of an activity, as well as how 
quickly milestones were achieved.  One notable difference, however, relates to the emergence of path 
dependent systems and processes.  In Pixel and Prospect, network constituents intentionally managed 
resources and stakeholder engagement through the development of systems and procedures to stabilize 
and guide the unfolding of an activity.  The data from Coupon, however, revealed that network 
constituents were not as focused on the development of such systems and processes in the execution of 
activities, although there was a growing recognition of the need to implement such structure in the future. 
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The findings from all three cases reveal a continuous interaction between an activity and the composition 
of the network that forms around the activity, each shaping the other as the venture emerges.  The 
similarities in findings across cases provides support for using the networks formed around the five key 
activities as a conduit for studying path building in emerging firms.   
 
Taking a broader view, if the boundaries of the venture are viewed as the sum of all the networks that 
form around activities being enacted in the firm, this dynamic between activities and networks illuminates 
how the boundaries of an emerging venture expand, contract and change during emergence.  Using 
Coupon as an example, the three networks that formed around capital acquisition, product development 
and customer acquisition changed significantly during emergence as a result of changes in strategies of 
those activities.  The capital acquisition network expanded from primarily venture capital firms who 
provided capital to strategic corporate partners who helped the company access new domestic customer 
segments as well as international markets.  The product development network evolved from a small team 
of developers who specialized in fast prototyping to a network made up of traditional software engineers 
and developers as well as stakeholders from other networks such as customers and sales managers who 
redefined the product.  The sales team went from a team of professionals from the digital media industry 
to a sales team from a more traditional advertising industry that changed significantly the customer base 
of the company.  Taken together, the changes in these three networks as a result of changes in the 
strategic direction of the activities altered how the company defined itself in terms of investors, customers, 
geography, employees and the product itself.  In essence, a study of network development is a study of 
venture boundaries. 
 
4.4.2 Influence of Funding Source  
The design of this study intentionally included variation for the method in which each case was 
capitalized.   Each case relied on a distinct funding source:  Coupon co-founders funded their venture 
using venture capital, the Pixel founder relied on angel investors, friends and family for funding, and 
Prospect co-founders bootstrapped their venture.  This enabled an investigation of the impact that 
different types of funding sources had on network development and emergence of entrepreneurial 
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ventures.  A summary of the results provided in Table 4.4.1-1 below reveals that there were differences in 
network development and firm emergence associated with the specific funding source.  However, are the 
differences an outcome of a particular type of funding, or can these differences be attributed to broader 
strategic action on the part of entrepreneurs? 
 
Table 4.4.2-1 Influence of Funding Source on Emergence of Networks and Venture 
 
First, it is interesting to note is that the entrepreneurs in this study funded their current ventures in the 
same manner as their previous venture(s).  An immediate conclusion is that the pattern of funding may be 
attributed to entrepreneurs simply leveraging relationships from preexisting networks for their new 
ventures.  The co-founders in Prospect, however, pursued two different modes of funding, expending 
great effort to build new funding networks, and both times chose not to use those resources.  Thus, 
simply attributing funding source to existing network contacts is insufficient.  Furthermore, the building of 
the networks was not solely predicated on the type of resources stakeholders could bring to the table.  
For example, the literature often cites the non-financial benefits of outside funding such as expertise and 
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leads.  Instead, what the evidence from this study reveals is that engagement of a particular funding 
source reflects how founders weighed the desire to maintain autonomy and flexibility against the 
mobilization of resources. Institutional investors, such as venture capitalists, require formal engagement 
with their portfolio companies through board seats.  Individual or angel investors may be amenable to less 
formal types of engagement or they may see themselves as partners in the business.  However, 
bootstrapping or self-funding offers the greatest autonomy to an entrepreneur…if you can afford it.  The 
evidence from this study showed that the founders in all cases intentionally managed their networks of 
stakeholders and expressed the desire to avoid the type of investors who want to tell the founder how to 
run the business.  The actions of Pixel and Prospect founders, however, clearly reflected an aversion to 
interaction with investors as partners in the business and placed a higher value on control of how the 
business unfolded.   
 
When the initial co-founders of Prospect, for example, decided to scrap the original business concept and 
significantly change the venture based on market feedback, they determined that flexibility and autonomy 
were critical.  Consequently, the co-founder who also provided seed capital acquired the interest of the 
angel investor.  This path of capital acquisition influenced the development of the business model in that 
a repeatable customer acquisition process needed to be quickly attained so that the venture could 
generate sufficient cash flow to support growth.  The co-founders pursued venture funding several years 
later to accelerate growth, but again decided against accepting institutional capital because of concerns 
about dilution of ownership and the need to perform to investor expectations.  In fact, these co-founders 
deliberately choose not to establish an advisory board, instead seeking outside counsel opportunistically 
through peers and mentors in both informal and formal settings.  Independence of ownership allowed the 
co-founders to shape the venture according to their timeline and in response to stakeholder feedback 
instead of building a venture based on the expectations and timeline of other investors. One co-founder 
admitted that although this path was initially more challenging, it unfolded as the more “liberating” path. 
 
Coupon co-founders, in contrast, strategically sought investors with specific resources that could help the 
venture grow and were actively engaged with investors as business partners and board members.  
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Indeed, they even expanded the board to include an independent member recommended by another 
investor.  The network they built around capital acquisition not only provided access to capital, but also 
provided access to advice, key executives, specific customer segments and international markets.  Thus 
the type of funding impacted not only the networks built around capital acquisition, but facilitated all key 
activities with the exception of product development.  Without access to these resources, the co-founders 
of Coupon admit that the process of venture emergence would have taken much longer.  
 
Similar to Prospect, the founder of Pixel placed a higher priority on autonomy and intentionally managed 
stakeholder engagement around this.  By seeking capital from individual investors, requiring all investors 
to assign their voting rights to him and limiting the board in the first five years to the largest investor, the 
founder was able to manage stakeholder interaction by minimizing “micromanagement” from owners.  
Unlike the co-founders of Prospect, however, the Pixel founder followed a specific capital path to not only 
maximize autonomy, but also to enable access to other potential investors.  So, resource mobilization 
was a secondary driver.   In contrast to Coupon and Prospect, the capital path of Pixel became an 
obstacle to network and consequently, venture emergence however.  One explanation may be a 
mismatch between the chosen capital path and a business model that required significantly greater 
capital than could be raised from individuals and the length of time to internally generate funds due to the 
long R&D and sales cycle. 
 
The comparison of cases based on source of funding provides insight into a key entrepreneurial decision, 
the tradeoff between autonomy and resource mobilization.  Evidence from this study reveals how the 
capital acquisition path can impact network development and firm emergence through an activity effect 
(the strategy pursued by a specific activity determined network constituents) and a network effect 
(network constituents determined the speed of an activity).  In addition, these findings raise the potentially 
detrimental impact a mismatch between the source of funding, the balancing of autonomy versus 
resource mobilization and the business model.  Thus, insight into the process of network building and firm 
emergence provided by this variation in cases highlights an important factor that should be attended to 
when studying network building and new venture emergence.  
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5 CONTRIBUTION 	  
 
The absence of a dominant paradigm (Rothaermel, Agung, & Jiang, 2007), mixed findings (Sarasvathy & 
Venkataraman, 2011), and limited in-depth empirical studies (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011) 
suggest there is room for a contribution to the understanding of how entrepreneurship unfolds.  First, 
however, it is important to acknowledge that it was a very rich body of nearly four decades of prior 
research that provided the foundation for this study.  In other words, this study was crafted by ‘standing 
on the [shoulders] of giants’ and even perhaps ‘stepping on the toes of those who came before [me].’7   
The exploratory nature of this research contributes to the understanding of how entrepreneurship unfolds 
in three ways: (1) by advancing the principles of engaged scholarship to further ground research in 
practice, (2) by providing new insight into the relationship between entrepreneurial activities and networks 
during new venture emergence, and (3) by integrating an organizational path building framework with 
network-based research to understand how paths are built during new venture emergence.   In addition, 
this research illuminates a path for future research in entrepreneurship that builds on these findings.  The 
contributions are not limited to the scholarship arena, however.  This research also has important 
implications for the practice of entrepreneurship, especially as it relates to managing the relationship 
between key activities and the networks that form around those activities during emergence of a new 
venture. 
 
5.1 Benefits of Engaged Scholarship 
 
Klein (1999, p. 6) makes the following observation about applied research: “If the things we learn do not 
have much practical value, perhaps we are investigating questions that are not important.”  The most 
effective way to determine if what is being studied is important to practice, is to fully engage practitioners 
in the research process.  Van de Ven (2007, p. 9) defines “engaged scholarship” as “a participative form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  According to Wikiquote on 06.08.12 (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton), the first quote is 
attributed to Sir Isaac Newton in a 1676 letter to Robert Hooke.  In the letter, ‘shoulders’ was spelled 
‘sholders.’  The second quote is attributed by various internet sources to Dan Ingalls, Jr., a pioneer in 
computer programming. 
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of research for obtaining the different perspectives of key stakeholders…in studying complex problems.”  
The spirit and practice of engaged scholarship was carried throughout this research. 
 
Certainly entrepreneurship is a complex phenomenon and, the emergence of entrepreneurial ventures 
with the ability to defy the likelihood of failure is a problem yet to be solved...and worthy of continued 
investigation. By leveraging the knowledge and experience of entrepreneurs and their advisors from the 
onset, the domain was bounded and a study crafted that enabled the collection of a robust set of data. 
Interviews from the initial sampling of entrepreneurs provided an understanding of the practice of 
entrepreneurship from the viewpoint of the practitioner.  Access to resources was a recurring theme in 
these interviews, validating the importance of network research and the study of resource acquisition 
strategies of entrepreneurs.  In fact, one participant even asked if I had contacts at the University to help 
in their recruiting of students with degrees in software engineering and statistics, causing me to pause 
and rethink my selection of a case study methodology over action research! Furthermore, framing the 
study around the key entrepreneurial activities defined by entrepreneurs themselves meant that interview 
questions required little explanation and appeared to be similarly interpreted by participants.  As a result, 
common terminology, stories and themes emerged facilitating not only the analysis of activities within a 
case, but also the cross-case analysis.  Thus, the application of principles of engaged scholarship 
enabled a research path that led to findings that will not only advance the relevant body of literature but 
will be meaningful to entrepreneurs seeking to improve their practice…and odds of survival. 
 
5.2 Multiple Networks and Key Entrepreneurial Activities 
This research contributes to entrepreneurship literature that addresses the entrepreneurial network, new 
venture emergence and the resource acquisition strategies of entrepreneurs.  By approaching new 
venture emergence as a function of not one large firm network but many networks, this research builds on 
earlier research that disaggregates the entrepreneurial network in terms of different functions.  
Specifically, this research demonstrates the efficacy of studying the dynamics of emergence through five 
activities in which entrepreneurs of new ventures explicitly claim to engage to mobilize resources vital to 
the pursuit of goals that facilitate firm emergence.  The extension and application of this approach by this 
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research enabled the collection of robust data that facilitated an alternate understanding of new venture 
emergence.   
 
In particular, findings of this research illustrate how an activity influences network formation and dynamics 
in terms of the coalescence, the composition and the changing of network participants (activity effects).  
Without a focal activity, a network has no purpose or reason for being.  Thus, the purpose or driving force 
behind a network, that is, the focal activity, should provide a basis for studying network development in 
entrepreneurial firms.  Whether it is the five entrepreneurial activities identified in this research, or some 
modification thereof, the benefit of studying a network in terms of a specific focal activity is the rich data 
that enables deeper insight into how and why network stakeholders that shape a venture come to be.  
Additionally, the use of entrepreneur-defined activities improves communication between researchers and 
entrepreneurs and may lead to more practical theory. 
 
Conversely, this research also revealed how the particular constituents of a network impacts the unfolding 
and the outcome of an activity in terms of strategy, speed of execution, management of resources and 
stakeholder engagement (network effects).  Indeed, an activity that is initiated to pursue a certain goal of 
a young venture is enabled by the network that forms around it.  Without the network, the activity has no 
organized way to pursue the goal.  Furthermore, certain activities, or the pursuit of certain milestones that 
involve multiple concurrent activities, create networks that draw upon multiple existing networks to 
mobilize vital resources (interlocking networks).  In fact, the totality of the networks that form around 
different activities in essence define the boundaries of a new venture during emergence, boundaries 
which are continuously being shaped and reshaped as the firm emergences.   
 
Based on these findings, this research contributes an alternate view of new venture emergence that is a 
function of the symbiotic relationship between specific activities enacted by entrepreneurs to pursue 
certain goals and the networks that form around those activities. This research also contributes a new 
lens through which to study firm emergence in terms of the networks that form around five key 
entrepreneurial activities.  But this is only part of the story of entrepreneurial venture emergence. 
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5.3 Path Building as a Framework for Studying New Venture Emergence 
 
A second contribution of this research is to the literature on organizational path building and 
entrepreneurial path building.  Literature pertaining to entrepreneurial networks, entrepreneurial 
effectuation and new technology emergence present conflicting claims with respect to entrepreneurial 
path building.  Some speculate this conflict arises from a limited or varied understanding of path building 
theories (Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010).  Recent literature on path dependence, path 
creation and effectuation were synthesized to identify a priori criteria that distinguish these modes of 
organizational path building.  By consolidating these theories into one framework, this research 
contributes a foundation for a common language, understanding and mode of discernment of path 
building in order to advance a uniform use of these concepts in the literature.  It also may change the 
conversation.  For example, entrepreneurial effectuation, which explicitly claims to be path dependent, 
was originally considered a potential third category of path building.  However, when the path building 
framework was applied, effectuation mapped to path creation, not path dependence as defined by Sydow 
et al. (2009) and Vergne and Durand (2011).   
 
The use of organizational path building provided both an interesting metaphor and a disciplined format to 
study the unfolding of entrepreneurial activities and formation of entrepreneurial networks. The path 
building criteria was an effective structure for both coding and analysis of interview transcripts.  In 
addition, when applied at both the activity level and firm level, the framework enabled a deeper insight 
into venture emergence.  Notably, the findings in this research provide a different perspective on 
entrepreneurial path building than presented in much of the entrepreneurship literature.   Not only was 
path creation identified as the initial and principle mechanism of network building, but evidence of the 
emergence of a second mechanism of path building, path dependence, was found in all three cases.  
Whether it was Divine intervention or just dumb luck, one pleasant surprise was how each case 
represented a different phase in emergence of path dependence as a concurrent mode of network 
building.  Thus, an additional contribution of this research is the integration of organizational path building 
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into the network-based literature based on a view of entrepreneurial firm emergence as the transition from 
a single mode of path creation to a bimodal course of path building where path creation and path 
dependence coexist.   
 
5.4 Implications for Future Research and a New Model of New Venture Emergence 
Findings from this research provide texture and practical context to models of emergence and offer 
interesting opportunities for future research.  From the perspective of scholarship, while generalizability is 
a key issue with the case study methodology, similar findings across the three cases illuminated issues 
important to understanding entrepreneurship that are ripe for further investigation.  For example, the path 
building framework and criteria, although useful for the limited scope of this research, could be refined 
and expanded to include models of path dependence that differ from the one proposed by Sydow et al 
(2009).  Past literature could be revisited using these criteria and definitions to determine if this new 
framework for analysis does indeed lead to a change in how path building is conceptualized in the 
entrepreneurship literature. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study suggests that examining the mode of path building in entrepreneurial 
ventures as they progress through different milestones, may uncover new insight into entrepreneurial firm 
emergence.  For example, do entrepreneurial firms develop one mode of network building, transition to 
another or engage in dual modes?  Taking this one step further, can studying survival outcomes in terms 
of path building modalities enable the discernment of ventures that fail early from those that survive and 
thrive?  For example, is it possible that transitioning from path creation to path dependence too early in 
the life of a young venture can contribute to firm failure due to premature lock-in?  Or conversely, could 
the inability to build path dependent structures and processes result in instability that leads a young 
venture to “spin out of control,” waste scarce resources and die a premature death?  Continuing along 
this line of thought, future research may also investigate whether and how a particular mode of path 
building affects the interplay between a focal activity and the network that forms around that activity.  For 
example, does path dependence, with the constricting patterns of action, inhibit changes in a network that 
may be required to achieve the goals of a certain activity?  Perhaps future research that addresses these 
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questions will explain or reject Schumpeter’s assertion that “…everyone is an entrepreneur only when he 
actually “carries out new combinations,” and loses that character as soon as he has built up his business, 
when he settles down to running it as other people run their businesses… ” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 78).  
 
5.5 Implications for Practice for All Organizations 
New insight into the emergence of young technology ventures advanced by this research also has broad 
practical implications for organizations large and small, new and old that seek to practice 
entrepreneurship and respond more effectively in a rapidly changing business environment.  The 
incremental and intentional gathering of resources through thoughtful management of stakeholders 
focused on specific activities provides a disciplined model of organizational path building for 
entrepreneurs striking out on their own path of creating new ‘things’ or ‘ways’ in resource constrained and 
rapidly changing environments.  But managers embedded in established organizations or large 
corporations seeking ways to reverse the tide of stagnation or change business practices to prevent 
obsolescence may similarly benefit from the example of growing ventures.  The findings of this research 
indicate that striking a balance between processes that enable innovation and processes that manage 
resources and stakeholder engagement may promote entrepreneurship in an organization.   
 
From the three cases examined in this study, five distinct paths of strategic action in network building 
appeared to facilitate progress and contribute to this balance.8  First, the entrepreneurs in this study knew 
what they didn’t know and consistently demonstrated the humility to admit it and seek out expertise from 
others to fill their gap in knowledge and skills.  In fact, those who worked for them viewed this as a 
positive attribute.  Second, the entrepreneurs in this study recognized that the people they hire are not 
always right for every season of a firm.  In other words, not everyone has the ability to adapt to change as 
the firm develops.  Operating with scarce resources required that these entrepreneurs demonstrate the 
courage to make changes in the network even “wreck and rebuild” part of the organization if necessary.  
Third, these entrepreneurs continuously engaged others in an effort to gather critical feedback and they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On April 13, 2012, I was interviewed for an article on entrepreneurship.  During that interview I shared 
these five insights.  The article written from the interview appeared in Womentics.com on May 15, 2012.	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acted on it even if it meant a material change in strategy.  Fourth, the entrepreneurs in this study created 
an environment in which experimentation was encouraged and mistakes tolerated.  Missteps and errors 
were opportunities to learn and improve.  And finally, the entrepreneurs built their organizations 
incrementally, one milestone at a time, so that they could shift gears quickly and avoid squandering 
scarce resources (namely, people and capital) and minimize losses.  Although, these practical insights do 
not guaranty long term success and prosperity, they did help the organizations in this study create paths 
that enabled them to rebound or avert ‘near death experiences’ that could have put them out of business 
much earlier in their development.  After all, the objective is to find the path, or paths, that promote both 
viability and durability in emerging ventures. 
 
The importance of entrepreneurial firms and established corporations to the economic health of a nation 
implies that findings, such as those from this study, that further the understanding of how 
entrepreneurship unfolds cannot be overstated or over-communicated. The importance of this body of 
research was underscored during testimony in front of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee on July 20, 2011.  At a hearing titled Access to Capital: Fostering Job Creation and Innovation 
Through High-Growth Startups, Dr. Ted Zoller of the Kauffman Foundation remarked during the Q&A that 
“we need to talk about networks.”  I agree and suggest that we continue to build a path of engaged 
scholarship that allows us to talk more about how these entrepreneurial networks unfold to enable 
organizational viability and durability. 
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6 APPENDICES 	  
6.1 Initial Screening Criteria for Cases 	  
 
1) The company was founded and is currently operating in the Southeastern U.S.: Although the 
Southeast is home to a number of respected research universities, it is cited for its lack of funding for 
early stage companies and lack of mentoring from the entrepreneurial community.  By selecting 
companies operating in a similar resource-constrained environment, I assert that mobilizing resources 
will require a greater emphasis on network development activities; 
 
2) The company was founded no more than seven years ago:  Five to seven years is generally the point 
where professional/institutional investors look to liquidate their investments in early stage companies 
through some type of sale.  It is generally accepted that within five to seven years the business model 
should have proven to be viable enabling a return of a multiple of the capital invested.  Thus, it is 
assumed that companies less than seven years are more likely to be in an emerging stage of growth 
where viability and sustainability of the business model has not been established and the company 
has not established independence from its original founder(s).   Thus making these early stage 
companies a fruitful setting for the study of network formation (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009); 
 
3) One or more of the original founders is still engaged in the venture and at least one founder or senior 
manager is willing to participate in the screening interview:  The founder or senior manager directs 
the growth of the company and can provide a view from inception of the venture.  Furthermore, they 
are likely to be the individuals who actuate the network for resource mobilization; 
 
4) At least one of the founders or the senior manager is a serial entrepreneur or has had previous 
corporate experience launching a new product:  The assumption is that the more experience a 
founder or senior manager has had building and launching new products or services, the greater the 
likelihood they relied on a network of business contacts to access critical resources and the greater 
their appreciation for the benefits of building and maintaining a network.  Although Greve and Salaff 
(2003) found no effect of prior experience on networking patterns, Mosey and Wright (2007, p. 932), 
in their longitudinal study of nascent, novice and habitual academic entrepreneurs found, that 
“[a]cademic entrepreneurs with prior business ownership experience have broader social networks 
and are more effective in developing network ties.”  Furthermore Amaral et al. (2011) found in the 
literature the expectation that serial entrepreneurs have better network contacts.  Moreover, 
Sarasvathy (2008, p. 46) cites recent studies that found “... organic growth leaders [managers who 
successfully led organic top-line growth]  appear to have a great deal in common with expert 
entrepreneurs….”  Thus, in order to study network development, it appears that a more fruitful path to 
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studying network formation is to study serial entrepreneurs and senior managers who have launched 
new products based on the assumption that they utilized and realized benefits from building a 
network and are more likely to do the same with subsequent ventures; 
 
5) The company is a technology based, predominantly B2B company and there is commonality in terms 
of the line of business:  The assumption is that a company that operates in a dynamic environment 
has a higher likelihood of relying on and activating their network to respond to changes in the 
environment during the time the research is being conducted.  In addition, I hope to reduce other 
factors that may facilitate or impede growth of an early stage company by limiting the investigation to 
companies that focus on the B2B market since they may look structurally different than companies 
that sell B2C; 
 
6) The company is not engaged in biotechnology:  The growth of a biotech company is distinctly 
different from other technology companies.  The R&D and regulatory approval process can take up to 
10 years before it can begin the commercialization process making it difficult to study network 
development within the time limitations of this research.  In addition, because biotechnology products 
are subject to intense regulation, it adds a complicating dimension to the study of how these firms 
emerge from a network perspective. 
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6.2 Interview Protocol: Initial Sampling and Case Screening 	  
 
A. Pre Interview Disclosure and Consent: 
a. Research Summary 
b. Informed Consent 
c. Oral Consent to Audio Recording 
d. Definitions: 
a. Resources: tangible and intangible  
b. Value Proposition: what a company proposes to deliver to a customer and how the 
product/service is differentiated from other similar offerings 
e. Duration: 30-45 minutes 
 
B. Preliminary Questions: 
a. What is your current title and role? 
b. How long have you held this position? 
c. What is the line of business and sector of the new company? 
d. When was the company established? 
e. Describe your professional background and previous positions you held? 
f. Describe the entrepreneurial ventures you have been involved with, the nature of your 
engagement and the origination of your engagement. 
 
C. Based on the experience with your company(s), what are the key activities of entrepreneurs 
and emerging entrepreneurial firms? 
a. If possible, prioritize those activities in terms of importance to the creation and growth of a new 
venture? 
b. At what point in the creation of the new venture is each of these key activities initiated? 
c. Who has responsibility for each of these activities in your current venture? 
d. Who was responsible for these activities in previous ventures? 
e. Can you identify developmental stages of [your venture], beginning with inception or 
establishment of the entity? 
 
D. Definitions: 
a. Based on your personal experience, how do you define entrepreneurship? 
b. How did/do you define success in [each of your ventures]? 
i. How did/do you define success in terms of each of the key activities? 
c. How did/do you measure success in [each of your ventures]? 
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i. How did/do you measure success in terms of each of the key activities? 
d. With respect to [your venture], what causes (d) you to lose sleep? 
e. What would or did cause you to walk away from, give up on or terminate your involvement with 
[your venture]? 
f. When would you consider an early stage company to be unsuccessful? 
g. How do you define failure? 
 
E.    Access to Case & Network Information: 
a. Are you willing to provide referrals or introductions to other people involved with the current 
venture? 
b. …with the past venture? 
c. Are you willing to share the names and roles of individuals in your network of 
contacts/stakeholders associated with the current venture? 
d. …with the past venture? 
e. What questions would be too sensitive to ask…off limits? 
f. What type of company information do you feel comfortable sharing? (i.e., financial, customers, 
investors) 
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6.3 Initial Sampling Entrepreneur Quotes and Definitions 
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ho*help*
uncover
*a*marke
t*or*help
*bring*a*
new*pro
duct*to*
market*
or*help*g
et*a*com
pany*off
*the*grou
nd;*the*e
ntrepren
eur*is*al
l*about*
risk…the
*hard*co
re*risk;*t
he*risk*t
aker*wh
o*gets*to
gether*t
he*neces
sary*
resource
s*(talent
,*capital*
partners
hips,*dis
tribution
*agreem
ents)*to*
build*
somethi
ng...the*a
bility*to
*not*get*
setback*
by*failur
e...one*w
ho*not*o
nly*likes
*
taking*th
e*risk*bu
t*also*on
ce*they*f
ail,*it*do
esn't*set
*them*ba
ck;*the*e
lement*
of*failing
*and*con
tinuing*i
s*an*imp
ortant*o
ne*for*en
treprene
urs.
Having*a
*busines
s*that*ha
s*more*t
han*a*m
illion*do
llars*a*y
ear*in*gr
oss*mar
gin*
from*rec
urring*r
evenue…
and*the*
business
*has*eno
ugh*scal
e*that*it*
no*longe
r*
needs*th
e*entrep
reneur*t
o*be*pre
sent*to*b
e*succes
sful…yo
u*can*go
*on*vaca
tion*
for*a*we
ek*and*t
hings*ca
n*operat
e;*[To*ac
comlish
*this*in]*
four*yea
rs...year
*four*
is*a*gene
ral*time
line.*
I'm*the*b
lissfully
*ignoran
t*where*
you*try*s
omethin
g*and*it*
fails…ch
alk*it*up
*as*a*lea
rning*
experien
ce…it's*j
ust*anot
her*form
*of*conti
nuing*ed
ucation…
So,*I*don
't*think*a
bout*fail
ure*very
*
often…I*
have*ma
de*tons*
of*mista
kes*and*
failures*
but*it*do
esn't*bo
ther*me
*in*the*s
lightest;
*If*I*
have*to*
define*it
,*it*woul
d*be*som
ething*a
round*k
nowing*
that*som
ething*w
asn't*a*g
ood*idea
*
and*still
*doing*it
....failure
*would*b
e...going
*against*
my*gut*o
r*going*a
gainst*so
mething
*that*I*
know*is
*not*righ
t*and*sti
ll*doing*
it.
3
Founder
*&*Presi
dent*
&*CEO
(1)*Crea
ting*a*sp
ace*that
*nobody
*else*is*i
n.**Go*in
to*comp
anies*an
d*listen*
to*the*pr
ospectiv
e*buyer,
*
study*th
eir*busin
ess*in*de
tail*to*un
derstand
*what*th
ey're*do
ing*now
*that's*w
orking*a
nd*what
*they're*
doing*th
at*isn't*w
orking*a
nd*wher
e*there*m
ay*be*op
portunit
ies*that*
they*hav
e*never*
identifie
d.**You*
can*crea
te*a*new
*value*pr
opositio
n.**You'r
e*creatin
g*somet
hing*fro
m*scratc
h*becaus
e*you're
*listenin
g*
to*the*cu
stomer*a
nd*they*
don't*ev
en*know
*they*ne
ed*it.**[W
e]*went*
out*and*
threw*a*
lot*of*sp
aghetti*o
n*
the*wall
*to*see*w
hat*wou
ld*stick;
*(2)*Dev
elop*a*b
udget*an
d*make*
sure*you
*know*w
here*you
r*money
*is*
coming*
from.**I*a
m*all*ab
out*the*b
udget;*(3
)*The*pe
ople,*in*
terms*of
*who's*o
n*the*tea
m*that*c
an*help*
you*deli
ver*the*v
ision.**T
he*bigge
st*challe
nge*that
*I*have*n
ow*is*ide
ntifying
*top*tale
nt;*(4)*Id
entify*yo
ur*
clients*in
*advance
;*It's*ver
y*iterati
ve.
It's*an*o
pportun
ity*to*bu
ild*a*bus
iness*tha
t*no*one
*else*has
*built.**It
's*an*
opportu
nity*to*b
uild*a*te
am*that*
is*engag
ed*in*the
*mission
*and*the
*
purpose
…it's*an*
opportu
nity*to*h
ave*a*tre
mendou
s*amoun
t*of*free
dom*of*
ideas*an
d*execut
ion*that
*I*would
*never*e
ver*be*a
ble*to*ha
ve*in*a*c
orporate
*
setting.
You've*g
ot*to*def
ine*it*fin
ancially*
or*what
's*the*pu
rpose…t
his*is*no
t*just*a*
passion.
**This*is*
a*profita
ble*pass
ion…tha
t's*how*I
*would*s
ay*we've
*achieve
d*
success…
my*wind
ow*is*fiv
e*years…
to*have*
people*i
n*here*r
unning*t
he*busin
ess,*
have*peo
ple*take
*care*of*
the*dayY
toYday*t
hings,*an
d*I*want
*to*be*in
volved*
significa
ntly*on*a
*global*b
asis...op
erating*o
ur*of*[Eu
rope]
…any*bu
siness*p
erson*w
ill*tell*yo
u*that*fo
r*all*the*
successe
ss*they'v
e*had,*th
ey've*ha
d*five*
times*as
*many*fa
ilures…I
*don't*co
nsider*th
ose*failu
res*per*s
e.**I*cons
ider*the
m*huge*
dissappo
intment
s;**A*fail
ure*to*m
e*is*som
ething*w
here*you
*have…f
ailed*oth
er*peool
e,*not*
stood*fo
r*what*y
ou*stand
*for...you
*haven't
*been*au
thentic..
.if*it*doe
sn't*sync
*with*my
*
values...
they*ma
y*not*lik
e*me,*bu
t*they*kn
ow*wha
t*I*stand
*for*and*
I*can't*h
ave*anyb
ody*
messing
*with*tha
t.
4
Interim*
Presiden
t*(1
)*Connec
t*the*dot
s*with*w
here*the
*market
*is*going
,*what*th
e*hell*is*
going*on
*with*it*a
nd*how*
do*you*
use*tech
nolog*to
*sell*mor
e,*servic
e*better
*and*cut
*cost*fro
m*the*bu
siness.**W
hat*prop
blem*are
*we*goin
g*
to*solve
*in*the*m
arketpla
ce.**I*sit*
down*w
ith*big*c
ustomer
s*and*sa
y*here's
*what*w
e're*thin
king,*do
*you*
agree*or
*disagre
e*and*wh
at*do*we
*need*to
*build*in
to*these
*platform
s*for*you
;*(2)*Pitc
hing*cus
tomers.*
*
It's*alwa
ys*about
*cutome
rs.**If*I*c
ould*get
*custom
ers,*I*cou
ld*raise*
capital.**
If*I*could
*raise*ca
pital,*I*
could*hi
re*good*
people;*
(3)*Pitch
ing*peop
le*to*com
e*work*f
or*us.**H
ow*to*ge
t*good*p
eople;*(4
)*Raising
*
money;*
(5)*Shar
e,*comm
unicate*
the*visio
n.**The*a
bility*to
*articula
te*a*com
plex*ser
ies*of*th
oughts*i
nto*a*
very*sim
plistic*m
anner*th
at*peopl
e*get.**Ar
ticulatin
g*the*pro
blem*in*
the*mar
ket*and*
getting*p
eople*to
*
quickly*
get*it*an
d*how*w
e*were*g
oing*to*s
olve*the
*problem
;*Raising
*money,
*hiring*g
ood*peo
ple,*tryin
g*
to*sell*to
*custom
ers.
The*act*
of*creati
ng*a*bus
iness*tha
t*survive
s*you…t
hat's*mo
re*impo
rtant*
and*bigg
er*than*y
ou*are*a
s*an*ind
ividual.*
*Entrepr
eneursh
ip…that*
intentio
nal*and*
delibera
te*ability
*that*reg
ardless*o
f*time*or
*industr
y*can*
figure*ou
t*how*to
*create*a
*busines
s*that*w
ill*outlas
t*that*pe
rson...st
art*it*
fund*it*a
nd*grow
*it.
You*get*
to*the*po
int*wher
e*if*you'
ve*done
*your*job
,*the*firm
*wll*not*
only*sur
vive*
but*thriv
e*once*y
ou*leave
…it's*no
t*just*en
ough*to*
survive*
when*yo
u*leave.*
*They*
should*a
ctually*g
o*to*the*
next*lev
el*when
*you*leav
e.**[I]t's*
going*to
*provide
*a*
return*o
n*capita
l*investe
d...creat
e*a*retur
n*of*cap
ital*that
*exceeds
*the*cost
*of*
that*cap
ital.**
It*doesn
't*work.*
*You*los
e*the*mo
ney…yo
u**lose*th
e*money
*and*it*d
oesn't*w
ork*or*y
ou*run*o
ut*
of*mone
y*before
*you*can
*make*it
*work….
the*busi
ness*clo
ses*and*
there's*n
o*return
*to*the*
shareho
lders…T
here's*m
any,*man
y*levels*
of*succe
ss…ther
e's*only*
one*leve
l*of*failu
re.***so*
when*I*h
ear*peop
le*say*it'
s*not*in*
my*voca
bulary*[
failure],
*I*hear*n
aivety...I
*hear*tha
t's*
someon
e*who*m
ay*burn*
up*a*lot*
of*freaki
ng*mone
y*uneces
sarily.
5
CoYfoun
der,*Pre
sident,*
CEO
(1)Sales
*and*ma
rketing;
*(2)*Tran
slating*c
ustomer
*needs*in
to*produ
cts;*(3)*R
ecruitin
g*and*br
inging*o
n*
the*talen
t.**Gettin
g*the*rig
ht*peopl
e*in*plac
e.**Attra
cting*the
*right*pe
ole*so*yo
u*can*bu
ild*the*r
ight*
culture;
*(4)*Mak
ing*sure
*strategi
cally*dri
ving*the
*busines
s*and*it'
s*aligned
*with*wh
at*the*cu
stomers
*
want*an
d*where
*the*indu
stry*is*h
eaded.**H
ave*a*go
od*visio
n.**Tthin
king*thr
ee*to*fiv
e*years*o
ut;*(5)*
Underst
anding*t
he*finan
ces*of*th
e*compa
ny.*Mak
ing*sure
*we're*ca
pitalized
*enough
*to*achie
ve*what
*
we're*lo
oking*to
*do.*
…the*sp
irit…the
*creative
*process
…the*ide
a*of*bein
g*able*to
*underst
and*an*
industry
,*to*find*
a*busine
s*opport
unity*an
d*being*
able*to**
execute*
against*
that…to
*create*s
omethin
g*from*s
cratch…
build*an
d*develo
p*the*bu
siness*
and*the*
people…
get*into*
somethi
ng*small
*and*gro
w*it*into
*someth
ing*
much*bi
gger...to
*be*the*o
ne*maki
ng*all*th
e*decisio
ns*and*b
eing*abl
e*to*see*
the*outc
ome*of*t
hose*dec
isions
…be*the
*best*in*w
hat*we*d
o*and*re
ally*focu
s*on*win
ning,*rea
lly*focus
*on*
employe
es*havin
g*a*grea
t*time*at
*their*jo
b…then*
creating
*a**great
*sort*of*
sustaini
ng*brand
…financ
ial*succe
ss*follow
s…mone
y…*is*a*m
easuring
*stick.
…we*cou
nt*on*fai
lure*all*t
he*time*
so*I*don
't*think*f
ailure*is
*really*a
*bad*thin
g…it*can
*be*the*
most*im
portant*
part*of*t
he*entre
preneur
ial*exper
ience..it*
really*fo
rces*you
*to*really
*dig*deep
*
and*real
ly*focus*
on*what
*should*
be*the*co
re*focus
*of*the*b
usiness.
..that's*r
eally*kin
d*of*a*
defining
*momen
t*for*a*co
mpany*i
n*terms*
of*their*
sustainb
ility...we
're*going
*to*take*
calculate
d*
risks*an
d*not*all
*of*them
*are*goin
g*to*wor
k*out.**F
ailure*is
**making
*a*decisi
on*that's
*erratica
lly*
bad*that
*it**actua
lly*jeopa
rdizes*n
ot*only*t
he*busin
ess*but..
.your*em
ployees*
and*othe
rs...thos
e*
are*extr
eme*fail
ures...th
ose*ones
*that*cou
ld*jeopa
rdize*the
*busines
s*existen
ce.
r
6
CoYfoun
der,*COO
(1)*Fund
raising.*
*It*takes
*a*lot*of*
money.*
*More*th
an*you*t
hink.**I*u
nderesti
mated*th
e*amoun
t*of*time
*
and*dur
ation;*(2
)*Selling
*the*idea
*and*the
*concept
.**This*ta
ke*an*en
ormous*
amount*
of*energ
y*and*tim
e.**
It's*like*
pushing
*a*bould
er*uo*hil
l*to*get*t
hat*first
*custom
er.**Selli
ng*to*the
*first*cus
tomer*b
efore*yo
u*
have*the
*money;
*(3)*Wha
t*should
*we*do*n
ext*and*
how*do*
we*stay*
ahead.
The*idea
*has*to*b
e*signifi
cant…ga
meYchan
ger…a*fa
ntastic*i
dea*that
*could*
be*big
We*didn
't*leave*b
ig*cushy
*jobs*to*s
tart*a*sm
all*comp
any.**Th
e*fun*ab
out*bein
g*
an*entre
preneur
*is*build
ing*a*com
pany*in*
your*im
age*whe
re*peopl
e*like*to
*
come*to
*work…
Year*1:*I
f*it*does
n't*take*
off…not
*enough
*wind*to
*prove*th
e*concep
t;*Now:*I
f*we*hav
en't*buil
t*a*
multiYm
illion*do
llar*busi
ness…w
e*didn't*
do*what
*we*coul
d*have;*W
ild*succe
ss*raises
*the*bar*
and*the*
definitio
n*of*succ
ess*and*
failure.
7
Founder
,*CEO*
(1)**You
've*got*t
o*have*a
n*eye*fo
r*what's
*a*great*
formida
ble*idea
.**Execut
ion*is*90
%*of*suc
cess*but
*I*
think*th
at*if*you
*start*wi
th*a*bad
*idea,*yo
u*could*
never*su
cceed*at
*the*othe
r*90%;*(
2)*Appr
opriatel
y*
access*a
nd*mana
ge*resou
rces*and
*execute
*on*the*i
dea...peo
ple,*loca
tion,*inv
entory,*a
ll*the*inp
uts*and*
outputs*
for*comm
ercializi
ng*the*id
ea,*the*m
oney*an
d*the*res
ources,*f
inancial
*resourc
es,*the*h
uman*
resource
s,*the*int
ellectua
l*resour
ces.**For
*softwar
e*and*fo
r*techno
logy,*the
*number
*one*res
ource*
initially*
is*going*
to*be*the
*individu
als*wo*w
rite*and
*deploy*
the*softw
are.**The
*product
*geniuse
s.**If*it's*
longer*t
erm,*you
r*most*im
portant*
resource
*is*going
*to*be*ac
cess*to*f
inancial
*capital*f
or*mark
eting*an
d*
sales*an
d*expan
sion;*(3)
*You*are
*always*
building
*hypothe
ses.**Tea
ring*the
m*down
*and*onl
y*lettng*
stick*wit
h*what*w
orks.**An
d*even*t
hen,*wh
at*works
*you're*c
onstantl
y*challen
ging*as*w
ell*but*n
ot*to*the
*
same*de
gree.
An*inter
mediato
r*betwee
n*capita
l*and*lab
or…som
ebody*w
ho*codd
les*an*
idea*from
*birth*to
*maturit
y…it's*ca
re*and*n
urturing
*of*an*id
ea.
When*I*w
as*much
*younge
r,*the*su
ccess*wa
s*really*
the*jour
ney…to*
me*now
*
success*
is*a*mile
stone*an
d*that*m
ilestone
*could*re
ally*man
ifest*in*m
any*
differen
t*ways…
as*I've*g
otten*old
er,*the*m
ilestone
*is*some
*degree*
of*financ
ial*
or*comm
ercial*su
cces…so
me*valid
ation*by
*the*ever
*present
*Mr.*mar
ket...in*t
he*
past...su
ccess*wa
s*if*I*was
*learning
*someth
ing*and*
growing
*with*the
*compan
y.***
I*would*
say*now
*that*it*is
*more*m
easured
*that*the
re*is*a*p
oint*whi
ch*it's*
sufficien
tly*comm
ercially*
viable...f
or*some
*kind*of*
exit*or*a
*bona*fid
e*round
*of*
funding.
..where*
the*idea
*is*impo
rtant*en
ough*to*
either*th
e*money
*people*
or*to*a*
strategic
*acquire
r.
The*defi
nition*of
*failure*w
ould*be*
not*und
erstandi
ng*what
*lies*ahe
ad*and*n
ot*adjus
ting*to*
those*ch
anges.
8
Founder
,*CEO
(1)*Test
ing.**Thr
ow*som
enthing*
on*the*w
all*inexp
ensively
*and*see
*if*it*will
*stick.**C
onsult*a
*lot*with
*
clients.**
Testing*
was*a*pr
iority.**D
on't*put
*everyth
ing*into*
it*before
*you*kno
w*it's*go
ing*to*w
ork;*(2)*
Crafting
*the*bus
iness*for
*scalabil
ity;*(3)*D
ocumen
ting*eve
rything.
**Differe
nt*proce
sses*can
*become
*
second*n
ature*an
d*you*do
n't*realiz
e*that*th
ey're*im
portant*
when*yo
u're*teac
hing*som
ebody*e
lse*to*do
*
it;(4)*Da
ta*collec
tion*was
*always*
very*inp
ortant*fo
r*me.**W
e*track*e
verythin
g*about*
our*cust
omer*so
*
that*you
*don't*as
sume*so
mething
;*(5)*Ma
rketing*
and*PR*w
ere*big.*
*[We]*fo
und*eve
ry*way*t
o*craft*a
*
message
*that*wa
s*newsw
orthy*fo
r*free*ad
vertising
;*(6)*HIr
ing*peop
le*to*do*
the*busy
*work*ca
use*I*
could*be
*doing*so
mething
*that*wo
uld*gene
rate*mo
re*reven
ue;*I*did
n't*really
*spend*m
ost*of*m
y*time*o
n*
any*one
*thing*or
*any*five
*things.
The*acti
vities*an
d*abilitie
s*around
*seeing*o
pportun
ities*and
*capitali
zing*
on*them
…it*does
n't*have
*to*be*w
hen*you
're*selfYe
mployed
…
…my*go
al*was*n
ot*to*cre
ate*a*litt
le*store*
that*wor
ks…my*g
oal*was*
to*have*
many*
of*these
*stores…
.that's*a*
philosop
hical*thi
ng…how
*you*def
ine*succ
ess……st
ores*
have*clo
sed,*one
*may*cal
l*that*a*f
ailure…t
here*are
*some*th
ings*tha
t*failed*b
ut*I*
don't*ne
cessarily
*say*that
's*a*failu
re.**I*say
*it's*a*su
ccess*th
at*I*built
*
somenth
ing…wa
s*the*ult
imate*ou
tcome*su
ccessful
…not*ne
cessarily
,*but*I*th
ink*
it's*usin
g*what*y
ou*learn
.*and*con
tinuing*t
o*implem
ent...it's*
the*little
*peaks*th
at*
you*hav
e*along*t
he*way*t
hat*are*s
uccesses
,*it's*not
*some*en
d*goal....
I*think*it
's*
the*little
*things...
I*felt*ver
y*succes
sful...fro
m*starti
ng*a*bus
iness*an
d*having
*
custome
rs*come
*in*to*cu
stomers
*coming
*back*to
*an*artic
le*in*the
*paper...
Failure*i
s*when*y
ou*stop…
if*all*my
*stores*h
ad*close
d*and*I*d
idn't*pic
k*up*and
*move*o
n*with*[*
new*ven
ture]…It
's*not*us
ing*wha
t*you*lea
rned…h
aving*th
e*opport
unity*to
*do*som
ething*w
ith*
what*yo
u*learne
d*and*no
t*doing*i
t,*that's*
failure*t
o*me…ju
st*stopp
ing*with
*a*lot*of*
knowled
ge*
and*hav
ining*it*g
o*to*was
te.**So*tr
ying*som
ething*a
nd*and*i
t*not*wo
rking,*it
's*not*fa
ilure
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   99	  
 
 
 
Ta
bl
e&&
Ke
y&Q
uo
te
s&a
nd
&En
tre
pr
en
eu
r&D
ef
in
iti
on
s&f
ro
m
&In
iti
al&
Sa
m
pl
in
g
9
CoYfoun
der,*CEO
(1)*Whe
n*we*firs
t*started
*it*was*a
ll*about*
sales.**T
hat*was*
about*al
l*I*did.**9
0%*was
*sales*ac
tivity,*
whether
*it*was*m
e*physic
ally*doin
g*sales*o
r*it*was*
me*recru
iting,*tra
ining,*hi
ring*and
*working
*with*
sales*tea
m;*(2)*C
lerical*a
dminstr
ative,*leg
al;*(3)*O
verseein
g*and*he
lping*to*
guide*th
e*focus*t
oward*
develop
ment*of*
the*tech
nology;*
There's*
still*pha
ses.**A*p
hase*wh
ere*we*n
ed*to*bu
ckle*dow
n*and*w
ork*
on*reven
ue.**Whe
re*we're
*focused
*more*on
*some*of
*the*grow
th*of*rel
ationshi
ps*and*s
trategic*
partneri
ng.**Initi
ally*it*w
as*about
*proving
*ourselv
es,*not*o
nly*brin
ging*in*m
oney*bu
t*case*st
udies.*W
hat*
I*was*foc
used*on
*was*sal
es,*in*ma
king*sur
e*the*leg
alities*w
ere*all*cl
eared*aw
ay.**At*th
e*same*t
ime*wha
t*
was*hap
pening*o
n*the*tex
t*side*wa
s*we*we
re*devel
oing*jus
t*full*spe
ed*ahead
*how*we
*wanted
*to*
structur
e*the*ba
ckbone*
of*our*so
lutions*f
or*client
s.**Every
*case*stu
dy*we*w
orked*on
*typicall
y*had*
addendu
ms*or*ad
ditions*t
hat*were
*develop
ed*that*w
ere*then
*made*av
ailable*t
o*the*en
tire*ecos
ystem.***
On*our*s
ide*of*th
e*fence*w
as*all*sa
les,*on*th
eir*side*
fo*the*fe
nce*was
*full*spe
ed*progr
amming
*and*
develop
ment*an
d*testin.
**Once*it
*leveled*
out*a*litt
le*bit*we
*could*b
e*more*s
trategic.
**From*t
here*we
*
realized
*what*ha
d*worke
d*from*t
he*first*w
ave*and*
what*ha
d*worke
d*from*t
hat*seco
nd*phas
e.**There
*
were*sm
arter*wa
ys,*so*w
e*actuall
y*scaled
*back.**W
e*spent*a
*lot*of*tim
e*trying*
to*think
*through
*what's*
absolute
ly*neces
sary*and
*then*wh
at*would
*be*like*a
*really*c
ool*valu
e*propos
ition*tha
t*nobody
*else*in*
the*mar
ket*has.*
*That's*a
*lot*ofwh
at**went
*on*in*th
e*early*s
tages.**It
*was*pri
marily*u
s*chasin
g*the*
market.*
*And*sta
rting*in*
the*4th,*
5th*or*6
th*year,*
we*start
ed*to*tak
e*the*rei
gns*mor
e...move
*them*
versus*t
hem*dra
gging*us
*around
.
The*abil
ity*to*tak
e*your*d
ream*or
*vision*t
hat*you'
ve*had*in
*your*he
ad*and*
translat
e*it*thro
ugh*the*
passion*
that's*ne
cessary*
to*make
*it*happe
n*
through
*your*he
art*and*f
ind*the*r
esource
s*that*ar
e*necess
ary*to*go
*after*
it…the*p
assion*a
nd*the*w
ill*and*d
esire*to*
make*it*
happen*
and*not*
stop*
until*you
*see*succ
ess.
…it's*cha
nged.**It
's*morph
ed*over*
the*year
s.**Whe*w
e*first*st
arted,*su
ccess*wa
s*
how*ma
ny*mem
bers*we
*had*on*
this*site
*or*how*
many*m
erchant*
partners
*we*
had*invo
lved…fin
ancial*ta
rget*tha
t*we*wan
ted*to*hi
t…it*see
med*like
*once*we
*
had*eith
er*the*fin
ances*in
*place,*w
e*didn't*
have*the
*number
*of*peop
le*we*
wanted.
..once*w
e*had*th
e*numbe
r*in*plac
e,*we*did
n't*have
*the*fina
nces...su
ccess*
was*elus
ive*in*th
ose*first
*few*yea
rs...now
*that*we
*have*a*f
irm*gras
p*on*wh
o*we*
are*and*
what*we
're*all*ab
out*and*
our*posi
tioning*i
nthe*ma
rket...su
ccesss*is
*all*
about*m
arket*sh
are...we*
define*o
ur*succe
ss*now*m
uch*mor
e*so*by*t
he*succe
sses*
of*our*cl
ients...th
eir*succe
ss*mean
s*our*su
ccess.;**S
o*that*su
ccess*de
finition*
has*
definitel
y*change
d*throug
h*the*ye
ars.
…lack*of
*success
*is*not*m
aking*re
venue*ta
rgets*mo
nth*after
*month,*
clients*n
ot*being
*happy*
with*pro
duct*or*d
eliverab
les…hav
ing*a*dif
ficult*tim
e*gainin
g*accept
ance*in*t
he*
market…
What's*i
nteresti
ng*to*no
te*is*tha
t*the*leg
s*on*the
*table*ne
ver*all*c
ollapse*a
t*the*sam
e*
time...so
*we*may
*have*an
*issue*on
*one*side
*and*it*m
ay*seem
*to*our*o
ffice*or*s
taff*that
*the*sky*
is*
falling*b
ut*we*st
ill*have*t
he*other
*three*le
gs*of*the
*table...I'
m*optim
istic,*but
*I'm*not*
ridiculo
us.**
The*defi
nition*of
*failure*i
s*just*no
t*hitting
*any*goa
ls,*not*p
leasing*c
utomers
,*not*bei
ng*an*
integral
*part*of*t
heir*suc
cess...if*t
hey*used
*our*tech
nology*a
nd*didn'
t*see*any
*results*
or*
ntothing
*happen
ed*or*it*j
ust*seem
ed*like*a
*big*was
te*of*tim
e*and*en
ergy,*I*th
ink*that*
alone*
...will*fee
l*like*a*h
uge*failu
re,*even
*if*the*co
mpany*w
as*still*m
aking*m
oney
10
Founder
,*CEO
(1)*Aski
ng*for*ad
vice*all*t
he*time*
and*gett
ing*men
tors*and
*advisor
s*and*co
aches.**F
igure*ou
t*who*is
*the*
best*per
son*to*ta
lk*to.**It*
really*ju
st*starts
*to*bloss
om*to*th
e*fact*th
at*you*h
ave*all*th
ese*peop
le*that*
now*are
*in*your*
corner*a
nd*they*
want*to*
see*you*
succeed
...It's*cal
led*the*'
boattapp
er.'**It*ge
ts*you*
pointed*
in*the*ri
ght*dire
ction;*(2
)*Consta
ntly*rep
rioitizin
g.**We*ar
e*consta
ntly*cha
nging.**T
his*is*the
*
nature*o
f*the*ear
ly*stage*
compan
y.
…freedo
m*and*e
mpower
ment.**A
nd*being
*able*to*
to*make
*a*differe
nce*and
*
change*t
hings*qu
ickly.**M
oving*qu
ick*and*n
imble*an
d*not*ge
tting*cau
ght*up*
in*the*bu
reaucrac
y*and*ju
st*make
*things*h
appen…
I*always
*push*th
e*
envelop
e…
…it's*eas
y*to*look
*back*an
d*see*all
*the*succ
esses,*bu
t*when*y
ou're*in*
the*
moment
,*you*nev
er*feel*li
ke*you'r
e*there…
.just*to*l
ook*arou
nd*and*s
ee*we're
*
suportin
g*22,*24
*families
*…it's*pr
etty*coo
l*and*it's
*pretty*r
ewardin
g*to*thin
k*
that*this
*started*
as*a*kern
el*of*an*i
dea...and
*you*got
*it*off*the
*ground
...so*that
*to*
me*is*re
warding
,*it's*suc
cessful.*
*But*whe
n*you're
*in*the*m
oment...
you're*a
lways*
looking*
for*the*n
ext*win.
**I*think*
when*w
e*can*re
turn*for
*our*sha
reholder
s*a*
decent*r
eturn*an
d*the*da
y...there
's*going*
to*be*a*d
ay*that*I
'm*going
*to*take*
that...I'm
*going*to
*turn*a*t
en*grand
*into*wh
atever*it
*is...so*th
at's*goin
g*to*be*
rewardi
ng.
So,*I*hav
e*a*plan*
to*fail…I
*wrote*it
*two*yea
rs*ago,*b
ut*it*was
*if*you*fa
il,*what*
do*you*d
o?...it*
helps*yo
u*sleep*b
etter.**A
nd*you*r
ealize*th
at*as*bad
*as*it*get
s…you'v
e*run*ou
t*of*mon
ey*and*
then*you
*have*to
*fire*eve
rybody*a
nd*you*g
o*bankru
pt*and*y
ou*list*it
*all*dow
n...at*the
*end*of*t
he*
day,*you
're*going
*to*survi
ve,*you'r
e*going*t
o*move*
on*and*i
t's*comf
orting*to
*know*y
ou*have
*a*
plan...th
ere's*som
e*microf
ailures..
.if*you*h
ave*to*le
t*people
*go...whe
n*you*ha
ve*to*pu
t*people
*
on*defer
red*com
p...There
*are*littl
e*failure
s,*but*I*t
hink*as*l
ong*as*y
ou*fail*fo
rward,*y
ou're*
always*g
oing*to*b
ecome*a
*better*p
erson...A
nd*I*enc
ourage*o
ur*empl
oyees*to
...we*rew
ard*risk
*
taking...y
ou*made
*the*best
*decision
*you*cou
ld*with*t
he*infor
mation*y
ou*have
*and*it*d
idnt't*
work*ou
t.**What*
did*we*l
earn*fro
m*it?*So
*let's*not
*do*that*
again.
11
CoYFoun
der,*
Univers
ity*Rese
archer*
(1)*Sales
;*(2)*Ma
king*the
*product
*work*in
*differen
t*types*o
f*venues
;**(3)*Ide
ntifying
*contact
s*at*
potentia
l*custom
ers.**Ide
ntifying
*the*righ
t*distrib
ution*ch
annels.*
Not*only
*to*make
*millions
*of*dolla
rs…just*
tryingto
t*make*l
ife*bette
r*for*
people…
making*
life*bette
r*for*som
eone*or*
the*plan
et…it's*t
he*small
er*wins*
along*th
e*way…a
lready*e
xperienc
ed*succe
ss*by*he
lping*to*
create*s
tandard
s*in*
this*area
…
If*we*sta
rted*the
*compan
y*and*pu
t**money
*in*and*h
ad*no*sa
les…now
*only*tim
e*in*and
*have*ha
d*
some*sa
les*so*it*
it*not*a*f
ailure…b
ut*it*wou
ld*be*a*b
ig*disapp
ointmen
t*if*not*a
dditiona
l*
sales…si
nce*ther
e*had*no
t*been**a
*lot*of*te
chnolog
y*transfe
r*from*u
niversiti
es,*succe
ss*is**no
t*
necesse
sarily*ex
pected...
fail*to*m
eet*mile
stones.
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CoYfoun
der,*CEO
(1)*Capi
tal*raisin
g;*(2)*Pu
tting*the
*right*te
am*toge
ther.**Br
inging*in
*the*righ
t*people
,*definin
g*job*
respons
ibilities;
*(3)*Buil
ding*out
*the*buis
ness*pla
n,*financ
ial*forec
asting.**W
e*spent*m
ore*time
*on*
things*li
ke*accou
nting*sy
stems*an
d*collect
ion*syste
ms.**Tha
t*part*is*
not*fun*b
ecause*i
t's*not*th
e*part*of
*
the*busi
ness*tha
t's*really
*going*to
*move*it
*forward
;*Pulling
*togethe
r*the*fou
nders,*d
evising*t
he*
business
*plan,*pu
lling*the
*right*pe
ople*tog
ether,*an
d*getting
*them*en
gaged.**B
ecause*y
ou*can't
*raise*
capital*u
ntil*yo'v
e*done*t
hat;*Step
*one*is*y
ou*get*th
e*right*p
eople.**S
tep*two*
is*raisin
g*capital
*and*unt
il*
that*hap
pens*you
*basicall
y*can't*r
eally*exe
cute;*Yo
u*launch
*with*the
*wrong*m
odel*or*y
ou*launc
h*with*a
*
model*th
at*has*fl
aws,*how
*do*you*
tweak*th
at*and*a
djust*it*a
nd*make
*it*some
thing*be
tter*and
*if*the*
manage
ment*tea
m*is*able
*to*do*th
at*then*t
ypically
*they*sur
vive*and
*go*on*to
*be*a*mu
ch*bette
r*
business
.
…essent
ially*tak
ing*an*id
ea,*a*con
cept*and
*taking*i
t*from*a
n*idea*al
l*the*
way*thro
ugh*to*p
rofitabil
ity*and*a
ll*the*ste
ps*in*bet
ween.**B
uilding*u
p*the*
right*bu
siness*p
lan,*test
ing*it,*ge
tting*cus
tomers*o
n*board
,*getting
*funding
*
for*it*,*la
unching
*it…
…there's
*always*
a*financ
ial*targe
t,*right?*
*Revenu
e,*profit
ability,*h
itting*th
e*plan*
that*you
've*laid*o
ut,*being
*on*track
*to*that*p
lan…tra
ffic*goal
s*which*
is*a*grea
t*
proxy*fo
r*consum
er*aware
ness,*con
sumer*a
doption
*of*the*p
roduct…
traffic*is
*so*
critical*t
o*drivin
g*revenu
e*and*no
t*busine
ss*plann
ing*goes
*out*with
out*a*
financila
*forecas
t...we've
*had*an*i
nternal*
goal*tha
t*we*thr
ow*arou
nd*all*th
e*eimt.**
We've*h
ad*since
*day*one
*which*i
s*at*300
*million,
*that*we
*want*to
*sell*the*
compan
y*for*300
*million.
..genera
l*goal*of
*we*wan
t*to*be**a
*300*mil
lion*doll
ar*
compan
y*or*mor
e.
Failure*i
s*not*an
*option.*
*I've*nev
er*believ
ed*we*w
ould*go*
out*of*bu
siness...w
e*would
*figure*o
ut*
a*way*to
*make*it
*work...F
ailure*w
ould*be*
having*t
o*sell*ea
rlier,*no
t*realizin
g*the*kin
d*of*valu
e*
that*we*
think*is*
there...r
unning*o
ut*of*cap
ital...sell
*the*bus
iness*in*
a*fire*sa
le*kind*o
f*
situation
...failure
*to*me*is
*just*not
*realizin
g*the*val
ue*that*I
*know*is
*there.**I
*think*m
ost*
entrepre
neurial*v
entures*
fail…rela
ted*to*br
eakup*w
ith*partn
ers,*disa
greemen
ts*on*dir
ection,*
strategy
*and*we*
don't*ha
ve*any*o
f*that*he
re.**So*th
at's*a*hu
ge*benef
it*for*us;
*an*unsu
ccessful
*
venture
*to*me*w
ould*be*
one*that
*doesn't
*realize*
a*return
*for*inve
stors,*th
at*essen
tially*eit
her*
goes*out
*of*buisn
ess*or*ge
ts*sold*fo
r*an*unf
avorable
*valuatio
n;...we*q
uickly*re
alized*th
at*it*
wasn't*g
oing*to*g
row..it*w
ould*gro
w*but*it*
would*g
row*mar
ginally...
.it*wasn'
t*going*t
o*be*a*
hundred
*million*
dollars*i
n*revenu
e...so*we
*decided
*to*move
*upstrea
m...it*act
ually*led
*us*to*th
e*
model*th
at*is*goin
g*to*be*t
he*categ
ory*kille
r...that*ty
pically*t
ends*to*
be*the*d
ividing*l
ine*
between
*compan
ies*that*
survive*
and*com
panies*t
hat*don'
t;*so*it's*
either*p
artnersh
ips*blow
ing*
up*or*ha
ving*to*a
djust*yo
ur*mode
l*and*no
t*being*a
ble*to*ge
t*it*done
.**
13
CoYfoun
der,*CEO
(1)*Recr
uiting,*p
articular
ly*gettin
g*the*sen
ior*team
*togethe
r,*and*th
en*let*th
em*recru
it*downw
ard;*
(2)Prod
uct*to*m
arket*fit
…You*co
me*up*w
ith*an*id
ea…You
*talk*to*a
*bunch*o
f*banks…
they*say
,*"This*is
*
great,*bu
t*I*would
*never*d
o*it*that*
way"…Y
ou*got*to
*talk*to*e
ngineers
...just*ge
tting*the
*product
*to*
market*f
it*before
*you*star
t*putting
*gas*in*th
e*engine
*and*tryi
ng*this*o
ut;*(3)*M
ake*sure
*the*com
pany*is*
funded..
.capital*r
aising.**I
*would*p
rioritize
*recruiti
ng*first..
.It*doesn
't*matter
*how*go
od*your
*
product
/market
*is*or*ho
w*much
*money*
you*hav
e*if*you*
don't*ha
ve*the*ri
ght*team
.
…entrep
renerus
hip*is*ab
out*a*lov
e*of*crea
ting*thin
gs*and*th
e*art*of*
persuas
ion…you
*have*to
*persuad
e*a*lot*o
f*differe
nt*peopl
e*a*lot*o
f*
differen
t*things…
to*build*
somethi
ng*that*d
oesn't*ex
ist…you
*have*to
*really*
love*cra
zy*thing
s*that*do
n't*exist
*and*you
*have*to
*be*able*
to*persu
ade*
people*t
hat*they
*can.
…refusin
g*to*fail.
Definitio
n*of*failu
re...I*don
't*think*a
bout*tha
t*much.*
*I*have*a
*definitio
n*of*succ
ess..I*gu
ess*
failure*w
ould*be…
unablet*
to*capita
lize*a*co
mpany*o
r*unable
*to*figur
e*out*the
*product
/market
*
fit…that
*would*b
e*a*direc
t*result*o
f*not*hav
ing*the*r
ight*team
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6.4 Key Entrepreneurial Activities 	  
 
This list represents common activities described by thirteen founders of early stage technology–based 
companies.  Data was collected during interviews conducted from May through July 2011.  The founders 
were identified through direct relationships or referrals from business professionals who engage with the 
entrepreneurial community in the Southeast US.  The companies these founders are associated with 
were screened using the criteria in Appendix 7.2. 
 
1) Creating a unique value proposition…developing a ‘great formidable idea’: 
i) Where is the market going 
ii) Who are the potential customers 
iii) What is the problem to solve 
iv) Identifying product/market fit 
v) What is the need we can fill 
vi) Bottom up approach 
 
2) Capital acquisition…making sure there’s enough money: 
i) Identifying where capital will come from 
ii) Fundraising 
 
3) Talent acquisition…getting the right people on the bus: 
i) Recruiting to build the right culture and deliver the vision 
ii) Seeking advisors and mentors 
iii) Hiring domain experts and product developers 
iv) Recruiting the senior team and letting them recruit downward 
v) Hiring sales and finance 
 
4) Establishing repeatable customer acquisition: 
i) Selling the idea 
ii) Getting customer buy-in 
iii) Sales, marketing and PR 
 
5) Product development…from a minimally viable product to a product able to accommodate 
growth: 
i) Begin with a quick, simple and inexpensive product 
ii) Test it, experiment with customers 
iii) Tweak, adjust repeat 
iv) Build a hypothesis, challenge it, tear it down 
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v) Continually throw ideas against the wall to see what sticks 
vi) Striving to stay ahead of the market and competition 
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6.5 Interview Protocol: Founders  	  	  
A. Pre Interview Disclosure and Consent: 
a. Research Summary 
b. Informed Consent 
c. Oral Consent to Audio Recording 
d. Definitions: 
i. Resources: tangible and intangible  
ii. Value Proposition: what a company proposes to deliver to a customer and how the 
product/service is differentiated from other similar offerings 
e. Duration:  
i. Founder Interview #1: 60-90 minutes 
ii. Founder Interview #2: 60-90 minutes 
B. Background 
a. Founding Team 
i. When and with whom was the company established? 
ii. How did the relationship between co-founders originate? 
iii. What resources did each of the founders provide and what role did each assume? 
b. Other Founding Contributors  
i. Aside from the original founders, who else was vital to establishing the new firm?  
ii. How and when did their involvement originate? 
iii. Why was their input or involvement important? 
c. Are each of these individuals/organizations still involved with the company? 
i. If not, when did that occur and how did that affect access to resources or individuals? 
d. Were there individuals/organizations and resources that the company could not gain access to? 
C. Activity 1:  Developing a Unique Value Proposition 
a. What is the value proposition? 
b. When and how did the company create the value proposition and the product offering? 
c. Who is/was involved in the creation of the value proposition & product conceptualization? 
i. What is/was their role and how did the relationship originate? 
ii. Why is/was their input important? 
iii. Are they still involved in the company? 
d. Who or what are/were the resources and people/organizations that are/were the most difficult to 
access and what were the specific impediments to accessing those resources? 
D. Activity 2: Capital Acquisition 
a. How and when did you identify the capital needs for the new venture? 
i. Who is/was involved and what resources did they bring?  
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ii. How and when did the relationship originate? 
iii. Are they still involved in the company? 
b. What was the source of seed money for the firm? (if self funded, go to e.) 
i. How and when did the relationship with each seed investor originate? 
ii. Why do you think they committed to the new venture? 
iii. Were there any potential investors who did not invest?  
c. Were there subsequent rounds of external fundraising? (if no, go to f.) 
i. How and when did the relationship with each investor originate? 
ii. Why do you think they committed to the new venture? 
iii. Were there any potential investors that did not invest? (if no, go to vii) 
1. Who were they, why did they not invest and when did this occur? 
d. What were the challenges to identifying investors and gaining commitment for subsequent 
rounds? 
e. How did inclusion of later round investors impact the relationship with seed/founding investors? 
f. When an investor wanted to liquidate their investment, when did this occur and what impact did 
it have on the company’s access to vital resources or individuals and on performance?  
E. Activity 3: Talent Acquisition 
a. How did you identify and recruit experts and talent to the company? 
i. How and when did the relationship originate and what roles were being recruited? 
ii. Were there individuals/organizations that declined to be involved or couldn’t be accessed? 
1. Who were they, why and when did this occur? 
iii. Has there been a situation when vital talent/expertise left the company? 
1. When did this occur and what impact did that departure have on the company? 
b. Does/did the company have one or more Boards? 
i. If multiple boards, what is/was the purpose/role of each board (i.e., formal vs. advisory) 
ii. Who are the Board members and how did the relationships with board members 
originate? 
iii. Why did they join and what resources/access do/did they each provide? 
iv. Where there individuals who declined a position on a board?  
1. What was the reason and when did this occur? 
v. Are there board members who are no longer serving? 
1. When did their involvement end and why? 
c. What were the impediments to attracting key talent or persuading someone to come on board? 
F. Activity 4:  Establishing Repeatable Customer Business 
a. Who has responsibility for customer acquisition? 
i. How and when did this relationship originate? 
ii. What resources do they bring to this effort? 
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b. Did any of your customers help gain access to other potential customers? 
c. Has the company been nominated for and/or received business awards?  
i. If so, who and when were you nominated and what was the award? 
ii. What did the company gain from this effort? 
d. Are there individuals/organizations key to gaining customers who ceased involvement? 
i. When did their involvement end and why? 
ii. What impact did this have? 
e. What has been the greatest challenge to gaining repeatable business from customers? 
f. Was there a time when the company could not attract enough new customers to stay in 
business? 
i. When did this occur and what was the impediment? 
G. Activity 5: Product Development 
a. Who has been responsible for product development? 
i. How and when did this relationship originate? 
ii. What resources do they bring to this effort? 
b. Who else and what other resources are vital to this activity? 
i. How and when did these relationships originate or were these resources accessed? 
ii. Why were they important to this activity? 
c. Are there individuals/organizations key to product development who ceased involvement? 
i. When did their involvement end and why? 
ii. What impact did this have on the company? 
d. Were there resources or individuals/organizations critical to this activity that the company was 
not able to access and what was the impediment to this access? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   105	  
6.6 Interview Protocol: Non-Founders 	  
 
This protocol will be used to collect data on one specific activity with which the participant has been 
identified. 
A. Pre Interview Disclosure and Consent: 
a. Research Summary 
b. Informed Consent 
c. Oral Consent to Audio Recording 
d. Definitions: 
i. Resources: tangible and intangible  
ii. Value Proposition: what a company proposes to deliver to a customer and how the 
product/service is differentiated from other similar offerings 
e. Duration:  
iii. Network Actor/Stakeholder (non-founder): 30-60 minutes 
f. Note: Questions to network participants will be framed in terms of the specific key activity with 
which they were associated  
g. Note: ‘Other Informants’ refers to actors related to a case that were not specifically identified with 
an activity-based network, but are able to corroborate information provided by other case 
participants   
B. Describe the origination of your relationship with the company: 
a. When and how did you become involved with the company? 
b. Why did you decide to become involved with the company? 
c. What was your expected contribution in terms of resources or contacts? 
d. Was your involvement with the company formal or informal (i.e., contractual)? 
C. Are you still active with the company?  
a. What was/is your role in the company?  
b. If no, when and why did you stop being engaged? 
i. Do you still maintain relationship(s) with anyone associated with the company? 
ii. What is your current principal occupation? 
D. What were the specific resources or contacts you delivered to the company? 
a. How and when did this occur? 
E. What were the challenges or impediments that were encountered in accessing resources and 
achieving goals associated with this activity? 
Can you recommend and facilitate an introduction to other individuals associated with the 
company that might be helpful in understanding how the company grew 
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6.7 Detailed Path Building Narrative: Coupon 	  
 
Capital Acquisition: 
Initial Conditions: Neither co-founder contributed capital to the new venture. Both co-founders had 
broad networks of senior people in corporations nationwide; however, one co-founder’s network was of 
particular importance (“When it came to fundraising, his network was fantastic”). Having been a former 
venture capitalist, this particular co-founder had access to the venture capital community not available to 
most pre product and pre-revenue entrepreneurs.  With such strong access to the VC community, the test 
of the viability of their idea was whether they “could actually raise money against it.” 
 
Instigating Event: The co-founders developed their “pitch” the first month and began scheduling 
meetings through their network.  Over the next two to three months they met with 10 to 12 VC firms, 
including the former firm of the co-founder and another firm that the co-founder knew through joint board 
positions.  
 
Drivers: Time was of the essence in getting to the market first with this concept.  With the particular 
business model they created, the co-founders knew they would not be able to get the attention of major 
corporate clients without institutional financial backing (“…so we talked to people…but three minutes into 
the conversation, “So how much money have you raised…””).  So, they were motivated to quickly get to 
the business model that had the most appeal to institutional investors (“…we knew from day one that if 
we did not have major investors behind the company, no [customer] was going to engage us.”).  At the 
same time, they were careful to pursue investors who would provide capital with minimal interference 
(“what you don’t want is an investor who’s going to tell you how to run your company.  You want an 
investor whose going to be supportive…”) so as not to slow down the process of building the company 
(“we were very focused on what were the things that let us move fast and what were the things that 
slowed us down and avoid them at all cost.”) and thus, concentrated their efforts on raising capital from 
those VCs they knew “incredible well” because “that made the process easier.” Once the product was 
launched, the co-founders cast a wider net in subsequent fundraising efforts in order to identify strategic 
investors who could provide access to markets that they did not have or who could accelerate the 
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penetration of a market.  The co-founders took a strategic and incremental approach to fundraising 
seeking investors who could provide them with the resources they needed for a particular point in the 
development of the venture but only raising enough to get to the next key milestone (“…you have to get to 
your next key milestone before you run out of money or you die.”). 
 
Stakeholder Engagement: From the onset, the search for investors to commit to the venture included 
not only the engagement of direct relationships with potential investors, but tapping into their network to 
identify connections to potential investors principally through contacts who were entrepreneurs that 
received VC funding.  Although, the first two institutional investors had a prior relationship with one of the 
co-founders, the co-founders also began building a relationship with a third firm who they came to know 
through another entrepreneur and former VC partner because of geographic proximity to the new venture.  
As the strategy of the new venture developed and gaps were identified in their resources, a senior 
member of their leadership team introduced them to the third round investor who had expertise and 
access to a segment of the market they identified as a gap. This investor and board member quickly 
became their “hardest working sales guy.”  Similarly, when international opportunities began to emerge, 
they sought a fourth round corporate investor who could provide not only funding and access to potential 
customers, but facilities and employees to help develop global opportunities.  All the investors became 
board members and trusted advisors providing access to more than just financial resources, but also to 
members of the senior management team, an independent director and customer segments and new 
markets as needed based on the development of the venture.  The co-founders did not report being 
constrained by their investors, nor did they feel pressure to build and sell as is the stereotype for 
institutional investor engagement (“The exit does not seem to be a motivating factor…they all seem to be 
very patient with their time lines, none of them are pushing us.”).   
 
Contingency Response: The co-founders took advantage of unexpected opportunities and information 
that arose from investor engagement.  This manifested in the form of new and valuable relationships.  
During the first round of fundraising, one potential VC required the co-founders to bring in a VC within 
local geographic proximity to serve as the contact for the other distant VCs.  Although, the cofounders did 
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not pursue funding from that particular firm, as a result of those negotiations, they identified a local firm 
with important synergies that eventually became an investor and important mentor to the co-founders.  
During the third round of fundraising, potential investors repeatedly compared the business model of the 
new venture to that of a company in another industry.   Picking up on that cue, the co-founders decided to 
recruit for their senior management team from that company’s network of current and former employees.  
 
Scope of Action: The cofounders were disciplined and strategic in their actions when it came to raising 
capital (“…the thing we always try to solve for is to get to the next milestone…”).  They raised funds 
incrementally based on the next near term goal (“…part of it is planning what’s the next milestone”) and, 
as a result, were deliberate in who they engaged while raising capital and from whom they received their 
capital infusions (“…we raised very little money, just enough to get this going”).  One co-founder 
described the nature of their actions as follows: “ …you tend to get insanely focused on hitting the 
milestone and you get very protective of anything that’s getting in your way from doing it.” 
 
Outcome: The strategic and incremental approach to fundraising allowed the co-founders to maintain 
control of the process of building the new venture by managing the fundraising network to gain access 
only those well-defined financial and other resources offered by investors that were critical to achieve the 
“next milestone.”  The resulting limit on the number of decision-makers and sources of feedback enabled 
the new venture to pursue each consecutive milestone quickly, however, it also served to constrained the 
building of the venture in that “everything is stretched…everything [employees] do is being done on a 
shoestring.” 
 
 
Development of Value Proposition: 
Initial Conditions: The new venture was started with no capital, no employees, only an idea based on 
two major industry trends they observed while working at their previous employer.  It appeared to them 
that no one was attempting to capitalize on these trends to create a business (“no one is doing anything 
with it.”) The co-founders believed there was potential for a viable business model (“there is a business 
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model there…”).  The question they asked themselves was: “How do you put this together in a meaningful 
way?” The path was unknown (“frankly, we were not sure if we could build a business, we were not sure 
how to do it…”). 
 
Instigating Event: “Pretty convinced [they] had a good idea,” they reached out to “their senior network” 
and “just started talking to a lot of people.”  They crafted a “half dozen business models they thought 
would work.”  
 
Drivers: The co-founders were motivated to identify the business model “that would make sense to 
investors” because “[the co-founders] knew from day one that if [they] did not have major investors behind 
the company, no [customer] was going to engage…” The positive feedback they received from their 
“senior network” (“And…frankly, we generally got a pretty good level of excitement.”) provided the 
momentum for further refinements of the business model. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement: The co-founders simultaneously tested the ideas with individuals from each 
of their existing professional networks: (1) potential investors, to see if they could raise money and (2) 
potential customers or those who worked with potential customers, to see if there was a market for the 
product  (“…two things we did simultaneously to test the value. The first was, see if you could actually 
raise money against it….the second was calling up all the senior [customer] people we know and saying, 
“Hear us out, what do you think?”…it was not a sales call…but those were the ways we sort of validated 
could this idea have some real feet…”; “We talked to a lot of people that served those customers…if we 
came to them with this type of product, what would they think about it.”). 
 
Contingency Response: No findings. 
 
Scope of Action: The co-founders thoroughly vetted the concept for the new venture with senior level 
professionals drawn from their respective professional networks before hiring employees and building the 
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technology.  Their personal investment in the new venture was limited to time and minimal financial 
resources for travel for meetings to pitch the idea. 
 
Outcome:  Based on feedback from this new network of advisors created from their existing professional 
networks, the co-founders were able to craft a business model that enabled them to raise institutional 
capital and create interest from potential customers, which in turn, allowed them to pursue the next 
milestone in the building of the new venture.  Thus, this activity provided the beginnings for development 
of networks focused on fundraising and customer acquisition. As one co-founder noted, the outcome of 
this activity validated their starting point and refined the vision: “I don’t think we ever evolved the core 
value proposition.  I think we definitely made it smarter and more precise and more elegant…” (“I don’t 
know if we were smart or lucky.  Probably lucky.  I could pull out our original investor presentation from 
April 2008.  It looks identical to what we do today.”).  
 
Talent Acquisition & Management: 
Initial Conditions: Although the co-founders drew from many individuals in their existing professional 
networks to vet the idea and raise capital, the new venture initially consisted of just two employees, the 
co-founders.  In building the network of talent and those who had access to talent, the co-founders initially 
were constrained by contract from hiring people they knew and trusted from their previous employer for 
first two years.  Additionally, the establishment of the new venture in a city where the co-founders had 
neither lived nor worked limited the ability of their existing network to facilitate the search for talent.  As a 
consequence, with no capital, no product and no recruiting strategy, the challenge was to attract talent to 
the new venture by seeking “people who really get compelled by the vision and want to be part of 
something like this” because according to one co-founder “the only currency you have to trade in the early 
days is a vision that we could build something great.” 
 
Instigating Event: Hiring at the new venture followed fundraising (“We didn’t have an employee until 
after we got the money”). Once the first round of capital was raised the co-founders recruited developers 
to build the prototype, then recruited the sales organization to find customers.  Each successive round of 
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capital raised and milestone attained reignited the search for talent. (“…after we raised the next five 
million…we started bringing…a broader set of skills into the business.”) 
 
Drivers: The recruiting and retention of talent to the organization was driven by four precepts of the co-
founders: (1) associate with individuals that would enable the new venture to quickly achieve the next 
milestone (co-founder: “…we often thought people were slowing us down…we had an idea, we knew 
what it was and we were just trying to move very fast”), (2) engage individuals who could fill gaps in 
expertise and access to resources (member sr. leadership team about the cofounders: “they knew what 
they didn’t know” and “And that was important for me to know that they actually recognized what they 
didn’t know and they needed somebody who could fill that void for them.”), (3) performance manage and 
recognize that changes in the business may necessitate changes in talent because “[h]uman beings can’t 
always scale as quickly” as a business (co-founder: “in a new company…people each have their own 
season…most of the people you get in the early days of the company don’t belong in the season we are 
in now” and “people aren’t bad, but the positions aren’t right for them”), (4) maintain the chemistry or 
cultural fit that facilitates the agenda of the new venture and the co-founders at all levels of the 
organization (co-founder: “we were careful to make sure we brought the partner from the Series C 
investor that we thought would most gel with the existing board members.” Member of senior leadership 
team: “…this was a culture that was going to work for me…we want to make sure that every person we 
add to the equation at this point in a company this small doesn’t upset that in any way”).  
 
Stakeholder Engagement: Initially, the co-founders relied a multitude of tools and sources to identify 
talent for the new venture, both from network and non-network sources. Their investors referred members 
for the senior leadership team who they know from previous portfolio companies, they sought referrals 
from their existing professional network, utilized recruiters, career fairs, job boards and social media for 
sales and technology hires.  With little capital and high risk, the co-founders recognized that “the only 
currency you have to trade in the early days is a vision that we could build something great.” Therefore, 
the recruiting efforts appealed to candidates with entrepreneurial desire and appetite for risk (sr. exec: “I 
think my heart and drive comes from building things” “ it was never about coming for the salary or the day 
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to day comp plan.  This was about wanting to finish my career building something…”).  All employees 
became owners in the new venture and thus, had a stake in any future success that would flow from their 
efforts.  And as the venture grew, it was able to leverage the reputation of existing employees and board 
members to attract individuals who trusted them.  
 
Contingency Response: The co-founders were quick to respond to unexpected results and changing 
needs by reworking and expanding their network to seek solutions.   They replaced almost all the original 
product development team, though proficient at fast prototyping needed in the early years, was not able 
to adapt to the needs for structure and scalability required once the company had customers (“We got 
talent that got the job done and that we could afford…”; “They were quirky…they were a great little team.  
And yet they were excited about the vision…they were people that generally would not have fit in big 
corporations…the problem we had almost universally with that team is when we got just a little bigger and 
we had to have a little bit of management structure in place and a little bit of process, they sort of started 
dropping and being ineffective.”).  The co-founders similarly replaced the head of sales and most of his 
sales team when they realized that “he didn’t know a darn thing… his network and his sales experience, 
his sales skills were all wrong.”  So, they hired a recruiter to find candidates with experience from a 
company they had heard about during their fundraising efforts that had a similar business model in a 
different industry.  The resulting new head of sales and new sales and support team he was able to 
recruit largely with a similar background was critical to developing and executing an new strategy and 
achieving the next milestones of the new venture. 
 
Scope of Action: The co-founders were diligent in managing the network.  According to one co-founder 
“I do think a way to crush a new company is to get too much of a network around it because they take 
time…because managing all these relationships and knowledge and all these people “helping you” takes 
time.  And so I think we’ve been lucky in terms of we’ve generally gotten new relationships to broaden our 
network when we were ready to handle it.” Limited by funding and driven to achieve the next milestone 
before they ran out of capital, they recruited incrementally and purposively those they could afford and 
those who had expertise and resources they did not possess.  The cofounders built the network of talent 
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slowly and “did not rely on a lot of expert folks around us to get the business going...we often thought 
people were slowing us down....we were just trying to move very fast.” “For the first couple of years…we, 
frankly, didn’t want other senior people around.  We didn’t want them muddying the water in terms of 
where we needed to go.” As aggressive performance managers, they were willing to “wreck and rebuild” 
the network as the talent needs of the new venture changed or if results slowed growth.  One co-founder 
is known for “accidental firings” but as the other co-founder noted, “ I can’t think of one mistake we’ve 
made there.  I do think, generally, we’ve erred in not letting [co-founder] accidently fire people a little 
sooner.” This pragmatic approach to managing the network of talent has been adopted by the senior 
management team. As one sr. exec stated “We’ve been…really good…taking out people that just don’t fit 
or can’t carry their weight or just personality-wise don’t fit…the sword swings fast, fast and hard.”  They 
implemented this strategy, however, in an environment of honest and open communication, so 
expectations are clear with employees and separations were generally amicable where both parties 
agreed, “it’s time.”  As the sr. leadership team was put in place, the co-founders have slowly released 
recruiting and management of talent to the senior management team and encouraged a shift in focus 
from the hiring of specialists to recruiting the “natural athlete” because as one sr. exec described the 
philosophy of the co-founders, “you don’t know where the next problem is coming from.  So, if you hire 
someone to do something specific, it doesn’t really work because tomorrow we are doing something 
different.”  
 
Outcome: One co-founder describes the transition in identifying talent from “what we could find”, which 
was often through non-network social media and internet-based sources, to organic growth through 
referrals which led to more growth through referrals.” One co-founder admitted that talent acquisition is 
their “biggest constraint to growth.”  The willingness of the co-founders to dynamically manage the talent 
network enabled them to change course and achieve their immediate milestones in spite of he shortage 
of resources. The open and honest communication and unambiguous action has created a strong culture 
and a sr. leadership team committed to maintain that culture: “…we want to make sure that every person 
we add to the equation at this point in a company this small doesn’t upset that in any way.” The co-
founders and senior leadership team, however, recognize the need for a more structured recruiting 
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strategy (co-founder: "we haven't had a recruiting strategy.  We've been able to sort of find the talent 
based on basically who we know and the occasional recruiter... I know that's not sustainable but that's 
how we kind of got to this point...Going forward we need a recruiting strategy...we probably need 
someone in the company whose primary role is to think about recruiting...").  Structure around recruiting is 
not only needed to add headcount to support growth but to address three specific challenges in the 
network: (1) the growing need for management (sr. execs: “you bring some really smart, really senior 
people as part of the leadership team and then you hire a bunch of the least expensive and most talented 
people you can hire to do all the work, but at some point you have this one person who is trying to 
manage this massive amount of work”; “We’re having to build spans…layer the management structure 
now.”; “…we have all the Chiefs and we have all the Indians.  Well, the Chief now has to be everywhere 
and the Indians are getting bigger, bigger, bigger, bigger and the Chief can’t be everywhere so everyone 
is becoming ineffective.”), (2) the lack of diversity in terms of experience and ideas (sr. exec: “We have a 
seasoned and talented team by default”) because they were able to attract individuals who could tolerate 
the career risk and the financial risk (sr. exec: “it’s not that we don’t have headcount open, it’s the 
challenge of hiring here…we’re not exactly paying market level for a lot of these positions”; “…this was 
going to sound trite, but I’ve got to find people who are living well below their means.”) and drew upon 
their networks of candidates who worked for the same companies (sr. execs: “we need to go find people 
that already had these skill sets, which quite frankly, led us back to a lot of people who  had at some point 
in time…worked for [company with similar business model]”; “…we’ve changed our direction in terms of 
the next wave of recruiting…we don’t want to become [a company they recruited heavily from].  We 
realize we need a breadth of experience here, so we’re really trying to broaden out our background…”), 
(3) the shortage of technology and analytical talent in the city in which they are located and limited 
network to connect them to that talent (“It’s very difficult getting people here.”; “…even though [the co-
founders] have fantastic networks, when it came to hiring in [city where the company was established]…it 
was not through our network because our network is very national and very senior.  And so when it came 
to finding our first developer in a state we hadn’t even lived in, I think that’s important to know.” 
 
Product Development: 
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Initial Conditions: At inception of the new venture there was no product, no employees just an idea.  
According to the co-founders, “ we were first movers in this space.  We invented it.”  Although they were 
able to design the core product and write the requirements, they had to find the people to build the 
technology. However, their national network of senior business professionals “was not helping us hire our 
first couple developers…”  
 
Instigating Event: After raising the first round of capital, the co-founders set out to hire a team of 
developers to build a prototype for piloting as quickly as possible (“We didn’t have an employee until after 
we got the money.”). The co-founders used social media and online job boards to source their first 
technology hires.  And what they found were “classic early stage developer[s]” capable of writing huge 
amounts of code for fast prototyping.  Which enabled them to begin piloting the technology with a small 
number of customers.  At the same time however, the co-founders were fully aware that these individuals 
and their product would not last an increasing need for product scalability, organizational structure and 
accountability to customers.  
 
Drivers:   (1) Initially this activity, driven by the need for fast prototyping to serve a few number of 
customers to prove viability and justify the next round of funding, (2) as the number and size of customers 
grew the increased accountability and responsiveness to customer requirements required greater 
organizational structure and process around product development; (3) Similarly the growth in the 
organization as other functions building out (sales, marketing, analytical support), increasing sources of 
input into product development 
 
Stakeholder Engagement: It was in this activity that perhaps the most diverse network of stakeholders 
has arisen.  Beginning with a few developers and oversight by co-founders, grow of the customer base 
necessitated a change in the nature of the technology expertise from developers who could build fast 
prototypes to professionals who could build a product that could accommodate growth and be responsive 
to customer technical requirements.   As the organization itself grew, employees from different functions, 
sales, marketing and analytic support also joined the network to provide input they received from 
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customers and ideas they crafted to address objections from prospective customers. Product 
development became an organizational wide activity. 
 
Contingency Response: See Talent Acquisition 
 
Scope of Action: For the first two years product development was micromanaged by the co-founders: 
“And so it was our product and we, frankly, weren’t terribly open to suggestions.  Not because we were 
being jerks but we had a very specific thing we wanted to go do…” Growth of the new venture, however, 
meant an increasing number of stakeholders from across the organization engaging in this activity to 
address customer demands and new ideas. Facing more ideas than technical people to build those ideas 
into the product, a more inclusive decision-making process and protocol for prioritization of product 
modifications has emerged. “[Y]ou have stakeholders from each of the major areas saying this is what 
we’d like to build.  We put a priority on it based on the estimated value and the estimated time it’s going to 
take and then company-wide we say here’s what’s going to be in our next release and that decision is 
made with [the co-founders] and all the executives in the room…then we actually hand it over to the 
product folks…”; “and there’s a lot more input that comes from a lot of different areas, it’s much more a 
decision-making process and, frankly, it’s all about prioritization…”; “I feel it’s pretty wide open from 
creating the analytical products.  I don’t feel any constraint around that at all.”; “We’re creating a path.  It’s 
really an open field or an open slate from what needs to be analytically.”) 
 
Outcome: Increasing stakeholder engagement has extended decision-making authority beyond the 
micromanagement of the co-founders that marked the early years to other members of the sr. leadership 
team who bring feedback from customers and prospective customers and creative solutions to problems.  
However, this increased stakeholder engagement has been encompassed in a decision making process 
that entails prioritization of action. 
 
Customer Acquisition: 
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Initial Conditions: The co-founders had a strong network with one customer segment with which they 
consulted early on to vet the initial idea.  However, because they were creating a new business (“…no 
one new how the ultimate end user was going to react”), so finding that first customer was a challenge 
(“…actually we didn’t know how people were going to react…”; “…the biggest question all along was will 
people just freak out?”; “Nobody wanted to be first, everybody thought it was a great idea…”). 
 
Instigating Event: The first round funding and availability of a prototype enabled the co-founders to seek 
a small number of potential customers to pilot the technology.  The first pilot came from the existing 
network of senior professionals (“… so one of my closest confidants and mentors…actually ended up 
being our very first test…So our very first customer moved very quickly…”).  Similar to the case with 
fundraising, building this network with individuals who new and trusted the co-founders hastened the 
progression of this activity (“They’re buying the founders when you’re this early…they bought two people 
that they think will deliver…”).  With a product in hand, the co-founders also began building the sales 
team to develop opportunities with customer segments they did not have expertise or relationships in. 
 
Drivers: (1) This activity was driven by the need to get to the next “milestone” to prove the business 
model to both existing and prospective institutional investors for the next round of institutional funding.  
While the first round of funding enabled them to get to the testing phase, the cofounders knew that in 
order to get to the second and subsequent rounds of institutional funding, they would need to successfully 
pilot the technology and demonstrate customer acceptance and the ability to build out the customer base 
in all segments.  In this sense, a principal driver was the need to raise capital quickly, but incrementally 
while the company was not generating sufficient cash flow to be self-sustaining. (2) A second driver was 
the desire to acquire a “marquee name” customer to help drive business from other segments to build out 
the customer network (“they need national scale, meaning you have presence in every state…the second 
thing you needed frankly was a marquee name…for [customers] to stand up and take notice and actually 
pay attention to what you are saying.”; “in our gut we knew we really).  (3) Finally, this activity was driven 
by the need to get to an effective sales strategy and sales organization, especially to address the 
customer segments that the co-founders had neither the expertise or professional network (“…it was 
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introductions to the side of the business that we didn’t have a strong network with”; “…so we had to go 
out and find people who were consultative salespeople who understood how to sell data…”; trying to 
accelerate a sales process and a growth of a marketing service company”; “they are literally going to help 
us expand internationally to all the major countries in the world frankly in a much faster rate than we could 
ourselves…”). 
 
Stakeholder Engagement: This activity spanned multiple networks.  Third and fourth round investors 
were strategically selected because, in addition to financial resources, they provided networks that could 
facilitate access and expertise to customers and markets.  Existing customers understood that helping to 
build the customer base meant the new venture could expand its product offerings much quicker, so they 
provided references and credibility to help the sales effort.  In fact, the largest customer actually assigned 
sales executives to joint call with the sales team of the new venture in order to facilitate new customer 
acquisition (“”And they’re helping us build the [customer] network…It changes the nature of the 
conversation…it’s amazing and it’s not a contractual thing and we don’t pay them for it”).  In addition, 
employees from the technical and analytical teams were engaged as part of the sales process to directly 
address objections or problems raised by existing or prospective customers both in the field and in the 
office. But this network was not static.  “Course corrections” required replacement of the original sales 
team.  New solutions to address objections of potential customers, meant new segments of customers 
could be developed which required sales associates with different sets of skills (“[prospective customer] 
forced us to re-think a secondary business model that we never envisioned…could be a pretty significant 
second sot of side business for us…”).  Rapid growth of the customer base meant the venture was 
constantly seeking to recruit technical and analytic expertise to support the expanding sales organization 
(“…if you don’t have all those [customers]…engaged with tech resources, they’re never going to 
convert…”; “…I’d love to have an analyst who is…in the field working with my team to go on meetings on 
a regular basis…”; “it’s not that we don’t have headcount open, it’s the challenge of hiring here…we’re not 
exactly paying market level for a lot of these positions”).  
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Contingency Response: With respect to this activity, the new venture has demonstrated the agility to 
rebound and leverage the unexpected.  The co-founders replaced the original head of sales and most of 
his sales team when they realized that he was a “complete mismatch” and “he didn’t know a darn thing… 
his network and his sales experience, his sales skills were all wrong” and “they weren’t selling anything.”  
So, they hired a recruiter to find candidates with experience from a company they had heard about during 
their fundraising efforts that had a similar business model in a different industry to “wreck and rebuild” the 
sales organization.  The new head of sales (brought on even before they fired his predecessor) and the 
sales and support team he was able to recruit from his network, were critical to “restating what the 
business was about” by executing an new strategy and accelerating the pace of growth (“We completely 
changed the way we were positioning the product…”; “…they’ll be writing textbooks about how we did this 
because we’re trying to accelerate the sales process and a growth of a marketing services company from 
zero to 100 miles an hour by just skipping through all the gears…”; “the network is growing everyday, so 
we’ve survived through that point, but that was certainly the biggest challenge.”).  In another instance, the 
sales team encountered objections in the market that prevented then from winning the largest accounts in 
a market segment.  The sales team decided that one prospect in particular was “too big a client to just 
say, “Oh well, you can’t win them all.”  So a team of six met for an entire day to try to find a solution for 
this specific situation.  What they crafted was a solution that led to “a secondary business model that we 
never envisioned and it had never really been thought of relative to the revenue potential to this 
business…could be a pretty significant sort of side business for us.” 
 
Scope of Action: Although their actions were critical to initiating this activity early in the venture, the 
release of control to other members of the leadership team is most evident here.  The co-founders are 
focused on results and less on strategy.  Strategy is changed when needed, as are people to execute the 
strategy.  The co-founders maintain oversight and “are on the road all the time” to remain “plugged in to 
what challenges our sales guys are facing.”  But the co-founders appear to have turned over 
responsibility to those who have the networks and expertise by allowing them to rebuild the sales strategy 
to grow the company.  Again, with their actions are focused on getting to the “next key milestone before 
they die”, it is notable that the co-founders have instilled discipline with respect to the type of customers 
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the venture pursues.  The sales effort is focused on those customers who can add value, such as 
customers with a “marquee name”, avoiding smaller customers in certain segments who “just can’t move 
our needle” or prospective customers who demand product changes that would diminish the value of the 
business model (“…we could not let [a small company] set a precedent…they could literally destroy the 
value…So, we said, “Sorry, we’re not going to do it.””).  
 
Outcome: Because resources are stretched and the venture is seeking to scale rapidly, they have not 
been able to develop a repeatable customer acquisition process (“we’re building and running at the same 
time…it’s hard to get down a repeatable process this early in our life cycle…it’s the instability of a new 
company and our processes until we get those gaps filled we have to work around them so that we can 
deliver to our [customers] what we’re saying we’re going to deliver.”).  Conversely, the lack of processes 
and structure in this activity has allowed members of this activity network to opportunistically devise 
innovative solutions to problems and open new segments of the market to the new venture. 
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6.8 Findings by Activity and Path Building Dimension: Coupon 
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6.9 Detailed Path Building Narrative: Pixel 	  
 
Capital Acquisition 
Initial conditions:  The founder started with an idea and “found” the technology, but did not have the 
capital to acquire the technology or hire employees to build and sell the idea.  What he did have, 
however, was a network of high net worth individuals, ‘angel investors,’ who had invested in previous 
companies he and his spouse had run.  The additional challenge, according to one executive at the 
company, was that “[s]ome of them don’t like the space…[the city in which the company is located] is not 
a hardware community.” 
 
Instigating event:  “Capital needs,” as noted by the founder, “were first to acquire the technology…bring 
it down here and hire the people to turn it into a company.”  So in 2006 the founder sought seed capital 
from friends, family and then “went out to a group of high net work individuals we know and asked them 
for checks.”  The founder’s success in raising this initial round was considered “an endorsement of the 
idea” but had an additional benefit in that it meant “there’s somebody else who’s part of it because it’s 
lonely being CEO.” 
 
Drivers:  According to one executive, the greatest need of the company “is funds to keep it going as 
sales ramp up.”  However, as one executive noted, whether it was raising funds from potential investors 
or obtaining credit from potential suppliers “because we’re not a known entity” both cash and credit were 
difficult to come by.  For example, as one executive noted, “every time that [the founder] went over to 
England to try to raise money or in New York, we had certain milestones that we had to hit…to show 
progress.”  The venture tried to “hit all the hot patterns that venture capitalists want to see” but tight 
capital constrains growth and slows progress.  One executive described it as follows: “[W]e need more 
money than angel investors can provide, but we’re too small to get that venture capital money…too small 
for true private equity, so we’re kind of in that no man’s land.”  He went on to explain, “with one or two 
contracts in hand…we can go raise a whole bunch of money.”  In essence, the new venture found itself in 
an entrepreneurial Catch-22:  capital is needed for growth and growth is needed to access capital.   
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Consequently, investors were selected for two reasons: (1) their ability to provide capital and (2) their 
“Rolodex” of “financial connections.”  Nothing else.  In fact, the founder commented that looking for 
investors with expertise to help build the company did not factor into the search for investors because 
“[i]t’s hard to find high net worth individuals with expertise in something that hasn’t been done before.”  
However, beneath this is another important driver, which is the desire on the part of the founder to 
maintain control.   The founder avoided raising funds from investors who wanted to be engaged in the 
venture for the simple reason that “if you’re a pain in the ass, you’re a pain in the ass.  I’m not going to 
take your money and have you be an investor pain in the ass…At some point you have to figure out how 
many phone calls in a day or a week is worth that much money.”   
 
As a result, the acquisition of capital was most successful with friends, family, angel investors who had 
invested in previous companies of the founder and his spouse, and investors the committed angels 
introduced to the founder.  Trust and a track record with the founder and his spouse was an important 
component of attaining the commitment of these stakeholders to support the building of “something that 
hasn’t been done before.”   
 
Furthermore, the importance and urgency to raise capital also became the guiding factor in the selection 
of CFO.  A series of CFOs were hired and promptly fired because as the founder explained, “they wanted 
to sit there and count money instead of raising them…they came in to rearrange money.”   The current 
CFO, described by the founder “as the first darn CFO that he ever liked and worth a darn,” brought 
extensive experience in fundraising, investor relations and dealing with institutional investors. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  The three relevant constituents in this network are investors, investors who 
are board members and the CFO.  In seeking capital to support the venture the founder first went to those 
he and his spouse knew to pitch the idea.  And those who committed capital made introductions to other 
source of funding.  According to one executive, “our investors have been invaluable…Opening up doors 
for other investors.”   The founder maintains contact and continues to build relationships with potential 
investors.  He explained, “even if you tell me no, you’re on my list forever…and I just keep sending you 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   124	  
stuff.”  And this has paid off since “some of those people have actually come back and said this seems 
like a good time, can I come in now?”   
 
Board engagement has evolved as the venture emerged.  “To be on my board,” the founder explains,  
“you have to be an investor.”  For the first couple years, the board of the company consisted of the 
primary angel investor and the founder.  It has since grown to include three other major investors, one a 
neighbor of the founder and the others introduced by the primary angel.  Initially board engagement was 
infrequent, “a phone call twice a year,” and the focus was on expanding funding sources.   Board 
engagement is now more frequent and, in addition to providing “a Rolodex when needed,” the board is 
looked to for “candid counsel” and has even begun to provide customer leads.  In fact, in late 2011, the 
board, according to one executive, challenged the leadership of the venture:   “You’re thinking too 
small…You’re looking behind you instead of in front of you.”  This board challenge was the impetus for a 
new revenue model and line of business for the company. 
 
The greatest source of instability in this network has been in the position of CFO.  The expectation of the 
founder was to engage a CFO with the skill to draw in and engage investors. Persistently disappointed in 
what he was able to attract to the venture, the founder contacted a friend at a firm that specialized in 
placing temporary CFOs in to emerging technology companies.  As a result, in mid 2011, the venture 
contracted with a CFO who happened to be a serial entrepreneur himself with deep experience in 
fundraising, board and investor relations, financial reporting and financial engineering, all skills that 
provided structure, transparency and innovation and “alleviated the pressure on [the founder].” 
 
Contingency Response:  Thin capitalization of a new venture not only challenges the ability of the firm 
to grow as a business, but also has very personal implications.  In addition to not being able to offer 
market rate salaries to its employees, several executives provided accounts of weeks and months when 
the company was not able to make payroll.  “[T]hey all hung in,” according to one executive, “we didn’t 
lose anybody.  It was pretty amazing.”  There was a consensus that “confidence and belief” in “the vision 
and the team” prevented these situations from becoming catastrophic for the emerging venture. 
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Scope of Action:  There were two principal actions that surfaced, one that shaped the network and one 
that shaped the activity.  First, the founder put specific constraints around the type of investor he was 
willing to accept capital from.  He specifically avoided potential investors who “wanted to be more 
involved, micromanage, ‘help’.”  The founder had an additional limitation: “Nervous Nellies I didn’t take.”  
His rationale: “At some point you have to figure out how many phone calls in a day or a week is worth that 
much money.”  In addition, the founder required all investors to assign their voting rights to him.  “’Cause 
you’re betting on me,” the founder explained, “You don’t bet on me? Don’t invest.”  Unusual?  “Wildly 
unusual,” according to the founder, “ No one else has the guts to do it.”  This approach, although 
successful in providing the founder with control of the venture, likely constrained the size of the network 
and certainly controlled the type of constituents. 
 
Second, the founder provided the CFO with the autonomy to bring both structure and innovation to the 
venture to better position it to leverage market opportunities and seek institutional capital.  For example, 
in a relatively short period, the CFO had introduced financial reporting systems to provide greater 
transparency and information to all investors and especially the board, implemented sales tracking and 
reporting systems to enhance transparency and information to the sales team and managers, and 
developed innovative revenue models to expand the market of potential customers.  All of this creates the 
type of progress and milestones that attract institutional investors. 
 
Outcome:  “[The founder] never had a product, cash, a team and customers…he was always missing 
two or three of those pieces,” according to one executive, “we finally got over that over the last couple 
months.”  Although cash was one of the critical pieces in continuous short supply, a trusted group of 
investors has remained loyal in their support of the company.  “$14 million later it’s friends and family.”  
And, as the founder noted, “[a] number of them have re-upped as many as four times.”  Fortunately, as 
the venture has developed, the founder has moved toward more productive engagement of the board and 
greater reliance on the CFO that has enabled a shift in focus from persistent fundraising to product 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   126	  
innovation and customer development.  As one executive noted this shift is necessary because “we can 
limp along, but that’s not an idea where to go to create value.” 
 
Development of Value Proposition: 
Initial Conditions:  By studying the business model and industry of the company his spouse was 
running, the founder of Pixel identified an emerging trend and a gap in technology that ignited a vision for 
a new business.  “And so seeing that wave coming” the founder decided that “jumping in the middle of 
that big wave” made sense because “if you’re going to run a company, do it in one where there’s a rising 
tide.” 
 
Instigating Events:  Prior to acquiring the technology, the founder met with potential customers to test 
the waters.  He not only asked them “what’s going on in the space,” he explained his vision and asked, “If 
I can do these things, is this something you would buy?”  After receiving affirmation that a market existed 
for the concept, the founder raised seed capital and acquired the technology.  
 
Drivers:  The founder engaged two groups of constituents to develop the value proposition: technical 
experts to develop the technology and prospective customers to understand the need.  An advisory team 
of scientists and engineers, “some of the best brains in the world,” was formed to periodically collaborate, 
“brainstorm” and “challenge each other on what’s the right technical solution.”  According to one 
executive, the founder established the advisory group “so I don’t get hooked.” The executive explained 
that “what often happens is the CEO/CTO founder, technical founder, they fall in love with 
technology…they have blinders on.”  Throughout the development of the concept and the business 
model, the founder remained in contact with potential customers.  As one manager explained, “you get 
something, you’d go back to the customer and say…”Are we close?””  In essence, these distinct groups 
of stakeholders were drawn into the network to prevent the founder from getting locked into a particular 
the technological path that would not be responsive to the needs of the market. 
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Stakeholder Engagement:  The founder, according to one executive, made it clear that “nobody owns 
the technology, we collectively own the technology. So we as a group are going to figure out the best 
way.”  By meeting with technical advisors “on a regular basis” to discuss and debate “what might work 
and what might not,” and relying on potential customers to identify “what’s going on in the space,” the 
process of transforming the vision into a viable value proposition was a collaborative effort from inception 
of the venture.  Development of the business model as a group effort continued as new executives and 
board members were brought into the venture with fresh ideas.  One manager provided the following 
example: “…we brought in a wonderful CFO…And the three of us sat around for probably two weeks, 
back and forth…let’s talk about assumptions, let’s run them by the board.” 
 
Contingency Response:  The concept for the venture came when the founder identified an emerging 
trend in an industry in which his wife was engaged, but no technological solution to convert the trend into 
an opportunity.   The subsequent introduction to a new technology presented by university scientists 
outside the U.S. at technology forum, enabled the founder to connect a need in an industry with a 
technology designed for another use. 
 
Scope of Action:  By encouraging technical advisors to “challenge each other,” periodically gathering 
feedback from prospective customers, and later revisiting and revising the business model as key 
executives joined the company, stakeholders were engaged in a way that enabled developing a value 
proposition grounded in market needs.    
 
Outcome:  The continuous engagement of a variety of stakeholders in the development of the value 
proposition both at inception and during emergence of the venture not only enabled the flow of input but 
also prevented the company from becoming enamored or “hooked” by one technological or business 
path.  Stakeholder engagement of this nature, as noted by one executive “decreases the probability of 
failure or risk because [the founder’s] got so many different minds…it becomes very collaborative.”  
Recent changes in the business model from this collaborative effort were described by one manager as 
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“a very exciting value proposition for not only our customers, but also for our investors…I think the 
success we’re getting is because we reframed it.” 
 
Talent Acquisition:   
Initial conditions:  The venture began with an idea that was affirmed by a few potential customers, but 
no money and no employees.  With the first round of capital, the founder acquired the technology and 
then shifted his attention to recruiting people to “turn it into a company.”  Finding those people would be 
challenge.  “[W]hen you’re doing something that hasn’t been done before,” the founder explained, “you 
can’t hire people who have experience doing it…this ‘previous experience’ thing doesn’t work.”  To his 
credit, the founder brought to the venture a strong background in R&D with a prestigious institution and 
extensive experience commercializing new technologies.  This gave the new entity a degree of credibility 
that would facilitate talent acquisition. 
 
Instigating Event:  After acquiring the technology, the founder sought two types of talent.  First, he 
formed a group of advisors “to determine what’s best to build out of the technology.”  “[W]ithout knowing 
anything about the space,” one executive explained, “[the founder] went out and found online some of the 
best brains in the world, called them up and said, “I’ve got this idea, I’ve bought the technology, I’ve 
already identified the market.”   The founder admits he simply “cold called” these experts because “they 
were some of the best guys in this space in the world and therefore they have the experience and breadth 
of knowledge I didn’t have to know what might work and what might not.”  Second, the founder hired as 
his first employee a head of sales and marketing to identify the markets and build the strategy to facilitate 
sales of the product once it left development and went into production. 
 
Drivers:  Three main drivers guided recruiting and retention of talent to the venture.  First, the founder 
sought professionals to fill his gap in skills and expertise.  One employee praised the founder and his wife 
for “being open to all kinds of ideas,” because “they know what they don’t know… And they’re confident 
enough to admit it.”  As a result, others were drawn in to shape and build the venture from inception.  For 
example, despite the strength of his background in R&D, the founder formed the group of technical 
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advisors because “they have the experience and breadth of knowledge I didn't have to know what might 
work and what might not.”   The founder similarly recognized that what he needed in sales was someone 
who was “great with social skills, since I have limited social skills.”  One executive commented that the 
founder and his spouse, with their extensive backgrounds commercializing new technology, did not need 
the “adult supervision” he has had to provide to other early stage management teams.   However, what 
they turned to him for were “process, procedures, things like that to supplement their skills.” 
 
Second, the founder sought to hire people with high adaptation skills.  He explained his approach as 
follows: “[T]hey have a base ability or knowledge in something, electrical engineering, mechanical 
engineering…But they also have a high adaptation curve.  In other words, I can sit down with them with 
an idea, explain it to them and they can translate that into reality…and they’re out of the box thinkers and 
they’ll then think continually about how to improve upon a design…So you look for some basic 
background skills…but then you look for people with the attributes of quick on adaptation.”  For example, 
the manager hired to take over operations was an engineer with extensive experience with early stage 
ventures as well as a Fortune 100 company, who wore a variety of hats in this young venture from hiring 
engineers to managing the supply chain and daily cash flow to working through technology issues and the 
eventual change in base technology with the founder.  In seeking people with “high adaptation skills,” the 
venture attracted individuals who were motivated more by the vision of the founder than a specific product 
and role.  As one manager explained, “it’s not necessarily what I’m doing that excites me, it’s who I work 
with.”   
 
This comment also reveals the third driver in talent acquisition, which was the personality of the founder.  
The founder openly shared what he viewed as his shortcomings, for example admitting that he had 
“limited social skills” and that his personality “wasn’t one that would fit to a corporate 
environment…because if you’re my boss and you’re a moron, you’ll see it in my face.”  This translated 
into hiring individuals who not only possessed the skills and adaptability the founder was looking for, but 
also the strength and confidence to work with the founder.  As one manager commented, “[H]is 
personality could drive a lot of people crazy…some people would have a hard time…he has been so 
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successful in his life and his career and you sort of learn to trust that.”  While another executive explained 
that he “had a fair amount of experience with former Marines or people of that ilk and I kind of know how 
to work with them pretty well…fighting fire with fire because [the founder] scares a lot of people but he 
doesn’t scare me.” 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Talent to build this venture was sourced in a variety of ways.  The original 
group of experts to advise the founder was a result of internet research to identify domain experts 
followed by cold calling.  Other key individuals were found through “friends and friends of friends.”  Some 
had previously worked with the founder or his spouse.  The founder also contacted people he knew with 
specific skills who could refer him to others with similar skills.  The venture even had an in-house recruiter 
for a brief period.  Employees became a reliable source of referrals and the company paid referral fees to 
their employees to encourage this mode of recruiting.   
 
The venture similarly engaged talent through a variety of arrangements, whether it was a formal board or 
advisory board, full time employees or contract employee.  For example the CFO, manufacturing and a 
marketing professional were all contracted.  Another senior employee worked on contract for over a year 
before joining the company on a full time basis.  This enabled the venture to benefit from the services of 
highly skilled and experienced individuals they would otherwise not be able to afford.   With limited capital 
resources, the venture was not able to pay market rate salaries or fees.  Instead full time employees were 
given an equity stake in the company.  Stock was also used as a form of incentive and compensation for 
professional services and contractors engaged by the firm.  As one executive explains, it was not the 
compensation that drew talent to the venture, “we got them because of the vision and the team and that’s 
how we’ve been able to keep them.” 
 
Contingency Response:  When it came to attracting talent, the founder took advantage of the 
unexpected.  For example, when an individual who had previously worked with the founder, contacted 
him “out of the blue,” the founder knew this individual was someone he could trust to take over operations 
so he could focus on fundraising and sales.  The position was created on the spot and the individual hired 
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because, it was a good fit at the right time.  Similarly, an introduction from a friend of a friend of the 
founder’s led to the hiring of a senior sales professional.  According to the employee, “it was just meant to 
be.”  However, the founder recognized that this person filled an important void: “[h]e’s great with social 
skills and since I have limited social skills, he was a great fit.”  The recent hiring of the founder’s spouse 
as the head of sales and marketing provides another example.  After the founder fired the original head of 
marketing and sales, the company conducted a formal search for a replacement.  Concerned “[w]e’re 
going to pay a whole bunch of money” and not get the desired outcome again, the founder turned to the 
person he trusted the most, his spouse.  Her extensive experience, contacts and demeanor actually 
made her another good fit for the team.  As one manager commented, “[the founder’s spouse] in her own 
right is a master visionary,” and he went on to explain that she “is coming up with some great ideas from 
her past life…and some exciting stuff is going to take place there.”  
 
Scope of Action:  Limited financial resources led to hiring that was judicious and opportunistic and 
retention that was based on the ability to perform.  As the founder commented, “I fire early and I fire 
often,” and he went on to explain, “If it’s not going well, it’s never going to go well…As soon as it became 
obvious they couldn’t accomplish what they were hired for they were terminated…Once it’s obvious, it 
never gets better.”   He provided two examples of this policy in action.  In the first situation, the founder 
fired “the first guy I brought in…once we got out of development and into marketing and sales, he didn’t 
have the ability to do marketing and sales…But that wasn’t evident until you called on him to produce that 
skill.”  The second example was the series of CFOs who were hired and fired.  “[T]hey want to sit there 
and count money instead of raising them…they came in to rearrange the money…and they failed.  They 
were fired.”  Action that enforced accountability and limited the impact of hiring mistakes, however, was 
balanced by action that encouraged advisors and employees to participate in innovation and solution 
generation.  One executive explained the relationship with the employees as follows: “[W]e value what 
they do every day.  That’s not just some mission statement on our wall.  Every single day we value what 
they do and their voice is heard.”  Other executives praised the founder and his spouse for creating an 
open and accepting culture and “being open to all kinds of ideas” and “not afraid to try anything.”  These 
counter-balancing actions, however, were enveloped by structure and processes designed to guide action 
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and provide stability within the venture, such as sales tracking and reporting systems and lead generation 
and management systems.  
 
Outcome:  Hiring and retaining the right talent, that is, people who the founder could trust to execute their 
roles and help shape and build the venture, was an iterative process.  As individuals were hired, fired and 
replaced, a team of loyal and skilled professionals emerged that enabled the founder to turn over control 
of certain activities and focus on activities where he could add the most value.  The strong personality of 
the founder was balanced by the strength of his management team.  One executive recounted a 
comment from the founder where he described his management team in the following manner: “[I]t’s not 
like herding cats, it’s like herding tigers and the thing with tigers is that they bite back.”  But, as one 
manager commented, “the chemistry is good here.”  This “chemistry” manifested as a strong sense of 
loyalty that bound the employees to the venture even when they had to go “multiple months’ with out 
paychecks.  One executive commented that during those difficult times “we didn’t loose anybody.  It was 
pretty amazing.”  Retention of talent and the continuing loyalty of employees, however, were clearly linked 
to the founder.  One manager shared the following perspective:  “[T]here are three people in my life now 
that I would …walk across coals and [the founder] is in that category…just a great guy and I think I could 
speak for pretty much anybody, if [the founder] left tomorrow…and he’d go start another company…as 
much as we all love what we’re doing…if [the founder] calls me, I’m going to follow him.  He’s a pleasure 
to work with and you just learn so much.”  Another employee shared a similarly positive comment about 
the organization that has emerged, “ [T]hey’ve [the founder and his spouse] built a team with a lot of spirit 
and a lot of confidence that whatever happens…we’re going to fight ‘til we can’t fight anymore…it’s been 
a real experience and joy.”  
 
Product Development: 
Initial conditions:  The founder, who had a deep background in R&D and commercializing emerging 
technologies, was introduced to the original technology developed by the venture while participating in a 
technology forum as a judge and mentor.  With the initial round of capital, he purchased the IP from the 
university scientists who developed it. 
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Instigating Events:  With a new technology in hand, the founder “formed a group of advisors to 
determine what’s best to build out of the technology.”  At the same, time he consulted with prospective 
customers to define “the attributes they wanted to see.” 
 
Drivers:  Stakeholder engagement around product development was driven by three goals.  First, was a 
commitment to provide solutions tailored to customer needs.  “Our DNA,” according to one manager, 
“says we as a company-we really care about our customers and we really want a solution that fits in the 
long term…we’re going to compete because we’re going to listen to our customers and we’re going to 
help understand their pain points and we’re going to develop products that fit.”  There is a keen 
awareness by employees that “the [product] is there for one reason and that’s to make money for that 
[customer].”  Second, was the willingness to experiment and not give up until a solution is found.  One 
executive explained, “[the founder] is not afraid to try anything and that’s critical.”  Another employee 
described it as “an entrepreneurial spirit…no quit attitude…here’s what the problem is.  Let’s find a better 
solution and come up with a better product.”  Third, was a sense of urgency to stake their claim in the 
market before the competition emerges.  “[W]e don't have any top competitors," according to one 
executive, “So there is a place to do, if you will, a land grab...that is if we can go out right now and get 
some customers.”  And to do that requires products that can solve customer problems and help them 
make money. 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Product development is a multi stakeholder activity.  Since inception, the 
founder grounded product development in the customer.  He explained that “they defined the attributes 
they wanted to see and then I stayed in touch with them…And continued to show them the advancements 
along the way.”  “[L]istening to the customers has helped us evolve,” one employee related, “we listen, 
and we come back and we say…can we do this?”   
The founder, the management team as well as employees in sales and engineering participate in this 
activity.  As one manager explains, “[W]e encourage a culture where people are comfortable saying…why 
aren’t we doing this or my customer said this.”  However, engagement of stakeholders with different 
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perspectives involves a balancing act.  “Engineers by nature,” explained one manager, “got to make this 
thing perfect and they freak out when we’re releasing what we have.”  He went on to suggest that “if you 
left it up to this side of the aisle [engineering] we wouldn’t get any place, we would be sitting in a box,” 
because “[s]ix months in the technology world, 12 months in the technology world, people have already 
passed you by.”  Another manager explained his role was to manage the creative energy and vision of 
the founder and serve as the interface with other employees who in trying to keep up with the founder’s 
vision ask “why the changes, why are we going to go from this direction to this direction?”   
 
Being a hardware company required engagement of another group of stakeholders in product 
development, suppliers and contract manufacturers.  For a young venture that is not a known entity, it has 
taken time and trial to establish relationships with reliable companies.  As they sought to establish reliable 
relationships, suppliers unwilling to extend credit or who delivered poor quality product added to the 
challenges of the venture early in development. Capital constraints meant that contracting manufacturing 
was more cost effective than manufacturing in house and staying with local contract manufacturers gave 
the venture greater oversight on product quality.  The in-house engineering group became responsible for 
both building prototypes but also engaging with the manufacturing facility to find cost efficiencies.    
 
Contingency Response:  The venture demonstrated resilience in the face of the unexpected.  For 
example, one employee explained how the early product had a “difficult repair path” that created a  “make 
or break challenge” for the company.  The founder and the engineering team developed a unique design 
that not only eliminated the maintenance problem, but became new selling point for the product.  A more 
dramatic example was the problem the venture encountered in developing the new technology.  While the 
original group of technical experts wanted to continue to work through the issues and develop that 
technology, a newer manager was not as confident in the approach and began searching for an alternate 
technology.  “We went far down the path with [the original technology]…I think we probably stayed a little 
too long…[the founder] was being advised by …probably the smartest team in the country from a 
technology perspective…who were six more months we’re going to get there, 12 more months…X more 
dollars…we don’t have money …we’ve got shareholders who want to see progress.”  In time the founder 
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made the decision to change to another more reliable technology.  The new challenge was to take the 
technology that was already in widespread use and create a unique product.  By applying the learning 
from the original technology, the venture was able to develop a new line of products from an existing 
technology. 
 
Scope of Action:  Product development from inception was a collaborative process guided by a founder 
“who is not afraid to try anything.”  One executive noted that they are proposing on projects that “literally 
have never been done before.”  Another employee could not recall a time when he proposed an idea and 
the founder said no.  But being adventuresome is about the willingness to take risk and as one manager 
explains, “it’s all about timing…if you go too early, you could make a big mistake but if you wait, people 
are going to pass you by.”  He explained that when the founder buys into an idea, you have to be ready to 
move forward. 
 
Outcome:  Broad stakeholder engagement and an environment that encourages experimentation, has 
enhanced the ability of the company to create unique products for unusual problems in the market.  The 
venture has gone from one product offering to multiple products.  “Every obstacle we face,” according to 
one employee, “they haven’t gone around it, they’ve gone over it and that gives you a lot of confidence.”  
One executive shared comments from one prospective customer: “You’ve listened to me and developed a 
product that really hits the sweet spot.” 
 
However, the lack of structure around this activity may be a weakness.  For example, the technical 
advisory group formed to challenge ideas and prevent the founder from getting “hooked” on the original 
technology, became locked-in to the original technology and was not able to signal when it was time to try 
something new.  This cost the company time and money.  In addition, the venture has no way of 
prioritizing customer driven modifications, which could challenge thin resources.  One manager hopes to 
create structure in the future by separating he design function from the production function so a dedicated 
team can focus on new products, while another group focuses on product enhancements and driving 
down production cost. 
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Customer Acquisition: 
Initial Conditions:  Even before he acquired the technology, the founder of Pixel sought feedback from 
potential customers.  The spouse of the founder provided introductions to many of these early prospective 
customers as a result of her past engagement in key target markets of the new venture. During product 
development, the founder allowed prospective customers to “define the attributes they wanted to see and 
then I stayed in touch with them.”  He periodically showed them advancements in the hardware and used 
that feedback to continually refine the product. 
 
Instigating events:  Early engagement of potential customers was a key activity from inception.  
Consequently, the first employee hired by the founder was the head of sales and marketing.  So the initial 
sales effort was lead by the founder and the head of sales and marketing.  In 2009, after the change in 
the initial technology and as the product was being launched, an additional sales and marketing manager, 
with extensive experience in related products, was brought in to help build the team and develop the 
market. 
 
Drivers:  Network formation around customer acquisition can be traced to two primary drivers.  First, 
infused throughout the company was a philosophy that the customer, not the company, should define the 
product.  With limited financial resources, one manager explained that the only way they will be able to 
compete against other solutions is how well they address customer needs.  “You build the product based 
on what the customer’s requirements are as opposed to what we think they are,” one executive 
explained, “We’re going to be able to compete because we’re going to listen to our customers and we’re 
going to understand their pain points and we’re going to develop products that fit.”  Therefore, customers 
and prospective customers were continuously engaged to induce and solidify their commitment to the 
venture.  Second, a sense of urgency pervaded the company.  Not only was there was an awareness that 
competition can emerge at any time, but there was also an understanding that in order to raise another 
round of capital, the venture would need to demonstrate significant progress in penetrating the market.  
One executive likens the opportunity to that of a “land grab.”  “There will be competitors coming,” notes 
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the executive, “there aren’t any yet, but they will come once they see our success.”  As a result, there was 
a boldness in going after customers using both network, as well as non-network resources to identify 
prospects, referral sources and distribution channels fueled by what the founder describes as “a 
corporate culture of not fearing to call somebody.  It’s better to call and look stupid and dumb than not at 
all.”   
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Internally and externally customer acquisition was a multi-stakeholder effort.  
Stakeholders have been drawn into the network from a variety of disciplines and geographic locations 
and through numerous contractual arrangements. Engineering developed prototypes for trade shows and 
solutions to address specific customer problems.  The CFO who recently joined the venture, formalized 
reporting of the sales process to “create a well-oiled machine” that provides transparency but also “made 
a difference in that now people feel the pressure.”  He also brought “ a different way of thinking to the 
company” to facilitate sales by creating different ways customers can finance or capitalize hardware 
purchases in a market where “customers were not willing to spend money on any capital [equipment] over 
the last two years.”  A sales manager recruited early in the life of the venture because of his extensive 
experience and connections with competing products, built a young and aggressive sales team that did 
what ever was needed to get the product in front of prospective clients.   “We were the ones out 
there…putting 30,000 on the sprinter van, “ he explained, “ going out there to see where you can get the 
new [hardware] in front of…doing trade shows and begging and borrowing and stealing and hanging our  
[hardware] where ever we can get it hung.”   
Customer acquisition, however, was not executed without challenges.  Unable to execute a successful 
sales and marketing strategy, the original head of sales and marketing was replaced by the spouse of the 
founder.  She had to rebuild the strategy, the network and create momentum in this activity.  “[I]t took me 
a while to sort it out,” she explains, “I had to go talk to customers…figure out how they currently buy their 
products…I have no problem asking questions…everybody was happy to give all their opinions…and 
then I took all those opinions and went to my trusted advisors…worked out a strategy and then 
implemented it.”  Prior to her involvement, the customer acquisition strategy was “we’re going to hope and 
pray and talk to them all the time and they’re gong to buy.”  But as she pointed out “’hope’ is not a sales 
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strategy.”  Her new understanding about how business is conducted in the industry opened distribution 
channels previously closed to the company.  Not only has this new executive instituted sales training, a 
sophisticated demand generation program through an out of state telemarketer, a lead management 
system, but she has executed an aggressive PR campaign with a prestigious firm willing to work for a 
small stipend and stock and contracted a respected marketing expert who specializes in emerging 
technology companies.  
 
Contingency Response:  Leveraging the unexpected created opportunity for new stakeholder 
engagement and exposure to fresh ideas that improved execution of this activity.  For example, a friend of 
a friend of the founder met someone in Bible study that had industry experience and connections he 
thought would benefit the new venture.  He told the person to contact the founder.  “It was a great fit,” 
according to the founder, “[H]e’s great with social skills and since I have limited social skills…he spends 
time talking to the customers, getting them warm and fuzzy, figure out what they needed.  All those kinds 
of things you want from the sales guy.”  The “sales guy” not only built a successful team of aggressive 
young sales people, but also became an investor in the company. Another example came out of the 
difficulty in finding a CFO.   After firing a number of CFOs, the founder received a referral from a friend of 
a CFO who also happened to be a successful technology entrepreneur in his own right.  Noting the 
challenge the company was having selling hardware in a market where “customers were not willing to 
spend money on any capital [equipment] over the last two years” and understanding the aspects of 
financial reporting that discouraged a company from capitalizing equipment, the new CFO devised a 
strategy of licensing the hardware that opened market opportunities and facilitated sales.  “[N]o one else 
in the world, to my knowledge,” the CFO explained, “has ever thought about licensing [the hardware].”   
 
Scope of Action:  This activity was characterized by two competing categories of action: action that 
opened options and action that created structure around the activity.  Openness to new ideas and 
boldness to test new ideas enabled the venture to create options and momentum and change direction 
based on feedback from a diversity of stakeholders.  The following comments illustrate the spirit of this 
action: “a corporate culture of not fearing to call someone,” “do what we need to do to get the stuff done,” 
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“hanging our [hardware] where ever we can,” “[w]e just called them and went after them,” “[the founder], 
he never said no,” “[the founder] is not afraid to try something, “ “the good news is that [the spouse of the 
founder] and [the founder]…they are open to all kinds of ideas.”   Conversely, there was evidence of 
growing structure and processes that built in accountability and efficiency around this activity.  The 
implementation of formalized sales reporting provided tracking and transparency and pressure to perform.  
Sophisticated systems to find and qualify leads coupled with sales training, implemented by the new head 
of sales and marketing, lead to more effective and efficient use of the sales team.  Thus while the first 
type of action created options and momentum, the second type of action focused on effective use of sales 
resources and instilled accountability in the process.  
 
Outcome:  The commitment to customer engagement and implementation of customer feedback created 
a loyal and trusting customer base.  One manager provided the following example: “ [O]ne of the products 
one of the companies has bought from us…they could have bought it cheaper…it’s not really our core 
technology and yet they said…we just want to deal with you guys.”   Another example was the result of 
the new head of sales and marketing taking the time to understand how the product category is 
traditionally bought and sold.  This opened up new relationships with distributors, who previously refused 
to work with the venture.  However, as one manager explained, “once they figured out we were not out to 
cut them out…they were happy to introduce [us]…we got into the [major project] because of them.”  Also 
interesting to note, was the comment from one executive who said that since the implementation of the 
formal sales tracking and reporting processes “we’ve seen kind of increased energy if you will among 
sales people and more proposals per day.”  Whether the improvement in sales productivity can be 
attributed to increased scrutiny of sales production, a more efficient sales process, a growing product line 
or some other source is not known, however, it does support one executive’s observation that the 
company is “starting to get some pretty big traction.” 
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6.10 Findings by Activity and Path Building Dimensions: Pixel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Path 
Building 
Dimensions  Activity 1: Capital Acquisition Activity 2: Development of Value Proposition Activity 3:Talent Acquisition & Management Activity 4: Product Development Activity 5: Customer Acquisition
Initial 
Conditions
• 2006 founder “found” the technology to develop an 
idea and established the company
• Initial capital needs were estimated to acquire the IP 
and hire people to develop idea
• Idea developed from studying the business model 
and industry trends of company his spouse was 
running
• Founder’s background in R&D and commercializing 
emerging technologies provided credibility in recruiting 
• Founder had extensive experience in R&D and 
commercializing emerging technologies
• Founder identified the technology originally used by the 
venture while participating in a technology forum as a 
judge and mentor
• Spouse of founder provided introductions to potential 
customers
• Founder vetted idea with potential customers prior to 
acquiring IP
• Founder consulted with potential customers throughout 
product development
Instigating 
Event
• 2006 founderd raisedseed round from family, friends 
and high net worth individuals
• Prior to acquiring technology, founder vetted idea 
with potential customers
• After acquiring the IP, the founder formed a group of 
scientific advisors to determine how to develop the 
technology, and hired a head of sales and marketing to 
determine how and who to sell the product to
• Founder raised seed round and acquired the IP
• Founder formed a group of science and technology 
experts to advise company on product development 
• Founder consulted with potential customers to identify 
important product attributes
• First employee hired by founder was the head of sales 
and marketing
• After the change in technology, a sales professional with 
extensive experience in related products and technology 
was hired to help build a sales strategy 
Drivers
• Entrepreneurial Catch-22: capital needed for growth 
and growth needed to raise capital
• Access to capital and financial connections
• Desire to maintain control and autonomy
• Feedback from potential customers provided 
affirmation
• Technical advisors, formed to mitigate risk of lock in, 
provided sounding board, generated technical 
solutions
• Founder sought professionals to fill his gap in  expertise
• Founder sought to hire individuals with high adaptation 
skills
• Founder attracted similarly strong and confident 
individuals
• Commitment to tailor product design to customer needs
• Willingness to experiment and persist until a solution 
was found to address the customer/market need
• Sense of urgency to stake their claim in the market 
before competition emerged
• Commitment to tailor product design to customer needs
• Sense of urgency to stake their claim in the market 
before competition emerged
Stakeholder 
Engagement
• Founder began with potential investors he knew, 
including those who had invested in previous 
companies run by he or his spouse                                                                    
• Third party recognition and awards provided additional 
credibility to attract stakeholders                                                                      
• Founder sent periodic company reports to update 
investors and potential investors on company progress
• Investors opened doors to other investors
•First couple years, the largest angel investor served as 
the only board member
• Later, two major investors were named to the board
• Turnover of CFOs unable to facilitate fundraising 
slowed activity until current CFO joined in 2011
• Founder solicited input from technical advisors, 
potential customers and employees and encouraged 
discussion and debate to create a process of 
continuous transformation and improvement of the 
business model
• Network sources, such as friends and employees, and 
non-network sources, such as the internet and recruiters, 
provided leads to talent                                                                   
• Third party recognition and awards provided additional 
credibility to attract stakeholders               
• Talent was engaged through a variety of arrangements 
• Below market salaries supplemented by equity
• Stakeholders engaged because of vision, the founder 
and the team, not the compensation 
• Multi-stakeholder activity grounded in the needs of the 
customer
• Customers and potential customers engaged in an 
iterative process of product development
• Sales often served as conduit for ideas from customers 
and prospective customers
• Engineers had to balance the pursuit of a perfect 
product against the need to get the product on the market 
quickly
• Lack of history and lack of capital presented difficulty in 
establishing relationships with suppliers
• Multi-stakeholder, multi-functional activity that employed 
different contractual arrangements to attract expertise                                                              
• Third party recognition and awards provided additional 
credibility to attract stakeholders                                                          
• Prospective customers identified through network and 
non-network sources, such as telemarketing, internet, 
cold calling and sophisticated lead generation systems
• Customers and prospective customers continuously 
engaged to gather feedback and commitment
• Engineers developed prototypes to address specific 
customer needs
• CFO created formalized sales tracking and reporting to 
provide transparency and increased pressure on sales 
• Failed sales and marketing strategy led to hiring of new 
head of sales and marketing who developed a new 
strategy, instituted formalized and sophisticated sales 
process and hired outside PR and marketing 
professionals to promote the company
Contingency 
Response
• Challenges in raising capital meant difficult choices in 
allocation of resources and the founder and employees 
went multiple months, multiple times without paychecks 
to keep the company running and did so without losing 
or having to layoff a single employee
• While serving as a judge for a forum on emerging 
technologies, founder identified a potential 
technological path through a technology developed by 
university scientists, for another use .
• Calls “out of the blue” from a former coworker and a 
friend of a friend led to the creation of two positions to 
take advantage of the availability of skills and expertise 
the founder needed, one to head operations and the 
other in sales and marketing
• After firing the head of sales and marketing, the founder 
conducted a formal search for a replacement, but instead 
of spending  a lot of money to hire someone he was not 
sure could deliver, the founder hired his spouse who had 
the track record, the connections and the demeanor.
• Original product had a “difficult repair path” that 
presented a serious problem for the future of the 
business, however, the founder and the engineering team 
were able to develop a unique designt became a selling 
point for the company’s products.
• The original technology acquired by the founder was  
taking too long to develop, so the founder,influenced by a 
member of his management team, made the decision to 
drop the original technology and adopt an existing 
technology that when combined with the scientific 
learning from the original product resulted in a new 
product category.
• Calls “out of the blue” from a former coworker and a 
friend of a friend led to the creation of two positions to 
take advantage of the availability of skills and expertise 
the founder needed, one to head operations and the other 
in sales and marketing
• The current CFO, noting a chief obstacle to sales was 
the unwillingness of customers to spend money on capital 
equipment, devised a program to license the technology, 
the first of its kind in the industry, to place product in the 
hands of customers and create a source of recurring 
revenue.
Scope of 
Action
• Investors selected for capital and financial connections
• Potential investors  considered high maintenance or 
micromanagers were avoided
• Investors assigned voting rights tothe  founder
• Current CFO had autonomy to develop structure and 
systems to facilitate investor and board relations and 
position the company for institutional capital
• Founder encouraged technical advisors to challenge 
each other’s ideas, and integrated with input from 
other employees                                                                                      
•Ideas and prototypes periodically tested  with 
potential customers to ground development of the 
business model in actual market needs
• Recruiting was judicious and opportunistic
• Founder believed in firing early and often 
• Founder encouraged advisors and employees to 
participate in innovation and solution generation and 
created a culture that was open to new ideas and bold in 
testing them
• A collaborative process lead by the founder since 
inception
• Founder open to input from all stakeholders                          
• Experimentation and testing new ideas was encouraged
• Timing was an important consideration since releasing 
before the product was ready could taint the market, but 
staying in development too long enable competition
• Activity characterized by competing action: that which 
increased options and that which created structure
• Founder encouraged a culture of boldly pursuing new 
business
• In 2011 the new CFO and head of sales and marketing 
began implementing processes to increase accountability 
and efficiency of the sales function
Outcome
• Investors remained loyal and a number reinvested as 
many as four times                                                                           
• Constant contact by founder converted individuals who 
initially declined into later stage investors
• Founder maintained control of company
• Current CFO facilitated more productive engagement 
of board, investors and fundraising activities enabling 
the founder to focus on product innovation and 
customer development
• Business concept was validated by potential 
customers
• Engagement created interest from potential 
customers
• Multi-stakeholder involvement prevented lock in to 
one technological or business path
• The strong personality of the founder was balanced by 
the strength of the management team
• Aggressive performance management at the level of 
the management team limited the impact of hiring 
mistakes
• Strong sense of loyalty to the founder emerged
• Company started with one product and expanded to 
multiple products
• Customers had confidence in ability of company to meet 
their needs
• Employees had confidence in the founder and 
engineering team to solve problems and overcome 
obstacles
• Commitment to customer engagement created a loyal 
and trusting customer base who sought to consolidate 
business with the company in spite of lower cost 
alternatives from competitors
• By taking the time to understand how the product 
category was traditionally bought and sold, the new sales 
manager repaired damaged relationships and opened 
new channels for distribution of products
• Improvement in sales productivity and number of 
proposals per day
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6.11 Detailed Path Building Narrative: Prospect 
 
 
Capital Acquisition 
Initial conditions: In late 2006 the initiating entrepreneur began the search for people and capital to help 
develop an idea for a service that would not only benefit his existing business, but other similar 
companies as well.  Over a 90-day period he discussed the idea with people in the local technology 
community.   A chance meeting earlier in the year with an acquaintance from college provided the domain 
expertise he needed to help build out the concept.   They came up with a “rough budget”…” a rudimentary 
spreadsheet of what was it going to take to run the business for 12 months.  And so we did some simple 
math and came up with a number…so it was really let’s run this for a year.” 
 
Instigating Event:  Late 2006, the instigating co-founder presented the concept to an angel investor in 
the local technology community who had made his money from a software business that he built and 
sold.  The angel investor met the co-founder while trying to start a vehicle for seed funding and mentoring 
for startups in the community.    He commented that when he initially met the co-founder, “I was pretty 
blown away by [co-founder]…the only reason he wasn’t already famous was because he was just so 
young.  My gut feel told me that everything that he does is going to be done in a first class way.”  When 
asked by the co-founder if he wanted to participate in the new idea as a seed investor he agreed and did 
so without any further due diligence.  The angel investor explained, “ [T]his was really the first time I sort 
of invested almost without asking any questions.”  So in early 2007, the initiating co-founder contributed a 
third of the seed funding with the balance for the estimated budget provided by the angel investor. 
 
Drivers: In spite of the accessibility to outside capital, the co-founders choose a path of bootstrapping for 
the new venture.  One factor that went into the decision to discontinue the original business was the 
significant resources that would be required to scale the business.  As one co-founder noted, “[W]e 
realized to get massive…would take too much runway or too much time.” Ninety days after close of the 
seed round and formation of the company “the business was pretty different than what we had started 
with and the people that we started with,” according to one co-founder.   He went on to explain, “[W]e 
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quickly realized that the time frame of the business and direction we wanted to go in was a little different 
than what we had told him [the angel investor], so I bought him out.” Although the investor was “fine to 
keep going,” the initiating co-founder made the decision to separate from the angel investor (“go our 
separate ways because it was pretty different”) and bought out his stake in the business at a premium.   
 
The idea of outside capital was entertained once again by the co-founders in late 2009.  In order to 
leverage their momentum and increase the rate of grow, the co-founders sought institutional funding.  
Despite interest from the venture capital community, however, the co-founders again decided “it didn’t 
make sense to take money from any of them.  Basically the business was growing so nicely and the 
percent ownership that they wanted, roughly a third of the business, what the business would have to 
become and then the risks of needing subsequent capital to get to that stage and more dilution…the 
business was growing so nicely on its own organically that it didn’t make sense to raise any institutional 
money.”   
 
Thus, decisions regarding funding for the new venture appeared to be guided by a propensity for flexibility 
to experiment, fail and change course as the environment dictated through smaller milestones and having 
less at risk.   One co-founder acknowledged that being internally funded was challenging for the first 
couple of years, “but once you sort of cross that desert to profitability, then it’s really liberating.”  The co-
founders viewed the constraint on growth as a result of limited capital as an advantage since “you don’t 
have enough weight…to really get into trouble…to really make a huge disaster financially.”  One co-
founder summed up this logic as follows: “[Y]ou can try things and if they don’t work out that’s fine 
because you didn’t really have a budget for it anyway.  So next month you try something new.” 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Access to external sources of capital came through contacts of the initiating 
co-founder.  The original angel investor who met the initiating co-founder through a mutual friend in the 
technology community described him as a “like-minded soul” with whom he became “pretty good 
buddies.” When approached with the opportunity to invest, the angel investor “was on board right 
away…it was a very simple process.”  He described his investment as “really a bet on [the co-founders].”   
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According to the other co-founder, the angel investor “was instrumental in helping us get started.”  Not 
only did he refer a third co-founder to the original group but, as a lawyer, he provided legal advice and 
other counsel.  The mutual respect carried into the separation that was described by the angel investor as 
“[k]ind of the same way we went into the deal…we didn’t argue about price or valuation…There was not 
negotiation.”  The initiating co-founder maintained his relationship with the former investor after the 
buyback of his interest in the venture, and helped form the technology accelerator two years later. 
 
When it came to accessing institutional investors, the co-founders had to cast a wider net.  According to 
the initiating co-founder, “[w]e just talked to whoever would talk to us” and once the word was out “people 
who had different connections…would open doors.”  Although the initiating entrepreneur had existing 
relationships with the local venture capital community, other entrepreneurs, even a high school friend, 
were among those who opened doors to VC firms in other cities.  In the end, they were able to pitch to 30 
different firms around the country.  Thus, the existing network of the co-founders provided direct and 
indirect access to funding sources had they chose to pursue external funding.  
 
Contingency Response:  The original two co-founders acted quickly on feedback from potential 
customers that revealed it was the technology platform, not the intended service offering, that had value 
in the market.  Within 90 days after starting the business they changed direction and this not only 
changed the relationship with the other two co-founders, but with the angel investor also.  Because the 
new business focus was markedly different than the initial concept, the original two co-founders decided 
on a buyout of the angel investor.  While the specific circumstance leading to this decision are unclear 
(one co-founder said, “He was fine to keep going on but I said I prefer us to go our separate ways 
because it was pretty different”, the other commented, “It was just the case that he was really happy to 
put in money for the first business model, but not as much for the second business model.  So we 
decided to cash him out.”), the investor received a premium over his initial investment and commented, “it 
seemed like a fair deal.”  When asked if he would invest again with the initiating co-founder, he 
responded, “all he has to do is send me papers and I’ll sign…I trust him.”  As a result, no bridges were 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   144	  
burned and the two remaining co-founders enhanced their flexibility and autonomy to build the new 
business. 
 
Scope of Action: The original two co-founders opportunistically built and dismantled their network 
around capital acquisition, and they did so swiftly, incrementally and thoughtfully. Decisions around 
fundraising increased options but were also bounded by the amount the co-founders were willing to risk 
and the flexibility to fail and course correct.  For example, the seed capital they sought was based the 
amount it would take “to run the business for 12 months” and the company was capitalized with in 90 
days from the initial idea.  Ninety days later, they initiated a buyout of the angel investor when they 
realized the original concept would “take too much runway or too much time.”  This decision provided the 
flexibility and autonomy to pursue a new model that could be scaled with fewer resources.  The co-
founders were successful in using their relationships to gain access to the venture capital community, 
including the most prominent firms in technology funding.  However, realizing that VC funding would 
change the dynamics of the business away from their philosophy of being able to fail fast and “just try 
something new,” they choose not to stay on a path of self-funding.  As one employee commented, “I know 
[the initiating co-founder] has bootstrapped the company and had really been wary to go raise money 
from VCs, so that’s something that -- he has deliberately taken a certain path.”   
 
Outcome:  The strategic approach to capital acquisition taken by the co-founders provided them with a 
variety of options for funding, including both internal and external (angel and VC) sources.  Their decision 
to stay independent, although a more challenging path until they crossed “the desert to profitability”, 
allowed them to maintain control of the process of building the new venture as a small company through 
trial and error where mistakes didn’t “have enough weight…to really get in trouble…make it a huge 
disaster financially.” 
 
Development of the Value Proposition 
Initial Conditions:  According to one co-founder: “[T]he idea came from my experience with…the other 
company that I started…My background in sales and marketing and me wanting to have more visibility 
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into ways that we can become better at sales and marketing led to the idea…We were just trying to solve 
our own problem.”   Interestingly, the other co-founder admitted that he ”was not fond of” the original idea: 
“[T]hose business models are very successful, but they again take a lot of capital to get started…and so 
that was my concern to [the other co-founder] when we first talked about it.  And he kind of convinced me 
that it could work.  And so, basically when I started the company with him, I didn’t believe 100% in the 
idea, but I believed 100% in my co-founder.  Then I figure we’d fail fast and figure something else out.” 
 
Instigating Event:  The four co-founders who established the venture built the first version of the product 
focused on the original service concept and took it to market.  One co-founder explained, “[A]s part of this 
process we were just talking to as many people as would talk to us.” 
 
Drivers: Feedback from the market was a key consideration in the development of the value proposition.  
It drove a fundamental change in the business as explained by one co-founder: “[A]fter talking to some 
product vendors that we wanted to buy our [service], we realized that the product that we had built [to 
provide the service] was actually more valuable…so really quickly we realized that we were on the right 
path in the right area but we needed to focus on being a technology provider as opposed to [service 
provider].”  The willingness of two of the co-founders to “experiment,” “fail fast and figure something else 
out” enabled them to make their “first major iteration very quickly.” 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Although the business of one of the co-founders triggered the idea for the 
new venture, it was talking to “a number of different people,” including potential customers, that lead to 
the “first major iteration in the business” which was a shift in the value proposition from providing a 
service to being a software company. According to one of the co-founders, “It was very obvious once we 
had enough information, once we had talked to enough people about the original idea, it was obvious that 
what we had built and the direction we were going, this other thing was going to prove to be much more 
valuable.” 
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Contingency Response:  The two co-founders heeded the feedback from those they spoke with.  When 
they realized the value was not in the service, but in the technology platform they had built (“Ok, the 
business model is not going to be what we want, but the software prototype we built to power it is really 
valuable.”) and that a business built on the software was “much more repeatable,” they “scrapped” the 
original business concept, parted ways with the other co-founders and investor and became a software 
company.   
 
Scope of Action:  The actions of the co-founders are best summed up by the initiating co-founder: “[I]t 
was…coming up with the original thesis, taking it to market, gathering feedback on it and then seeing a 
better path once some data had been collected.”  But underneath this was the willingness and ability of 
the co-founders to “experiment and see what works” and then make the necessary changes, even if it 
meant reorganizing the venture and its founding group. 
 
Outcome:  As a result of the actions of the two original co-founders, the value proposition of the venture, 
as well as the organization, were reconfigured.   Version ‘2.0” was more consistent with the needs of the 
market and the desire of the co-founders to provide something of value and scale quickly with limited 
resources. 
 
Talent Acquisition:  
Initial Conditions:  When it came to attracting and managing talent for a new venture, the initiating co-
founder had “seven years worth of experience recruiting people and finding engineers and sales people.  
Engineers and sales people are the hardest positions to fill.” 
 
Instigating Events:  The initiating co-founder first concentrated on recruiting people for the founding 
team.  The first person he contacted was a classmate from college with whom he reconnected during a 
chance meeting at a professional association event.  According to the other co-founder, “I wasn’t ready to 
start something new, but we threw around ideas for essentially a couple years.”  Over the course of those 
couple years, “[H]e [the initiating co-founder] had this business and just wanted to look for ideas to make 
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the sales and marketing process more efficient.  So that’s where we came together with this idea.”  
However, once they decided to form the venture, they weren’t in total agreement about the original 
direction of the new venture, “[B]asically when I started the company with him I didn’t believe 100% in the 
idea, but I believed 1005 in my co-founder.  Then I figured we’d fail fast and figure something else out.  
And, we did.” 
 
Drivers:  This activity had two main drivers.  First, recruiting was based on domain expertise and the 
needs of the near term needs of the venture.  For example, the initiating co-founder engaged his college 
classmate because of his “domain expertise, his energy and excitement.”  Within a month after separating 
from the original founding team, the two remaining co-founders recruited a software engineer to build the 
product and fill the void left by a departing co-founder who was the original programmer.   The next hire 
was someone to fill the sales role left by the other departing co-founder, and they were able to find an 
individual with 10 years sales experience and a technology background.  A year later, with a growing 
customer base, the co-founders hired someone with team management experience to build the customer 
services team.   In the past year, the young venture has hired a manager to coordinate product 
development and management that has become increasingly complex as the number and nature of 
stakeholders engaged in this process expands. 
 
The second driver has been maintenance of the values and culture of the firm  “so when you hire 
someone you know they’re going to work out and culture becomes a self-sustaining thing.””  According to 
one employee, “We’ve done a really great job hiring people who will be good cultural fits…I think it’s the 
number one thing that we hire for.”  The culture, which was consistently described as “fun,” has been 
based on three key attributes that all interview participants articulated they look for when hiring: positive, 
self-starting and supportive.  As one co-founder explains, the culture was created “sort of by luck”: “[O]ur 
first dozen or so employees were fantastic…we looked around and said this is something that we want to 
preserve.  And so we kind of defined what ‘it’ was and really made it a scientific process to make sure we 
kept that going.”  It is a structured process where an offer for employment is predicated a “100% 
unanimous” decision of employees who participate in the hiring process.   
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Stakeholder Engagement:  One of the co-founders admitted that talent acquisition has been a “major 
growing pain” even though according to the other co-founder the “terrible economy…makes it easier to 
hire people.”  Initially the company relied heavily on a variety of network and non-network resources for 
candidates, including social media, online job boards, college fairs and recruiters.  However, s the venture 
has grown, 50% to 60% of their employees come from internal referrals.  In fact, one co-founder feels that 
internal referrals “have been the best” so they incent employees with a referral bonus and as one 
employee commented, “[W]e joked that it’s sort of a pyramid scheme.”  Last year they extended the 
referral program to people they know in the local technology community.   
 
In drawing talent to help build the venture, it is interesting to note that the co-founders have deliberately 
avoided establishing an advisory board.  When asked why, one co-founder simply replied, “Blissfully 
ignorant.”  Not having outside investors meant that the co-founders did not have to establish a board.   
The other co-founder acknowledged that at the heart of this decision is the fact that “none of us has 
friends or colleagues that have had great experiences with advisory boards” and went on to explain, 
“We’ve had friends that have had negative experiences with them.”  Instead, for advice, the co-founders 
turn to the expertise and experience of mentors and peers in a combination of informal settings and more 
formal entrepreneurial peer-to-peer forums. 
 
The co-founders from the beginning relied on their team of managers and administrators to shape their 
functions and teams as they saw fit.  In fact, one manager commented that the team he built is actually an 
“imperfect version of me” while another manager described his team as “close-knit.”  All the managers 
described how they were able to define their roles and processes, as typified by the following comment 
from one key employee: “[O]ne of the greatest benefits is getting to sort of craft what I do and shape it.”  
Communication within the organization was defined by one manager as “informal communication” with an 
“open door policy.”  This has encouraged “cross-pollination” in an environment where “co-workers really 
do care about each other.”   Even the sales organization which implements clearly defined performance 
targets and timetables also benefits from the support to of other departments to boost the success of its 
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sales reps.   While those who do not meet their targets are fired, and turnover in the sales function is the 
highest in the organization, monetary rewards and company wide recognition for sales reps who meet 
and exceed their targets is significant and young reps have been able to reach “places they’d never 
expected to be at this point in their lives.”  Despite the expectation of hard work, however, there has been 
a concerted effort to make the environment “fun.”  For example, employees break to play ping pong and 
pinball, lunch is catered on certain days, and the vacation policy is “be reasonable.”   
 
Contingency Response:  The co-founders have been opportunistic in hiring and shaping the talent in 
the organization.  Some of their key hires they attribute to “luck” and “accident”.  For example, one co-
founders described the timing of their search for a lead engineer as “just luck.  He was a former intern of  
[the company of the other co-founder]…graduating with honors.”  This same co-founder described their 
second hire as follows: “ An amazing VP of Sales that we hired kind of by accident.  We were looking for 
just an entry level sales rep…was contacted by this guy with 10 years of sales experience…[the other co-
founder] asked me how it went and I said, “I’m not sure if he’s trying to sell me anything, but I think I just 
bought it.””  Similarly, the culture that emerged in the organization and now is strategically nurtured 
happened by “luck”: [O]ur first dozen or so employees were fantastic…we looked around and said this is 
something that we want to preserve.  And so we kind of defined what ‘it’ was and really made it a 
scientific process to make sure we kept that going.”   
 
Scope of Action:  Initially characterized by informal actions both in terms of recruiting and talent 
management, the co-founders quickly honed on what was working and created or enabled structure and 
processes to perpetuate the positive aspects of the new venture.  For example, the structured recruiting 
process was an effort to continue the spirit of the small team they built in the beginning.  Similarly, the 
sales performance management system was developed over time.  Yet the informal nature of 
engagement within the company has been maintained to some extent within the larger structure through, 
for example, a “no vacation policy” policy and “relaxed” work environment, to attract and keep employees. 
 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   150	  
In addition, the co-founders did not rush to build the organization, but recruited incrementally and 
strategically only seeking to hire managers for specific activities.  For example, the initiating co-founder 
engaged his college classmate because of his “domain expertise, his energy and excitement.”  Within a 
month after separating from the original founding team, the two remaining co-founders recruited a 
software engineer to build the product and fill the void left by a departing co-founder who was the original 
programmer.   The next hire was someone to fill the sales role left by the other departing co-founder, and 
they were able to find an individual with 10 years sales experience and a technology background.  A year 
later, with a growing customer base, the co-founders hired someone with team management experience 
to build the customer services team.  Similarly, managers hired slowly in their functional teams.  
Engineering began in 2007 with eight interns and eventually hired a couple of full time positions a year to 
get to the team of 10 engineers that support the venture.  Customer service has developed a number of 
specialized teams over the years as needs developed, including one team focused on new customer 
onboarding and another on client advocacy for customers at risk of leaving. 
 
Finally, this activity has been characterized by the willingness of the co-founders to performance manage 
and dismantle parts of the organization that it can no longer support or aren’t appropriate.  One example 
is found in the break up of the initial founding team since it was not longer the right mix of talent for the 
new direction of the venture.  A second example also occurred early in the life of the venture when the 
company staffed the sales team too quickly and then had to lay off most of the team when they were not 
able to develop revenues to support the headcount.  One employee described that situation as “really 
difficult, but it’s sort of a live and learn thing.”  A consequence of that experience may have been the 
development of an aggressive sales performance system that flags performance issues quickly. One 
manager summed up the “mantra” of the firm as “Hire slowly, fire quickly.” 
 
Outcome:  This venture that found a new direction after one false start began as two co-founders in 2007 
and reached 65 employees by late 2011.  Although talent acquisition is a “major growing pain,” turnover is 
low and reliance on internal referrals, considered more reliable, are on the rise providing 50% to 60% of 
new employees.  An informal and collaborative work environment has given rise to structure recruiting 
	   Path Building in Emerging Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
	   151	  
and performance management system to preserve the unique culture that has emerged and attract more 
like-minded individuals.  In spite of the structure put in place, maintenance of the work environment and 
culture is uncertain as the venture continues to grow.  As one employee noted, “It’s starting to get to the 
point where not everybody knows each other really well…and then preserving the culture is difficult.” 
 
Product Development:  
Initial Conditions:  The original idea, born out of the experience one co-founder had with another 
company he founded, was transformed into a technology platform through the effort of three of the 
original co-founders.   However the driving force for product development early came from the original two 
co-founders.  The instigating co-founder describes the process as “us debating but me mostly leading the 
charge” for the first few months because of his experience with his other company. 
 
Instigating Event:  When market feedback initiated the conversion of the young venture to a software 
company, two of the co-founders left the company, including the co-founder who was responsible for 
technology.  The first hire for the reconstituted new venture was a lead engineer who was completing his 
Masters.  While one co-founder served as the product manager, the other co-founder along with the lead 
engineer built the new technology. 
 
Drivers:  From the onset, product development has been driven by a concerted effort by the co-founders 
to gather feedback from stakeholders.  Both potential customers and the company established by one of 
the co-founders provided critical input for the emergence of the organization and its client base.  
Emphasizing the venture’s focus on the customer, one senior manager explained, “[t]here has always 
been a dotted line between sales and product.”  As the venture grew, formalized processes, both internal 
and external, for gathering real time feedback on the product were put in place to ensure that resources 
were deployed and changes made on the product that created the most value for customers.  The 
company has an internal (for employees) exchange and an external (for customers) exchange where 
stakeholders can post and vote on ideas.  In addition, all departments within the young venture have the 
opportunity to provide their top 10 lists to senior management.  However, product development is closely 
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managed and driven by a philosophy that features will only be added or changed if they benefit “most of 
our clients.”  As one co-founder explained: “There’s an idea of products of ‘feature debt’ and that basically 
means you do some feature to make one person happy and as a result of it you’re stuck supporting it 
forever and it makes everything else you do worse.” 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Product development has engaged the most diverse group of stakeholders.   
Since inception, when input from potential customers completely changed the ‘product’ offered by the 
new venture, the co-founders have drawn in a wider range of participants into this activity.  According to 
one co-founder, “[W]e make changes everyday…it comes from a mix of customer requests and our own 
vision for the product…It comes from everybody at the company…every department is sort of a 
constituent and the clients are the main constituents.”  For example, clients can post ideas and vote on 
them through the external exchange.  Once manager commented that “we usually get notifications 
whenever something is posted’ and explained that if an idea gets 55 votes, “then we know it’s something 
important.”  Conversely, one co-founder noted that, “We never listen to prospects because they want 
everything…if something doesn’t benefit 80% of our clients, we don’t do it.  So even if, let’s say Microsoft 
said we’ll sign up but you have to do this…if it doesn’t meet the needs of the rest of our clients, it will just 
sort of ruin the product…we’d rather be opinionated.”  The result is that both clients and prospects know 
what to expect upfront from the product they are buying, and more important and clients know that their 
ideas are valued. 
 
Internal stakeholder engagement in this activity began with the hiring of the lead engineer, who built the 
technology “directed by both the founders and also market feedback.”  One manager explained that as 
the company grew, systems and processes have been put in place that allow everyone to contribute: 
“[W]e’ve seen some great stuff…because they don’t only poll sales, they poll service…even the engineers 
get the opportunity…every department in the organization has the opportunity to come up with 10 things 
and then you negotiate our way into having those in the product.”  The growth in the number and nature 
of stakeholders contributing to the activity is beginning to present challenges for management of this 
activity: “working on new features that clients want and making the product stable and scalable.”  In an 
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effort to continue to evolve this activity the co-founders recruited someone they knew from the local 
technology community for a “relatively new” senior management position, separate from sales and 
engineering, which is solely dedicated to overseeing the product management process. 
 
Contingency Response:  The original two co-founders looked to their environment to provide 
opportunity.  When the initial business concept wasn’t getting traction, they listened when prospective 
customers pointed to the technology platform, not the service as the more valuable aspect of the 
business model.  The co-founders were willing to scrap the original business and rebuild the organization 
and the product based on that feedback.  The month after they decided to become a software company, 
they were fortunate enough to be able to hire an engineer who was completing his masters who had 
interned for one of the co-founders a couple years prior.  As one co-founder expressed it, “it was just 
luck.”  That individual helped build the new ‘tool’ and now manages 10 other engineers. 
 
Scope of Action:  Product development initially began with the two original co-founders “debating” the 
issues but one actually “leading the charge.”  With growth in the organization and the customer base, the 
co-founders have enabled a broad group of stakeholders to influence this activity through multiple means, 
including the use of technology.  Limited resources, competing and growing demands, as well as a desire 
to maintain value for clients and the company has resulted in a more formalized structure to process the 
increasing sources of input through online voting systems, prioritization and justification of requests, and 
a dedicated manager to oversee product management.  For example one manger explained how one 
internal system works, “[A]ll the sale people get together and we come up with the top 10 things we’d like 
to see and then from there we have to explain and justify why we think this thing is important.”  He noted 
that every department in the organization has the opportunity to come up with 10 things and then 
“negotiate” which features get added to the product.  Indeed, even customer input goes through a 
process of justification where requests for product features must benefit most and not only a few.  Thus, 
while there has been an increasing number of stakeholders involved in this activity, decisions have 
become increasingly bound by more formalized systems for process input from those stakeholders.  But 
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in the end, as one manager involved in product development explained, “ [I]t’s not going to be the end of 
the world if you screw something up.” 
 
Outcome:  One senior manager attributed the rise of the young venture from “a blip on the radar to one 
of the major names” in the industry largely to “the quality of our product, obviously.”  Broadening 
stakeholder engagement, both internal and external, in product development, while closely managing the 
structure around it, including being specific as to exactly who has a stake in this activity (“we never listen 
to prospects”), contributed to the emergence of the young venture. 
 
Customer Acquisition 
Initial conditions:  In the beginning, the co-founders presented their business concept to anyone who 
would listen.  Although they encountered people who had an interest in the new service, “[w]e didn’t have 
any existing customers” according to one co-founder.  It wasn’t until after they went through the process 
of trying to sell the service to prospective clients, did they realize that “the product we had built was more 
valuable than the service.”  As one co-founder explained, “[W]e made our first major iteration very quickly 
in the business.”  The other co-founder was more blunt, “[A] month after starting that, we scrapped it, 
became a software company, hired a guy who became our lead engineer.” 
 
Instigating Event:  The fourth hire for the reconstituted business was a sales rep brought on in the last 
quarter of 2007 to start selling the product.  They building the customer base would be a challenge.  As 
one co-founder admits, “It was so early in our market.” 
 
Drivers:  The efforts to build the customer base of this new venture were driven by three goals.  First, the 
company has had to create awareness in the market and demand for the product.  The consensus in the 
company was that when they launched the product in 2007, they were “a little bit early.”  Even in 2011, 
the sales reps have to explain what the product does and “the market is still a market for early adopters.”  
One manager framed it this way, “[P]eople don’t know they can’t live without this stuff and they don’t know 
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that it gives them a competitive advantage…we’re working to over come that….we’re doing our part to 
educate the market.”   
 
Second, the new venture has had to identify the appropriate customer for their product, a customer that 
will add value to the business and not diminish value.  According to one manager, “[w]e’ve just refined our 
focus over a span of a few years.”  The company has found that not every customer or prospective 
customer is a good long-term fit.  In fact, another manager explained,”[I]f we know someone is not a good 
fit, then there are times when we have recommended other products.”  One co-founder explained this 
disciplined approach as follows, “[E]ven if, let's say Microsoft said we'll sign up but you have to do ‘this.’  
Well, you know, if it doesn't meet the needs of the rest of our clients, it 'll just sort of ruin the 
product…we'd rather just be opinionated and if for some reason it's not a fit, it's not a fit...as a prospect or 
client, you know that up front.”  Thus, the company has decided not to go after “sexy enterprise clients” 
because “it would completely change who we are.”   
 
Third, the company has attempted to develop a repeatable customer acquisition process from both the 
sales and service side of the business.  Strong mentoring by the sales manager, coupled with an 
aggressive performance management process with specific goals and tracking systems has been put in 
place to.  Sales reps are supported by ongoing education and a central knowledge base that allows them 
to quickly find answers to questions from prospects. In addition, a client services functions has been built 
to ensure “that clients see value early on and then continue to receive the support they need.” This 
includes standardized procedures for client onboarding as well as advocates to handle complaints and 
problems to prevent loss of customers.  Lost deals and lost clients are tracked to improve process for 
customer acquisition and retention. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement:  Customer acquisition involved a multiplicity of stakeholders engaged in a 
variety of ways to shape the young venture.  One co-founder summed up the focus of this activity as 
follows: “[E]very department is a constituent and the clients are the main constituent.”  In the beginning, 
feedback from prospective customers shaped the direction of the new venture.  Because customers are 
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on a month-to-month basis with the venture, customer acquisition has essentially been a continuous 
process based on open communication.  The use of public exchanges allows existing customers to post, 
comment and vote on customer service procedures and product modifications.  For example, the system 
for new client onboarding was a result of client feedback.  Customer feedback is also regularly sought 
through the customer advocates who intervene when there are product issues or a customer is perceived 
to be at risk of leaving.  According to one co-founder, “Our clients love us because we bend over 
backward for them.”   
 
Leads for prospective business are cultivated through word of mouth referrals and by “sponsoring 
communities…websites” where potential customers “hang out.”  Smaller customers allow their names to 
be used as referrals, and as contacts with customers have changed jobs, they have recommended the 
service to their new employers.  One co-founder explained that larger clients, however, generally do not 
want their names being used as referrals.  The sales team converts leads to customers via telephone and 
online demos.  As one manager explained the sales process in place has come a long way:  “[W]e were 
learning on the fly…there were times where I would be on a demo or on a phone call and I’d see an IM 
[instant message] screen pop-up – it was the person who shared a wall with me, [the co-founder who 
oversaw product development] or [the lead engineer]…you should say this or you should say 
that…coaching me on sales… we were learning as we went.”   This “dotted line between sales and 
product” has transformed customer acquisition into a collaborative activity.  All functions have contributed 
to building a knowledge base, “the corporate brain”, that provides the sales function with a quick way to 
respond to questions during sales calls.  And sales uses their customer interactions to create their own 
“top 10” ideas for product development. 
 
Contingency Response:  The new venture has taken advantage of unexpected resources and 
outcomes.  One manager credits the co-founders with “being opportunistic and being able to have a good 
idea and opportunistically staffing around that idea.”  For example, one co-founder explains how they 
hired the current EVP of Sales:  “An amazing VP of Sales that we hired kind of by accident.  We were just 
looking for an entry level sales rep to just bang on the phones and see what works…and was contacted 
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by a guy that had 10 years of sales experience…He was instrumental in developing this [sales] process.”  
The sales process it self early on lead to some “disasters” that the venture converted to learning 
experiences to hone the market for their product.  A manager explains one particular situation as follows: 
“[w]e had the idea that we sell [software]…it makes sense on paper.  We called [a particular customer 
segment]…no one cared…that was a disaster, so we didn’t try it any more.”  From that experience they 
returned to an original assumption they had about the appropriate customers for their product, which 
turned out to be the more effective strategy. 
 
Scope of Action:  This activity has been characterized by (1) management autonomy, (2) willingness to 
experiment, (3) open communication and debate, (4) aggressive performance management and (5) 
customer management.  In essence, a wide scope of action within specific boundaries or structure.  First, 
as functional managers were hired, the co-founders allowed them to shape their domain.  According to 
one manager, “I had to flush out the duties and responsibilities…and it’s definitely changed…just figuring 
out the role and how to make things more efficient.  We have changed a few thins along the way…just 
trying to streamline a few things and often figure out the best way to grow the team.”  Another manager 
explained, “[W]e were learning on the fly…We were learning as we went” and went on to describe the 
willingness of the co-founders to defer to their managers: [T]hey’ve never gotten involved in the sales 
process other than to give true feedback more so to say “How are you doing?”  “How’s the focus?” “What 
should we change?”…but never have they ever said you should definitely do this, this and this.”  Second, 
there is a willingness to try and fail that was evident with this activity.  For example, one manager 
describes his attempts to test new sales strategies as follows: “ [W]e needed to go out and find out how 
sound it was by stepping out and trying something new…after you know a couple weeks of trying that we 
finally said, you know, this is a horrible idea.”  His attitude was, “Fail as fast as you can and so we would.”  
In fact, one co-founder attributed their ability to develop a “repeatable sales process” to the following: “I 
think our theme is: We screw a lot of things up and just learn from it.  And the next time you screw up a 
little bit less and little bit less and a little bit less.”  Third, feedback from all constituents involved in this 
activity was sought and valued.  Input was discussed, debated and prioritized, externally through the 
public exchange and internally, through a separate exchange and “Top 10” lists departments prepare to 
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communicate what they hear from customers.  This input shaped the total customer experience from 
onboarding to product enhancements.   
 
The next two items represent boundaries around actions in this activity.  In order to continue to build the 
customer base and ensure customer gains every month, sales reps agree to specific performance metrics 
upon hiring and are tracked against those metrics.  “Sales is by far the most high churn arm of the 
organization,” but there are no surprises associated with those firings because it is based on results.  In 
one way, performance management is also applied to customers.  One co-founder explains: “Our clients 
love us because we bend over backwards for them, but by the same token we expect them to treat us 
well…so, if we ever have a client that is out of line or rude, they get transferred to me immediately so that 
I can fire them…they get one warning.” In addition, the venture has a policy of not changing the product to 
satisfy one customer at the expense of other customers.   In other words, they do not try “to be all things 
to all people.”  They are specific about their target market; don’t implement product enhancements unless 
it benefits “80% of our clients” and “[w]e never listen to prospects because they want everything.” 
 
Outcome:  According to one co-founder: “A repeatable customer acquisition process does not involve the 
founder or owner of the business.”  As the other co-founder explained: “[I]t took us probably almost the 
end of 2008 before we felt really good about just having a repeatable sales process where we knew if we 
did x, y and z then we’ll get this number of customers…it just came with experience and trying new 
things.”  As a result of setting “nice steady small milestones…there weren’t any near death experiences” 
and the company has been able to build a “predictable cash flow” with “no customer concentrations.”  
Client services has grown into specialized teams each focused on different aspects of the customer 
experience and the sales manager is credited with developing the sales process and mentoring many 
young sales reps to get them “to places they’d never expected to be at this point in their lives. 
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6.12 Findings by Activity and Path Building Dimension: Prospect 	  	  
	  	  	  
Path Building 
Dimensions  Activity 1: Capital Acquisition Activity 2: Development of Value Proposition Activity 3:Talent Acquisition & Management Activity 4: Product Development Activity 5: Customer Acquisition
Initial 
Conditions
• Late 2006 business owner begins search for people 
and capital to develop idea
• College friend with domain expertise engaged as a co-
founder
• They estimate budget to run business for 12 months                                                      
• Business owner (initiating co-founder) trying to solve 
problem in existing business
• Co-founder (college friend with domain expertise) not 
convinced idea would work but believed in ability of 
initiating co-founder
• Initiating co-founder had experience in recruiting for 
startup ventures
• Business owner (initiating co-founder) trying to solve 
problem in existing company
• Business owner and college friend with domain 
expertise developed idea (first two co-founders)
• Idea transformed into a service and launched by a team 
of four co-founders
• Original founding team launched product but could not 
gain customers
• Market input used to quickly change direction of the 
business
• Founding team separated and the original two co-
founders hired a lead developer to build the new product
Instigating 
Event
• Late 2006 concept presented to angel 
investor/technology entrepreneur 
• Angel investor agrees to fund most of estimated capital 
needed for first year 
• Team of four co-founders and one angel investor put 
together to develop and launch original idea
• Original concept presented to potential customers
• Initiating co-founder started building the founding team 
by seeking domain experts
• A chance meeting of a college friend with domain 
expertise lead to development of the idea for the venture 
and a partnership
• Market feedback initiated conversion of original concept 
from service company to software company
• Company reorganized around first two co-founders
• Co-founders hired first employee, an engineer to 
develop technology
• The fourth hire for the reconstituted business was a 
sales rep to begin building the customer base in late 2007
Drivers
• Outside capital as a way to accelerate growth                      
• Propensity for flexibility to experiment, fail and change 
quickly
• Limited capital, limits the extent of disasters
• Concern about the effects institutional funding would 
have on the emergent business
• Feedback from the market was key consideration                
• Co-founders willing to fail fast and change direction if 
market did not accept concept
• Recruiting based on the near term needs of the venture 
in terms of domain expertise and activity being executed
• Recruiting based on maintenance of values and culture 
of the venture
• Continuous gathering of stakeholder feedback
• Modifications that benefit most clients
• Prioritization of modifications due to limited resources
• Cultivate awareness and demand for the emerging 
technology
• Identify the appropriate customers for this emerging 
technology
• Development of a repeatable customer acquisition 
process
Stakeholder 
Engagement
• Initiating co-founder contacted potential investor he 
knew through local technology community
• Angel investor agreed to fund with minimal due 
diligence, based on character and reputation of initiating 
co-founder                                                                                          
• Original angel provided referral to technology expert 
for original founding team, as well as legal advice              
• In 2009 pursued institutional funding through VC’s 
initiating co-founder knew in local community, plus VC’s 
around the country introduced through friends and other 
business relationships                                                             
• Initiating co-founder sought ideas and feedback from co-
founders, local technology community and potential 
customers, including initiating co-founder's other 
business. • Feedback from various stakeholders and 
potential stakeholders changed the direction of the 
business
• Reliance on both network and non-network sources for 
talent
• Internal referrals gradually became most important 
single source of talent
• Co-founders deliberately avoided establishing advisory 
board, choosing instead to seek guidance from mentors 
and peers through informal and formal forums 
• Co-founders provided functional managers with 
autonomy to build and shape their teams
• Concerted effort to create a fun and relaxed 
environment where cross-pollination of teams is 
encouraged and mutual support is expected
• Clear expectations and communication around 
performance in sales function results in firings as well as 
exceptional performance
• Customers and employees from every department 
engaged in product development
• External and internal exchanges established to enable 
continuous input and polling of ideas
• Teams and department managers prioritize and 
negotiate product modifications
• A multiplicity of stakeholders engaged in a variety of 
ways
• Referrals from customers and online advertising and 
sponsorships provide leads to sales team who engages 
with prospects via telephone and online
• All departments contribute to a knowledge base to 
support sales effort 
• Services department built around customer needs from 
onboarding, advocacy to separation
• Customers engaged in product development through 
direct contact and technology that captures feedback
Contingency 
Response
• When within 90 days of formation, feedback on the 
original concept was not positive, the angel investor was 
bought out by initiating co-founder at a premium to 
provide the two remaining co-founders with flexibility to 
experiment and pursue other business options
• Market feedback indicated that value was not in the 
service but the technology that supported the service, so 
the original idea was scrapped, 4 person founding group 
disbanded, angel investor bought out and venture 
reorganized with two co-founders to sell technology
• Key hires attributed to luck and accident such as with 
the chance meeting of an college friend who had the 
right domain expertise, the hiring of the first employee for 
lead engineer who was a former intern in the initiating co-
founder’s other company and who happened to be 
graduating when the need arose, and the hiring of the 
fourth employee for sales rep who was an experienced 
sales professional who happened to be looking to 
relocate and was willing to take a pay cut
• Co-founders noticed a unique culture that had formed 
from the first group of employees and decided it was a 
culture worth preserving so they deliberately structured a 
hiring process around the key attributes of the culture
• Original product did not gain traction in the market, but 
market input and the willingness of the co-founders to fail 
fast enabled the product to be changed quickly and the 
timing allowed them to hire a former intern, who was 
graduating, as their lead developer
• Co-founders originally sought an entry level sales rep as 
their fourth hire, but when contacted by a candidate with 
10 years experience seeking to relocate, they seized the 
opportunity to hire someone who could sell and help build 
the sales function
• The venture attempted to reach customer segments 
outside of their initial market and when those attempts 
failed they quickly defined and redirected efforts to their 
primary customer base
Scope of 
Action
• Co-founders purposively built a network of funding 
sources and deliberately chose not to use outside 
funding
• Autonomy and agility to fail fast and change course as 
needed was preferred despite the challenge of limited 
resources
• Co-founders choose to be a small firm through slower 
growth over scaling rapidly to be a large firm
• Co-founders tested ideas in the market and gathered 
feedback from a variety of sources
• Co-founders reorganized ownership and founding team 
in response to feedback and change in direction
• Recruiting and management of talent began as informal 
processes that transformed to formal recruiting and 
performance management processes in an effort to 
perpetuate the positive aspects of the culture and 
positive growth of the venture
• Within structure processes, a degree of informality in 
policies has remained
• Recruitment of employees was incrementally and 
strategically in all functional areas
• Co-founders demonstrated the willingness and ability to 
downsize or dismantle the organization if the strategy 
was not effective or headcount could not be supported 
• Originally controlled by two co-founders, activity 
eventually engaged a broad range of stakeholders, 
including customers and employees from all departments 
reflecting the co-founders willingness to experiment to 
address market needs
• As stakeholder engagement increased, structures were 
put in place to gather input and allow for polling, 
negotiation and prioritization of modifications
• Boundaries established, including only executing 
modifications that benefitted most clients and not 
incorporating input from prospects
• Co-founders provided sales and customer service 
managers with autonomy tobuild and  shape their 
domains
• Actions reflect a willingness to experiment and 
incorporate the learning from those efforts
• Decision making values feedback from a variety of 
stakeholders, however needs of one customer are not 
valued above the needs of most of the customers and 
unprofessional customers are fired
• Structure and processes enable open communication, 
debate and negotiation within the venture
• Sales team is held to specific and rigorous performance 
targets that if not met result in firing
Outcome
• Co-founders maintained control of decisions and 
growth
• Errors and mistakes were not catastrophic because 
less capital was at risk
• Created potential funding sources and demonstrated 
the ability to raise capital if needed
• Original value proposition not validated by market
• Input from market revealed different value in the 
concept
• Direction of business changed in response to market 
input in terms of both product offering and venture 
organization
• Internal referrals which are more reliable have become 
the most important source of new talent
• Culture has been maintained through a combination of 
a highly structure recruiting process and informal policies 
in a relaxed work environment
• Growth has been maintained through an aggressive 
performance management system that rewards 
exceptional performance and quickly fires those who do 
not meet targets
• Growth has also raised concerns that culture will be 
difficult to maintain in the future
• Stakeholder input changed the product from the original 
business concept
• Broadening stakeholder engagement resulted in 
structures and processes and boundaries around 
modifications
• 2011, the venture hired a product development manager 
specifically to manage and develop this activity
• A repeatable customer acquisition process was 
developed that is not dependent on the co-founders for 
leads
• Small steady milestones and effective sales and service 
processes have created a customer base that is not 
concentrated and generates a predictable cash flow
• Performance management and mentoring have enabled 
sales reps to attain levels of success they did not 
anticipate
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